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For more information about MIND follow the campaign: https://www.caritas.eu/whatishome/

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Dear reader,

In 2015 in his encyclical *Laudato Si’ – On care for our common home* Pope Francis stated that the Earth is “our common home”, and that we need to address economic, social, political and environmental challenges together in an integrated manner. Exclusion and poverty, warfare, global inequalities, climate change, unsustainable consumption and growth – as well as forced displacement and migration – demand our utmost attention and engagement.

With the “Common Home” series, comprising 11 national studies and this European publication, Caritas Europa draws on this message to explore the complex connection between migration and development through the lens of its faith-based ethical framework respectful of human rights and dignity.

In Caritas’ view, under the right conditions, migration can contribute to the integral human development of migrants and of members of both countries of destination and countries of origin. Such a vision implies the recognition that migration, regardless of its drivers, is an opportunity for our societies to build a more prosperous, global “Common Home”, where everyone can make a meaningful contribution and live in dignity.

The aim of the “Common Home” series is to promote a more balanced and evidence-based debate on migration and development at a time when migration has become a deeply contentious issue in Europe. While many citizens show solidarity towards migrants, negative perceptions around migrants and migration are on the rise in Europe. Often grounded in negative messages and fake news, generated and amplified by populist politicians and some media, fear and myths around migrants and migration in general are increasing.

With this publication, the Caritas network wishes, first, to acknowledge the vital contribution of migrants to the development and well-being of our societies. Secondly, Caritas supports the promotion of laws and policies that contribute to integral human development, that foster solidarity and protect human rights and dignity across Europe and globally, leaving no one behind.

In addition to empirical data and existing qualitative and quantitative research, this publication also features the experiences of the Caritas Europa network which is committed to responding to the needs of the most vulnerable populations and contributing solutions to many of today’s societal challenges. Against this backdrop and considering the global outreach of Caritas, we are well placed to witness the many contributions migrants and refugees are making on a daily basis both in Europe and beyond. However, these contributions require opportunities and structures that can help foster everyone’s integral human development and protect their human rights and dignity, a main finding in this publication.

I would like to sincerely thank everyone who contributed to this important research: the Caritas members involved in the MIND project, the action group members, the researchers, the regions and last but not least my great and dedicated colleagues in the European secretariat without whom the finalisation of this report would not have been possible. I hope that this evidence-based publication will lead both to needed structural and attitudinal changes for the common good and towards improving the lives of the very people we serve.

Maria Nyman, Secretary General, Caritas Europa
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the last few years, migration has deeply polarised public debate in Europe. While the record number of migrant arrivals has considerably dropped since 2017, the ensuing political and social crisis in Europe remains today. It is in this climate, fraught with tensions and mistrust, that Caritas Europa launched a renewed reflection on the complex interconnections between migration and development, both in Europe and overseas, in order to promote a more balanced debate.

As described in Chapter 1, this publication is based on the findings, testimonies and good practices of 11 Common Home studies, covering Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany (Bavaria), Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden, and on the analysis of European and international statistical databases and the review of secondary literature. Caritas approaches migration and development from two angles. On the one hand, it analyses the extent to which migration itself does and may contribute to sustainable development in countries of origin and destination. On the other hand, it examines the extent to which European and Member State policies and practices, both internally and externally, contribute to the integral human development of people and the sustainable development of countries in Europe and beyond. A critical assessment of what has been done and what should be done in these domains in order to create structures and policies that foster integral human development and that support the development potential of migration are also presented in this publication.

As detailed in Chapter 1, Caritas uses a broad understanding of migration, inclusive of all those who are refugees and applicants for international protection as well as migrant workers and members of their families. As regards development, Caritas views it as the long-term process of building up community and household social and economic capacities in a sustainable manner, in order to eradicate poverty and vulnerability, and to promote social justice. Key to Caritas’ vision is the concept of integral human development, which places the human person at the centre of the development process. Integral human development is defined as an all-embracing approach that takes into consideration the well-being of the person and of all people in seven different dimensions: 1) social, 2) work, 3) ecological, 4) political, 5) economic, 6) cultural, and 7) spiritual.

In Caritas’ view, migration remains linked to poverty inasmuch as poverty is understood as not only economic poverty, but also encompasses exclusion or the lack of opportunities to participate in society or to access decent work, good governance, education and healthcare, freedom of expression and participation, or the ability to avoid the consequences of climate change. Caritas thus supports the view that there is no proven correlation between poverty eradication and reduction of migration, and further contends that although some of the drivers of migration need to be addressed to support the long-term development of the countries, poverty reduction is in itself not a migration-reducing strategy. For Caritas, the solution therefore is to facilitate integral human development. Both people who migrate and those who remain - whether in country of origin or in country of residence - have the right to find wherever they call home the economic, political, environmental and social conditions to live in dignity and to achieve a full life. Hence, rather than focus on stopping human mobility, governments should prioritise development policies that create environments, enabling people to achieve their full potential, their life project, their integral human development.

1 The national Common Home studies highlight how migrants contribute to integral human development in different European countries and in migrants’ countries of origin. Each study also identifies specific barriers and obstacles, as well as opportunities and promising practices that affect migrants’ ability to contribute to integral human development in the place where they settled and their place of origin. The national studies draw on extensive empirical data, national literature reviews and cross-sectional expert stakeholder reviews.
Contributions to countries of destination

There are multiple ways in which migration and migrants contribute to integral human development in countries of destination and in Europe more generally, as described in Chapter 2. With respect to the economy, in all countries under review migrants play a crucial role through employment, job creation and innovation. This is particularly important in countries with strong emigration and negative demographic trends (Bulgaria, Slovakia, Portugal, and Italy) but also in more dynamic countries such as Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden. In most countries, migrants are overwhelmingly present in low-skilled sectors (agriculture, construction, manufacturing, small-scale commerce), but their presence in high-skilled and high-tech domains (research, IT, medical professions) is growing. Migrant entrepreneurship is vital to create new services and consumption demands. Contrary to popular perceptions, which generally focus on remittances leaving European countries, all the countries object of the Common Home studies receive significant financial inflows. In the case of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia and Portugal, more money is remitted in the country by emigrants than sent out by immigrants, contributing to economic growth and sustaining local consumption. Migrants generally also contribute to social protection systems more than what they take, defying the common perception of migrants as free-riders and welfare exploiters. Regarding cultural and societal impact, this publication highlights several domains and ways in which migrants enrich European societies, from gastronomy to arts and literature, from sports to music. Such impacts are more marked in older countries of immigration, such as in Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, and Germany, but they begin to be visible in Italy, Portugal, as well as in Eastern European countries. Political contributions remain fairly limited overall due to the sometimes difficult requirements for obtaining citizenship and voting rights.

Barriers in countries of destination

In spite of these notable contributions, migrants frequently face challenges in realising their full potential. Chapter 2 identifies a number of barriers that threaten migration’s development potential and have a negative effect on European commitment to facilitating integral human development in Europe. For instance, within the context of Europe, rising public hostility and negative attitudes towards migrants and migration, fuelled by irresponsible, populist politicians and often the media, has led to an impasse both at national and European levels, blocking pro-migrant legislative actions. This divisive rhetoric has legitimised attacks on migrants’ rights, the criminality of solidarity, as well as discriminatory practices across Europe. It seems in current public debate that any contributions migrants make are either undervalued or ignored. Furthermore, many of the barriers that inhibit the development potential of migration and migrants in countries of destination typically relate to the overall insufficient economic, social, cultural and political inclusion of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. As described in Chapter 2, examples of these barriers include: a lack of access to and inclusion in the labour market; a lack of access to social provisions; limited social participation and political inclusion; and partial rejection or fear of migrants’ perceived “otherness”. In allowing discrimination, in creating social and economic marginalisation, in pushing people ‘outside of the system’, and in breeding resentment amongst newcomers, certain policies and practices ultimately contribute to weakening the potential of migration to contribute to the sustainable development of Europe. Additional EU-level barriers are identified, including the securitisation of migration; insufficient progress on legal migration; insufficient protection of the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants; stalled reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS); and concerns about EU funding goals and priorities on migration, asylum and integration in the upcoming MFF.

Opportunities in countries of destination

Against these barriers, there are also many positive experiences. Chapter 2 outlines some of the main opportunities identified in the countries of destination object of the 11 Common Home studies that facilitate migrants’ integral human development in Europe. General opportunities based on existing legal frameworks for the protection of the rights of migrants and refugees is one example. Another is building on new policy frameworks such as Agenda 2030, the Global Compact on Migration, and the Urban Agenda. Others include practices fostering social and inter-cultural dialogue, integration policies and practices at work, policies and practices fostering the social inclusion of migrants, and practices that seek to foster the participation of migrants and/or of migrant and diaspora organisations in social and political affairs.
Contributions to countries of origin

In the same way as migrants contribute to countries of destination, they also make important contributions to countries of origin outside of Europe, as described in Chapter 3. This is most visible in the growing flow of remittances to countries of origin, which may be used by migrants’ households for productive activities as well as for sustaining household consumption patterns or fulfilling basic necessities (education, healthcare, and food). But it does not stop there. Migrants, individually and collectively, also promote development in countries of origin through ‘social remittances’ – e.g. skills - and knowledge transfer. In addition, migrant and diaspora organisations also engage in some international cooperation activities, often in partnership with the private sector and/or local civil society and with the support of the institutions of the country of destination.

Barriers in countries of origin

Despite these contributions, a number of key barriers limit the development potential of migration and migrants overseas, as is described in Chapter 3. The barriers limiting the development potential of migration in this publication mainly refer to Europe’s lack of commitment on opening regular migration channels, insufficient progress on African regional mobility, the lack of enabling environments (including high cost of remittances) in countries of origin, and only limited involvement of diaspora/migrant groups in development processes. The challenges to achieving sustainable development focus instead on the barriers limiting the added value of European ODA, including, among others, the inflation and securitisation of aid, mainstreaming of migration in development policy, the lack of policy coherence, and the problematic role of the private sector. Ironically, some of these policies - including on trade, security, climate change or migration management, among others, - rather than addressing the ‘root causes’ and reducing migration to Europe, actually contribute to creating the conditions for increasing irregular migration movements. Ultimately, these challenges are found to inhibit migrants’ integral human development. Some other barriers include insufficient progress on African regional mobility, the lack of enabling environments (including high cost of remittances) in countries of origin, and the still limited involvement of diaspora/migrant groups in development processes in countries of origin.

Opportunities in countries of origin

Nevertheless, opportunities for migrants’ development potential to flourish in countries of origin, as well as to ensure that European governments and institutions contribute to sustainable development both in Europe and beyond, are also identified. Chapter 3 underscores the potential policy and practical opportunities that may promote and foster sustainable development and enhance the development potential of migration in countries of origin outside of Europe. With respect to the first aspect, this chapter reiterates the importance of Agenda 2030 to guide the EU’s external action, but also adds the Policy Coherence frameworks, the EU-ACP and MFF negotiations, as well as virtuous practices in private sector engagement. With respect to enhancing the role of migration in development, Chapter 3 also underlines the potential of the Global Compact on Migration, the Global Skills Partnership of Migration, the strengthening of African regional mobility as well as innovative projects on diaspora involvement in development processes. Moreover, some lessons to be learnt from NGOs’ and other organisations’ promising practices on the ground are described.

Ultimately, the combination of these various dimensions (i.e. the internal vs. external, country of destination vs. country of origin, barrier vs. opportunity) exemplify the interconnection between migration and development - both in policy and in practice on the ground. This alludes to the complexity of the so-called nexus between migration and development and leads to the conclusions and identification of five main findings, described below and presented in Chapter 4, that are the result of a deeper analysis of the commonalities in the 11 national Common Home studies identified as key concerns in all the countries.

Main findings

1 A longer-term, global approach to migration is needed that includes inclusive integration models, while also taking seriously the concerns of native populations.

Integration and broader social policies are key policy domains that influence the role of migration in contributing to sustainable development and migrants’ ability to realise their integral human development. Moreover, EU institutions actually have a mandate to provide incentives and to support Member State actions aimed toward promoting the integration of third-country nationals (European Commission website, n.a.a). Promoting the inclusion of migrants and refugees through robust integration policies is essential, not only for unlocking the full potential of migration but also for pursuing a sustainable development agenda universally. Member
States nevertheless continue to face numerous setbacks toward achieving this. One major challenge is the perceived competition between marginalised local populations and the visible migrant population supposedly competing for scarce material resources. This situation is more broadly linked to structural changes taking place both in Europe and globally, from the casualisation of work and the restructuring of economic production (delocalisation, sub-contracting, etc.) to the retreat of the welfare state in many European countries, as described in Chapter 2. These structural changes have had devastating effects on the well-being of many Europeans. Consequently, the politicisation of migration in the European context and the obsession with fighting against irregular migration is generally contributing to eroding the rights of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers as they become the easy scapegoats for all the societal ills. For migration to truly be seen as a driver in this recent policy agenda of the European Union and its Member States. In particular, the Union’s preoccupation with securing its external borders, and eliminating or at least ‘containing’ irregular migration from outside Europe, have questioned the added value and relevance of Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a tool of European foreign policy, ODA remains the primary tool through which both the European Union and its Member States can address poverty, social and economic inequalities and climate change, all major issues of our time. When responding to the needs and priorities of partner countries, if channelled to relevant domains (economic sustainable development, good governance, conflict prevention, access to food security, human rights, democratisation, and so forth), and when involving local stakeholders (including civil society), ODA can in fact play a major role towards achieving sustainable development worldwide. Unfortunately, however, worrisome trends of inflation, diversion and securitisation of European development assistance (backed by other research) identified public hostility, xenophobia and violence targeting migrants and refugees as a major barrier hampering migrants’ integral human development, both at the national and European levels. The toxic mix of populist nationalist politics, negative and biased media messaging and frustrated public opinion – much of which has been hurt by years of economic crisis, neoliberal labour and social policies, and the downsizing of the welfare state – has produced a vicious cycle in public debates that is difficult to break and requires a strong counter-narrative.

It is therefore important that the media, journalists, politicians and public figures take seriously their responsibility to contextualise migration accurately and responsibly. It should be stressed that migrants are people and members of our communities. They should never be described in terms of numbers, figures, as ‘problems’ or as subjects in newscasts. They should be given the opportunity to speak for themselves, to voice their own stories and to present their own testimonies, while, if they wish, also engaging in policy development and in proposing solutions. Also, highlighting publically some opportunities associated with migration could further help.

#### Rising hostility towards migrants erodes social cohesion in Europe and inhibits the recognition of migrants’ contributions to countries of destination and countries of origin.

In the age of social media and post-truth politics, exploiting media sensationalism and online disinformation, irresponsible populist politicians and governments have instrumentalised migration to gain popular support and to win national and local elections. In the current polarised political climate, migrants and refugees are invariably framed as a problem, either as a threat to European economy, identity or security or, at best, as passive victims in need of help, with the result that their contributions to European development are dramatically undervalued. Moreover, the Common Home studies (backed by other research) identified public hostility, xenophobia and violence targeting migrants and refugees as a major barrier hampering migrants’ integral human development, both at the national and European levels. The toxic mix of populist nationalist politics, negative and biased media messaging and frustrated public opinion – much of which has been hurt by years of economic crisis, neoliberal labour and social policies, and the downsizing of the welfare state – has produced a vicious cycle in public debates that is difficult to break and requires a strong counter-narrative.

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#### The value of ODA has been compromised as a result of the instrumentalisation of aid and the EU’s security and migration control priorities. Instead, ODA must be preserved as the EU’s and its Member States’ primary tool for addressing poverty.

Although voices from different sides of the political spectrum have questioned the added value and relevance of Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a tool of European foreign policy, ODA remains the primary tool through which both the European Union and its Member States can address poverty, social and economic inequalities and climate change, all major issues of our time. When responding to the needs and priorities of partner countries, if channelled to relevant domains (economic sustainable development, good governance, conflict prevention, access to food security, human rights, democratisation, and so forth), and when involving local stakeholders (including civil society), ODA can in fact play a major role towards achieving sustainable development worldwide. Unfortunately, however, worrisome trends of inflation, diversion and securitisation of European aid have been emerging, as identified in Chapter 3. There is also a problematic role of the private sector in further eroding the potential of ODA in pursuing a sustainable development agenda and increasingly, development policy is being directly linked to short-term migration-reduction objectives. The anti-immigrant climate described above has clearly been a key driver in this recent policy agenda of the European Union and its Member States. In particular, the Union’s preoccupation with securing its external borders, and eliminating or at least ‘containing’ irregular migration from outside Europe, seem to have overridden almost all other concerns related to the protection of migrants’ and refugees’ rights, and the preservation of development cooperation as an instrument exclusively devoted to eradicating poverty. European development policy should not be used as a migration-reduction strategy as this is a very short-sighted approach likely to backfire and it risks undermining the potential long-term benefits of development aid. If Europe wishes to retain its global role as a value- and principle-based international actor, and ensure that official development-based international assistance leads to meaningful poverty reduction, ODA should remain a cornerstone of European external action, and should not be influenced by other foreign policy objectives.
The integral human development of migrants and their human dignity is being compromised due to other contradictory foreign policy objectives of the EU and its Member States.

The EU and its Member States (to varying degrees) pursue numerous practices that may compromise their development objectives and actually contribute to harming the pursuit of sustainable development for countries and people outside of Europe. Examples of this are evident, for instance, relative to policies on trade, agriculture, tax regimes, military and security, environment and asylum. Such policies can easily come into conflict with development policies and undermine the positive role played by development aid and development cooperation more generally. Moreover, in certain cases, these policies and additional practices (i.e. arms sales, land grabbing, exploitation of natural resources, etc.), can contribute to exacerbating the conditions - such as wide social and economic inequalities, conflict, and climate change - that drive forced migration and displacement, and can thus contribute to creating the conditions for increasing irregular migration movements to Europe. This tends to further compromise relations with development partners in the Global South, as described in Chapter 3. For instance, Europe’s lack of commitment on expanding regular migration channels has so far embittered relations with African partners on migration cooperation. These trends and the resulting contradictory policies and actions are worrisome, because they show an utter disrespect of Policy Coherence for Development and fail to put the person at the centre of the policy or to foster an atmosphere that enables and fosters integral human development.

While the EU has tried to tackle the lack of policy coherence through the establishment of Policy Coherence for Development, numerous inconsistencies in interpretation and in practice remain, resulting in a rather ineffective translation of PCD at the operational level. The simple result is that there is no clarity or consensus among institutional stakeholders concerning the EU’s commitment towards developing countries. Greater effort is clearly needed for the EU and its Member States to ensure that their policies cause no harm to developing countries and bring about a positive contribution to their sustainable development. In a context in which the EU’s obligations regarding PCD remain ambiguous and in which PCD is at times applied in reverse (development at the service of other policy areas) and where mobility is framed as security-related, it is clear that political will remains a decisive factor in determining the effectiveness of PCD, as defined in the Lisbon Treaty.

Migration is a natural part of life. Opportunities must be assured so that people are not forced to migrate out of desperation, but rather via safe and legal channels in pursuit of their personal ‘life projects’.

Migration and mobility in a broader sense compose a universal feature of humanity. Since the beginning of time, people have been on the move - migrating. This is not expected to stop soon; on the contrary, greater mobility is expected in the future. Migrants are often resilient and have agency, meaning they – depending on their situations and financial means – can choose how to respond to life’s circumstances, i.e. whether (with whom and when) to flee their country. Expectations of substantially impacting this process through development cooperation is not only naive and likely to fail; regardless of the efforts put in place to deter, stop, or prevent migration movements, desperate people will find a way around the fences, and will continue to risk their lives along dangerous routes. If any meaningful connection between ODA and migration is to be made, then this should be to ensure that development policy contributes to making migration a choice rather than a necessity – keeping in mind that, as discussed in Chapter 1, development is likely to reduce (but will never completely stop) economically-motivated migration over the long term. Thus, in order to truly maximise the benefits of international migration, regular migration should be strengthened by giving people from all skill levels, education, and economic backgrounds the chance to move in a safe and legal manner between their countries of origin and destination.

Overall, the lesson for policy makers and communities is to create a virtuous circle on migration and development based upon the following logic: 1) on the one hand, migration, as with many other life choices made by human beings, is a potential opportunity for sustainable development of all countries and communities, and needs to be facilitated with measures ensuring the dignity and rights of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers; 2) on the other hand, the development agenda should be primarily concerned with fostering sustainable development in Europe and beyond for the benefit of everyone, ensuring that migration largely remains a choice and not a desperate necessity. The findings of this publication confirm that given the right structures and legal opportunities, states should build on the potential of migration to contribute not only to the integral human development of migrants and their families, but also to communities, as well as to the sustainable development of their countries of origin, transit and destination.
Main recommendations

In addition to these main findings, essential recommendations are also presented in Chapter 5 that target EU level policy makers in the European Commission, Parliament and Council, and where applicable, also the Council of Europe. These have been summarised according to the three categories below:

1. **Change the negative discourse on migration, counter rising hostility and harmful attitudes toward migrants and migration.**

Caritas calls on the European Union and its Member States to promote an evidence-based and nuanced debate on migration and development. In order to do that, it is essential to: emphasise the important role of migrants and migration’s contribution to development both in countries of origin and destination; fight misinformation and disinformation through evidence-based research as well as stories and testimonies, including via EU-wide awareness-raising campaigns; and foster a culture of encounter and exchange around migration.

2. **Maximise the development potential of migration and enhance migrants’ integral human development in countries of destination.**

Caritas calls on the European Union and its Member States to prioritise fair migration policies and robust integration and social inclusion policies in order to maximise the integral human development potential of migrants in Europe. Such policies should lead, with respect to migration, to the expansion of safe and legal pathways to Europe for protection, including for employment and family reunification purposes, as well as to a reform of the existing Common European Asylum System. In relation to integration, the creation of structures and practices that allow the full and active participation of migrant communities in society should be supported, in particular by ensuring equality of treatment and non-discrimination, facilitating labour market inclusion, and guaranteeing access to basic social and economic rights and opportunities for all. Overall, migration, integration and social policies should ensure that the human dignity of all, including of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are protected and respected. Building on existing global and European frameworks, such as human rights instruments and conventions, as well as new policy tools such as Agenda 2030, and the Global Compact on Migration should be used as key tools to support these policy directions.

3. **Maximise the development potential of migration, enhance opportunities for migrants to be able to contribute to integral human development and sustainable development in countries of origin, and ensure a virtuous circle between migration and development.**

Caritas calls on the European Union and its Member States to promote policies that enhance, rather than limit the potential of migration to contribute to sustainable development in countries of origin and outside of Europe. For this reason, ODA must primarily be used to tackle issues such as poverty, structural inequalities, and lack of good governance and should be based on actual recipients’ needs and development strategies. European development cooperation should abstain from mainstreaming migration-reduction objectives across its programming, and from using aid as a leverage to secure concessions on migration management and control; rather it should invest resources in mitigating the scope and consequences of forced displacement (driven by conflict, environmental disasters, extreme poverty, and persecution). European institutions should place respect for human rights at the core of all partnerships with third countries, and ensure that their external policies – including those that do not respond to a development agenda – do not harm existing development opportunities in developing countries (such as for example regional mobility across Africa). Again, Agenda 2030, the Global Compact on Migration, existing Policy Coherence frameworks as well as innovative projects on labour migration should also be sources for providing promising tools to advocate for these actions.

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2 For national level recommendations, please refer to the 11 national Common Home studies: https://www.caritas.eu/common-home-series/
Over the last few years, migration has deeply polarised public debate in Europe. This debate, which has revived across Europe since the 1990s, has been exacerbated by the European financial crisis of 2007-08. In a context of growing socio-economic inequalities and social tensions, the mediatised arrival of migrants and refugees between 2014 and 2016 has exposed deep political rifts in Europe. An outpouring of solidarity by ordinary European citizens, expressed in mass mobilisation and day-to-day social support to asylum seekers, has been countered by the spread of anti-immigrant protests and negative rhetoric, often channelled by the media and populist politicians. While the record number of arrivals of migrants in irregular situation had considerably dropped by 2017, the ensuing political and social crisis in Europe remains today. Across Europe, migrants are scapegoated for stealing jobs, for free riding on social security systems or for aggravating the persisting economic crises. They are also often blamed for threatening European identity and values and contributing to Europe’s moral decay.

It is evident that this anti-immigrant climate has been a key driver in the policy agenda of the European Union and its Member States. In particular, the Union’s preoccupation with securing its external borders, and eliminating or at least ‘containing’ irregular migration from outside Europe, have overridden all other concerns related to migrant integration, the promotion of safe and legal channels, and the protection of the rights of migrants and refugees, both in Europe and while on the move. Besides human rights concerns, such an approach also threatens Europe’s overall economic viability and social cohesion in the context of changing demographics, labour needs and production technologies. In their external action, under the objective of addressing the so-called ‘root causes of irregular migration’, the EU and its Member States have increasingly framed development policy and international cooperation with third countries as short-term tools to address and reduce migratory pressure – at the expense of long-term strategic objectives, such as the reduction of inequality and the eradication of poverty.1 Aware of the fact that many people reaching Europe irregularly would be potentially eligible for asylum, the European Council has also recently discussed how to outsource European obligations on refugee protection to neighbouring regions and transit countries, for example, via the idea of ‘regional disembarkation platforms’.

It is in this context that the Caritas network deems it necessary to launch a renewed reflection on the complex interconnections between migration and development. Public opinion, politicians and policy-makers have forgotten the key role that migration and migrants have always played in development worldwide, both in countries of destination and in countries of origin. In doing so, ironically, they have also conveniently overlooked the centuries-old experience of their own ancestors, particularly from the poorest regions of Southern and Eastern Europe, who left their countries and, in many cases, were able to find a better life in other countries and continents. Moreover, they have downplayed the fact that migration, particularly across Europe, is also driven by strong demand for labour and skills, and not only a matter of ‘push factors’ in countries and regions of origin. As a result, the current negative European rhetoric is challenging the legitimacy of migration as a ‘life project’ altogether. Even more worrying, it is undermining key principles such as the respect of human rights and human dignity, but also of solidarity, openness and inclusion towards those most disadvantaged – all of which are key preconditions for fostering integral human development.

Such a self-centred narrative, almost exclusively concerned with managing migration to Europe, has also failed to acknowledge that migration is truly a global phenomenon. Regional and south-south migrations are a far larger phenomenon than

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1 Ironically, both of these are Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), namely SDG 1 (end poverty) and SDG 10 (reduce inequalities), and the universal achievement of these goals is foreseen by 2030.
Europe-bound international migration and play a huge role in the development processes of these places. While more than three quarters of international migrants come from developing countries, the majority of them move to another developing country, rather than to the Global North. At the same time, the top five countries hosting the largest number of refugees and asylum seekers are all outside Europe and the ‘Western’ world. However, it is also clear that to recognise the role of migrants and migration in development does not equate with stating that the relation is always positive and benefiting everyone. Migration can be motivated by a lack of structural development in countries of origin and may result more from desperate necessity than free choice. Migration can also have negative consequences for the development of migrants, their families and societies in the countries of origin, for example, by undermining family unity and cohesion or by encouraging ‘brain drain’. Even when migrants make ‘development’ contributions to countries of destination, for example, by participating in their economies, this participation can hardly qualify as ‘real’ development if migrants are victims of labour exploitation or lack decent working conditions. These situations, therefore, call for a reflection on migration and development that firstly recognises the importance of ensuring that migration remains a choice and secondly links migration to an understanding of development that benefits everyone. Being aware of those complexities is today all the more necessary for policy-makers to ensure they undertake a balanced and evidence-based approach to migration.

This European publication presents the various ways in which migration and development are interconnected, both in Europe and overseas. The publication is based on the analysis of European and international statistical databases, the review of secondary literature, including academic and policy papers, analytical reports, publications on migration and development by international organisations, as well as news reports and online publications. It is also based on the findings, testimonies and good practices of 11 national Common Home studies, covering Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany (Bavaria), Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden. This European publication provides a critical assessment of what has been done and what should be done in the domains of migration and development with a focus on European Union competencies in order to create structures and policies that foster integral human development.

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2 The Common Home studies highlight how migrants contribute to integral human development in different European countries and in migrants’ countries of origin. Each study also identifies specific barriers and obstacles, as well as opportunities and promising practices that affect migrants’ ability to contribute to integral human development in the place where they settled and their place of origin. The national studies draw on extensive empirical data, national literature reviews and cross-sectional expert stakeholder reviews.
1.2. Structure of the publication

This chapter presents an introduction to the publication and includes the objectives, a brief overview of the current academic and policy debate on migration and development, as well as Caritas Europa’s vision, values and principles on these issues. Relying on the findings of the 11 national Common Home studies and additional desk research, Chapters 2 and 3 examine the interconnections between migration and development both in terms of policy and actions on the ground. Both chapters show the role that migration can play in fostering integral human development in Europe and elsewhere. The chapters also identify challenges and opportunities towards the realisation of integral human development for all (migrants and communities in countries of origin and destination) and of the sustainable development of countries.

Chapter 2 focuses on migration and development in the context of Europe, that is, countries of destination. The chapter begins by presenting examples of how migration and migrants contribute to their own development and that of European countries. It then outlines main challenges, barriers, opportunities and promising practices at both national and European levels that affect the extent of such contributions. Chapter 3 focuses on migration and development in the contexts outside Europe, that is, of countries of origin (and transit), with sub-Saharan Africa as a major reference region. Along similar lines, this chapter also identifies barriers and challenges, along with opportunities, that affect the ability of migration and migrants themselves to contribute to the development of countries of origin and of developing countries more generally.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of the findings of the publication while Chapter 5 provides a set of recommendations to European and Member State policy-makers. Chapter 4 broadly considers what types of challenges and opportunities affect the migration-development process and identifies a series of structural changes needed to foster an enabling environment for migrants to be recognised for their contributions to society. Chapter 5 concludes with a set of recommendations, framed within Caritas’ vision and values and existing standards in international law.

The present publication was researched and drafted by a team of researchers including the staff of Global Migration Policy Associates (GMPA) and a few colleagues in the Caritas Europa Secretariat (CE-S). The Caritas global network was involved in the process of reviewing the publication draft at different stages of completion. Reviewers included national members of Caritas Europa, such as MIND project partners and MIND Steering Committee as well as other Caritas organisations that are part of the expert-based Caritas Europa Action Groups on Sustainable Development Goals (AG SDGs), on Migration and Asylum (AG MaA), and on Social Inclusion and Integration (SIE AG) as well as Caritas’ Advocacy Steering Group. Members of Caritas’ global family – the Caritas Internationalis Secretariat, the regional Caritas secretariats of Africa and the Middle East and North Africa (MONA) regions – were also consulted on the drafting of this publication to ensure that the concerns from the Global South are as equally reflected as those of Europe.

1.3. Definitions and understandings of migration and development

For Caritas, a human-centred, ethical and rights-based approach is fundamental to law, to policy, and to all practice. Thus, an ethical interpretation of the relation between migration, development and the human person is essential to frame the vision and the objectives of the European “Common Home” publication. Caritas’ vision, actions and views are rooted in existing legal and political instruments and sources, as well as in Catholic Social Teaching (CST). These values and teachings have, in common with international legal instruments, an affirmation of human dignity, equality of all, and inalienability of human rights as key moral principles to ensure the peaceful coexistence and basic well-being of all persons and peoples on this planet. These include: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and eight fundamental United Nations human rights covenants and conventions;3 the 1951 Refugee Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; and the International Labour Standards defining principles and rights for decent work, and for Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter. These normative instruments are complemented by globally defined policy frameworks, namely the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the New Urban Agenda. Also, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)

and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) provide relevant policy guidance. Catholic Social Teaching (CST), the doctrine developed by the Catholic Church on matters of social and economic justice, and fundamental Christian values are the foundation for Caritas' views and actions.

Human rights can be defined as protection for individuals and groups, guaranteed under international law, against interferences with fundamental freedoms and human dignity. Human rights are inalienable and cannot be denied to or relinquished by any human being, regardless of any reason including legal or immigration status. They are universal in that they apply to everyone, everywhere. Human rights encompass civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, and are indivisible, meaning that the different sets of rights are all equally important for the full development of human beings and their individual well-being.6 Human rights instruments and customary international law generate three overarching obligations for states, namely: to respect, to protect, and to fulfil these rights.

1.3.1. Defining migration

Migration is a major feature of today’s globalised world as well as a complex and varied phenomenon. People often move inside their countries of birth, for example, from the countryside to urban areas or from one city to another.5 But many others also travel across international borders to go to work and live in other countries. People may move within a region, often between neighbouring countries, but also decide to migrate to another continent. Journeys can be long and fragmented, and often include several of these migratory stages (FAO IFAD IOM WFP 2018).

In broad terms, migration is the movement of people from one place of residence to another. For some, this term can be interchangeable with the concept of ‘human mobility’.6 While the term migration is very broad and also covers population movement internal to a country – rural to urban or from one locality to another in a different jurisdiction, this report specifically addresses international migration. International migration is a distinct legal, political and social category, as people move from a nation state in which they are a citizen, with the rights and protections citizenship normally confers, to other countries where rights and protections of nationality, of access to social protection, and of common identity often do not apply and where social and cultural paradigms may be significantly different.

While there is no international normative definition for migration, international conventions provide agreed definitions for refugees and for migrant workers and members of their families; the latter is applicable to nearly all international migrants. The definition of a refugee in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees is: "someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion." All EU Member States have ratified both the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.

The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW) states that: “The term ‘migrant worker’ refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national.” That Convention recognises frontier worker, seasonal worker, seafarer, offshore worker, itinerant worker, and other specific categories of migrant workers as covered under its provisions. The ICRMW iterates that all basic human rights cover family members present with and dependent on migrant workers. Data from the International Labour Organization (ILO) shows that nearly all international migrants, whatever their reasons for migration or admission, end up economically active – employed, self-employed or otherwise engaged in remunerative activity.

Specific definitions and statistical standards to obtain reliable and comparable data on international migrants have been agreed under UN auspices and are used by most governments. For statistical purposes, an international migrant is defined as a person who is living in a country other than his or her country of birth (UNDESA 2017a:3). The United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, Revision 1 (1998) associated the definition of an international migrant with the concept of country of usual residence, that is, an international migrant is “any person who changes his or

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4 This is according to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993.
5 Internal migration represents the overwhelming majority of human mobility. While international migrants represent about 3% of the world’s population, it was suggested that at least 10% had moved internally (FAO IFAD IOM WFP 2018).
6 According to Caritas members in the Africa region, “human mobility encompasses all types of migration, displacement and human trafficking” (Caritas Africa 2019:16).
7 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW).
her country of usual residence” (UNDESA 1998: 9). For an accurate analysis of the interconnectedness of migration and development, Caritas uses a broad understanding of migration, inclusive of all those who are refugees and applicants for international protection as well as migrant workers and members of their families.

The above-mentioned definitions and understandings of migrants and refugees are used throughout the report and also for the purpose of data collection. Nevertheless, Caritas also recognises that such legal categories—as well as the distinction between ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ migration—do not accurately represent the reality of migratory movements on the ground. In theory, people may decide to migrate voluntarily or rather be forced to leave because their physical safety or livelihood is under threat. In practice, the distinction between voluntary and forced migration is often quite blurred (van Hear, Brubaker and Bessa 2009). More generally, “often poverty, inequality and conflict co-exist, so that much migration in many parts of the world is ‘mixed’ in nature, both in terms of motivations and the character of the flows, ...so that [t]he reasons for movement are sometimes as mixed and complex as the people who migrate: those who flee a country where conflict, persecution, discrimination and human rights abuse are rife, for example, may also be trying to escape dire economic circumstances—which themselves feed into such conflict, persecution, discrimination and human rights abuse” (van Hear, Brubaker and Bessa 2009:1).

1.3.2. Defining development

Defining development is a complex task. There is no universally accepted definition and there are a variety of approaches reflecting different political inclinations and sensitivities (for reviews of the concept and various theories see Willis 2011; Peet and Hartwick 2015). Traditionally, development has been largely perceived in economic terms, reflecting the approach of international financial institutions9 or most national governments around the world (Willis 2011). Indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Product (GNP) or Gross National Income (GNI) have been frequently used as measures of development, ranking countries in terms of individual and collective economic wealth (Peet and Hartwick 2015). Reflecting the emergence of a broader understanding of development, non-economic indicators have also become a cornerstone of development over the last three decades. One of the most widely known instruments is the Human Development Index (HDI), which was designed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the 1980s and was incorporated in the UNDP’s annual Human Development Reports from 1990 onwards (Willis 2011). Such an index has shifted the debate from development to human development introducing the concept of capabilities linked to people’s well-being.10 The notion of human development sees development as the process through which people’s choices are widened, particularly when it comes to dimensions such as quality of life (life expectancy and health), knowledge (access to education and literacy) and decent living standards (sufficient income and resources). In this sense, development should therefore be understood as the means of expanding the protection and realisation of human rights for all persons—notably economic, social, and cultural as well as civil and political rights (HRBA Portal n.d.).

More recently, reflecting the growing awareness that social concerns are interconnected with ecological factors, the concept of sustainable development has grown in popularity, particularly in opposition to development paradigms championing ever-expanding economic growth (Blewitt 2018). The concept also links together a number of dimensions, which are all seen as crucial for development: participatory and democratic politics; sustainable and self-reliant economic systems; resilient societies that can deal with imbalances in development; environmentally sustainable production systems; and fair and sustainable international trading and financial systems (Blewitt 2018). Since 2015, with the launch of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),11 the concept has become the cornerstone of global development policy. The Agenda, endorsed by all 193 UN Member States, expresses their shared vision of and commitment to a world of universal respect for the following values and principles: human rights and human dignity, the rule of law, justice, equality and non-discrimination ethnic and cultural diversity, and equal opportunity. All of these are essential for the full realisation of human potential and contributing to shared prosperity—an idea encapsulated in the global pledge of the Agenda 2030 (United Nations 2015) to “leave no one behind.”12

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8 For example, workers of low socio-economic backgrounds, generally considered voluntary migrants, may practically have very limited options other than migrating to secure their livelihoods. On the other hand, quintessential forced migrants such as asylum seekers and refugees, especially upon reaching a place of safety, may want to move elsewhere in search of better social and economic opportunities, effectively transforming into voluntary migrants (Van Hear, Brubaker and Bessa 2009).

9 For example, the World Bank uses Gross National Income per capita (GNI) as its main measure of development, ranking countries in terms of economic wealth.

10 This is based on the capability approach, which is a theoretical framework entailing “two core normative claims: first, the claim that the freedom to achieve well-being is of primary moral importance, and second, that freedom to achieve well-being is to be understood in terms of people's capabilities, that is, their real opportunities to do and be what they have reason to value” (Robeyns 2011).Having been developed in a variety of specific normative theories related, for instance, to (partial) social justice theories or accounts of development ethics, the capability approach has further led to new statistics and social indicators, and a policy paradigm—referred to as the ‘human development approach’—used mainly in development studies (cf. Fukuda-Parr 2009; and Fukuda-Parr and Kumar (eds.) 2009).

11 Resolution by the UN General Assembly 70/1 “Transforming our world: 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” adopted on 25 September 2015.

12 The Sustainable Development Agenda notes that follow-up and review processes at all levels will be guided by the following principles: “They will be people-centred, gender-sensitive, respect human rights and have a particular focus on the poorest, most vulnerable and those furthest behind” (see Resolution by the UN General Assembly 70/1 “Transforming our world: 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” adopted on 25 September 2015: Paragraph 74).
In his encyclical *Laudato Si’*, as well as in the *Economy of Francis*, Pope Francis (2015; 2019b) has emphasised the strong connection between human dignity and development. In his words, “the urgent challenge to protect our common home includes a concern to bring the whole human family together to seek a sustainable and integral development” (Pope Francis 2015:4x). Moreover, he has called for an inclusive dialogue about “how we are shaping the future of our planet” and questions the current model of development and the present condition of global society, where injustices are numerous and increasingly more people are deprived of fundamental human rights. Such a dialogue demands “prioritising the weakest members of society as a way of measuring progress” (CAFOD et al. 2018:16). In this way, *Laudato Si’* also seeks to challenge our current model of (economic) development and notions of progress, inasmuch as economic growth is still widely viewed as the means to end poverty – an idea that still very much permeates the Agenda 2030 as well (CAFOD et al. 2018). The same intention is behind the *Economy of Francis*, which seeks to raise attention to the most complex problems in the world today, “from safeguarding the environment to justice for the poor”. Pope Francis argues, “Courageous commitment is needed to rethink the economic paradigms of our time,” and particularly to take action “against the careless exploitation of resources and short-sighted policies that look to immediate success without prospects for the long-term.” From this vantage point, the economy of St. Francis, espouses the necessity of rebuilding “a new integral ecology, one that is inseparable from the concept of the common good, which must be implemented through choices based on solidarity and the ‘preferential option for the poor’ starting from solving the structural problems of the world economy” (Pope Francis 2019a, 2019b).

Drawing on the above, Caritas views development as the long-term process of building up community and household social and economic capacities in a sustainable manner, in order to eradicate poverty and vulnerability, and to promote social justice (Caritas Europa 2010). Central to Caritas’ vision is the concept of *integral human development*, which places the human person at the centre of the development process (Caritas Europa 2010). It may be defined as an all-embracing approach that takes into consideration the well-being of the person and of all people in seven different dimensions:

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13 In support of the economy of St. Francis, a conference is scheduled to take place in Assisi, Italy from 26 to 28 March 2020, which will bring together economists, entrepreneurs and change-makers interested in proposing innovative ideas to “make the economy, today and tomorrow fair, sustainable and inclusive, with no one left behind”. With the invitation to participate coming directly from Pope Francis, the event is organised by a Committee composed of the Diocese of Assisi, Assisi City Council, the Seraphic Institute of Assisi and the Economy of Communion. The event represents for Pope Francis the consolidation of a “pact to change the current economy and give a soul to the economy of tomorrow.” Intending to give hope for the rights of future generations, for welcoming life, for social equity, for the dignity of workers and the preservation of our planet, this conference marks an invitation to develop a new economic, social and ecological paradigm. For more information, see: https://francescoeconomy.org/ (Pope Francis 2019a, 2019b).
The social dimension, which focuses on quality of life in terms of nutrition, health, education, employment, social protection and social participation as well as equality of treatment and non-discrimination on any ground;

The work and economic activity dimension as the main means of self and family sustenance, of socio-economic engagement and of direct contribution to development for most adults in all populations;

The ecological dimension, which refers to respect for the goods of creation and to ensuring quality of life of future generations without ignoring this generation’s cry for justice;

The political dimension, which includes issues such as: existence of the rule of law; respect for civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights; democracy (particularly as as a representative and participatory tool);

The economic dimension, which relates to aspects such as: the level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and distribution of income and wealth; sustainability of economic growth; structure of the economy and employment; degree of industrialisation; level of high-tech Information and Communications Technology; and state capacity to obtain revenue for human services and social protection;

The cultural dimension, which addresses identity and cultural expression of communities and peoples, as well as capacity for intercultural dialogue and respectful engagement among cultures and identities; and

The spiritual dimension.

According to Catholic Social Teaching, social inequalities demand coordinated action of the whole of society and the whole of government in all countries for the sake of humanity based on two premises: 1) social questions are global and 2) socio-economic inequalities are a danger for peace and social cohesion. In this sense, development of our own country, our own families and that of others must be the concern of us all – the human community. Just like development, poverty is seen by Caritas as a multi-dimensional concept, with both objective and subjective dimensions. It does not only refer to monetary or material poverty but also results from a lack of access to basic goods and services as well as the absence of any tangible connection to power and decision-making. In addition to objective factors of social exclusion, poverty can include a feeling of being excluded from society and from an absence of social contacts that generally help improve life conditions (social capital). Finally, poverty can stem from unequal access to environmental resources, or from ecological imbalances – environmental deterioration, expulsion from or denial of access to arable land, global warming consequences, and so forth - that threaten people’s livelihoods. For Caritas, poverty is fundamentally a violation of the human dignity and thus development is a fundamental right for every human being and the human rights of every individual should be respected at all times. While Caritas advocates for the use of the concept of integral human development, it also recognises the significant overlap between integral human development and sustainable development. For this reason, and taking into account the fact that sustainable development is widely used in global and European policy discussions, the two terms will be used interchangeably across the various chapters of this publication.

14 The idea that poverty is not only a monetary problem is reflected in the concept of a "human development" developed in the 1990s by Mahboub ul Haq and Amartya Sen, who won the Nobel Prize for economics in 1998 (Caritas Europa 2010).
1.4. Understanding the migration and development nexus

How migration is linked to social and economic development is a centuries old legal, policy and practical question. There is considerable research to indicate that interactions between migration and development are complex and not fully understood (Carling and Talleraas 2016; Castles and Van Hear 2011; Wickramasekara 2010; de Haas 2010a, 2010b). Nevertheless, the debate on migration and development revolves around two main aspects: 1) how development (or lack thereof) affects migration; 2) how migration affects development. The first aspect is intrinsically connected to the debate on the causes and drivers of migration and has been more recently linked to the question of whether development aid and international cooperation policy play a role in reducing migratory flows. The second aspect touches instead upon the role of migration and migrants in fostering development processes, particularly in countries of origin, relevant to themselves, their families and their communities.

1.4.1. How development affects migration

From development to migration

- Migration is a complex phenomenon with multiple drivers.
- Migration and development are interconnected, but there is no direct link between underdevelopment and migration, or between development and lack of migration.
- Migration is often one strategy among many for people to cope with poverty, inequality, lack of social and economic opportunities, crises, conflicts, violence, persecution, corruption, and natural and environmental disasters.
- Large-scale and recurring displacement patterns contribute to poverty by breaking livelihoods, disturbing markets, and diminishing economic opportunities, thus creating a cycle of vulnerability for many communities.
- Migration requires sufficient resources, connections and individual aspirations. As a result, it is not the poorest people who are able to migrate.
- There is no proven correlation between poverty eradication and the reduction of migration.
- Some drivers of migration need to be addressed to support the sustainable development of the countries of origin. But poverty reduction is not in itself a migration-reducing strategy.
- Nevertheless, development aid is likely to have a positive impact on the realisation of people’s integral human development in countries of origin. It may also contribute to reducing migration aspirations but only if it is directed to long-term projects that foster sustainable development.

Migration is often seen as a result of lack of development. Poverty, inequality, differences in wages, dysfunctional labour markets, deficient public infrastructures and services shape migration aspirations and intentions (Dustmann and Okatenko 2014; de Haas 2010a, 2010b, 2014; Carling and Talleraas 2016). The linkage between migration and development, however, is often poorly understood and trivialised, particularly in public debate. Notions such as the omnipresent ‘root causes’ of migration do not accurately capture the complex processes that trigger or accelerate migratory movements. It is therefore
useful to distinguish between: 1) the concrete relation on the ground between migration and development, as observed and studied by researchers; and 2) the policy discourse and frames which tend towards simplification, and which reflect a variety of political interests and priorities. While this chapter primarily analyses the first, the second point is discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3 which examine the vision and impact of European internal and external policy.

Carling and Talleras (2016) distinguish between root causes, drivers and determinants of migration. The root causes may be described as “the [social, economic and political] conditions of states, communities, and individuals that underlie a desire for change, which in turn, produces migration aspirations” (2016:6). Such conditions may include, among others, conflict, poverty, violence, political persecution, or natural disasters. From the perspective of researchers from the Global South, African countries are disproportionally affected by repeated crises, conflicts and natural disasters, which undermine their economic development by forcing people off their land. These large-scale and recurring displacement patterns contribute to poverty by breaking livelihoods, disturbing markets, and diminishing economic opportunities, thus creating a cycle of vulnerability for many communities. The issue of rural desertification and the departure of young people from the countryside to the cities has also emerged as a key issue of concern (Caritas Africa 2019). Drivers of migration can be quite complex with interrelated causal affects. They are usually also seen as broader than root causes, as they also include mechanisms that facilitate migration, e.g. migrant networks and access to information. Determinants of migration reflect more of a methodological concept in quantitative migration research, since they refer to the specific factors that help explain and predict migration patterns in a particular social and environmental context.

In European policymaking, the notion of ‘root causes’ was first used in the context of conflict-induced forced displacement, linked to humanitarian interventions to address violence and human rights abuses (Castles and van Hear 2011). In the 1980s and 1990s, the same concept was then applied to ‘economically motivated migration’, where “the assumption has been that migration can be stemmed by alleviating poverty and creating jobs” (Carling and Talleraas 2016:6). By the early 2000s, the ‘root causes’ discourse had become part of European policy on migration and development (Lavenex and Kunz 2008). However, it was not until 2015, following the migrant arrivals to Europe, that such a narrative would really begin shaping European external policy, particularly on development cooperation (see Chapter 3). As Carling and Talleraas (2016:6) argue, “the notion of ‘root causes’ implies a chain of mechanisms that eventually produce migration.” Implicitly, root causes – whether they are about conflict, violence, dysfunctional labour markets, poverty, inequalities, weak governance, climate change or environmental degradation – they are linked to deficits in development (inasmuch as all those aspects can be seen as an integral part of development). However, in practice, it is very difficult to establish a clear causal and direct relationship between lack of development, root causes and migration.

Figure 1. The relation between development and migration

Source: de Haas (2010b)
Research (Clemens 2014; de Haas 2010a, 2010b; Skeldon 2012; Zelinski 1971) has shown, time and again, that it is not the least developed countries that experience the highest rates of emigration, but rather those countries already experiencing increasing degrees of socio-economic development, with all the contradictions that such a process entails (see figure 1 in previous page). On the one hand, more development gradually leads, unsurprisingly, to more immigration.15 On the other hand, the relation between socio-economic development and emigration does not follow a reverse linear logic but a curvilinear one. In other words, emigration is likely to increase as a result of more development, and such a trend begins to wind down only after a certain income threshold is reached.16

The reason for this phenomenon lies in the fact that development shapes the material and social conditions that make migration possible. Researchers have argued that economic development, and in particular the process of industrialisation and mechanisation of agriculture, has played an important role in destroying the foundation of peasant economies and in uprooting entire populations in developing countries, forcing them to secure their livelihoods in urban areas or outside the country (Massey 1988). In these contexts, economic development may also lead to generalised improved standards of living, but the fall in mortality rate often precedes the drop in fertility rates, therefore producing a rapid increase in population. In such a situation, much of this younger population cannot be absorbed by the local economy, and thus high unemployment and social tensions may be mitigated by types of migration (circular, seasonal, etc.) (Arroyo 2019). More recently, the effects of climate change, including soil erosion, desertification or environmental disasters – which can be linked to similar imbalances in the development process – have made populations in areas such as the African Sahel even more dependent on circular and seasonal migration to secure their livelihoods (FAO IFAD IOM WFP 2018).

Development processes, rather than the lack thereof, also impact individual migratory decisions since they shape people’s aspirations and potentially give them the means to realise their life aspirations (Carling and Talleraas 2016:15). Among other factors, increased foreign investment or international trade, typically associated with development processes, often contribute to making people more aware of their (relative) poverty with respect to advanced economies (Czaica and de Haas 2012). Similarly, greater access to international media and culture, often the result of a country’s growing integration in the global economy, contributes to changing aspirations and desires in terms of lifestyles and occupations (Carling and Talleraas 2016). When such ambitions and desires are effectively frustrated in the local context, migration may become a possibility.

Still, not all people and communities in similar socio-economic conditions migrate and similarly not everyone experiencing conflict and violence flees their countries (Schewel 2019). Individual migration has often been shown to be one among several coping strategies that families use to secure access to food security, resist external shocks (i.e. famine, environmental disasters, economic crises), gain access to new or different social and economic opportunities, or climb the social mobility ladder (Bylander 2015; Konseiga 2006; Mas Giralt 2017). In fact, even when people are in situations of extreme duress and have the resources to migrate, they may still choose to remain where they are, provided they are able to cope with the situation or see prospects for change (Carling and Talleraas 2016). On the opposite side of this spectrum, even in the absence of clear root causes, individuals may nevertheless perceive migration as an opportunity to pursue their life project elsewhere (Benson and O’Reilly 2009; Zainub and Tremblay 2017; Interview with Ndiku Kisuke).18 Clearly, migration choices and options are shaped by socio-economic status, education levels, as well as by class, but there are also considerable differences in migratory patterns across social groups within the same country. The poorest people in the country often do not have the resources to migrate; when they can, they may only be able to move to nearby urban areas or neighbouring countries, and often only for a limited time. Research carried out by Caritas Africa (2019) reiterates this point that migration requires sufficient resources to which the poorest members of the population often have limited or no access. “For instance, a trip across the Sahara to Europe can cost up to €30,000 therefore requiring the migrant and his/her relatives to have access to substantial resources (land, estate, belongings) which can be mobilised or sold to pay for the journey” (Caritas Africa 2019:4). Hence, this seems to support the claim that it is people with higher levels of education, skills, capital and social networks, who generally embark on international and trans-continental migratory journeys (van Hear 2006, 2014; Docquier 2017). This picture is further complicated by the fact that there are also differences in migration rates between countries within the same income and development range.19

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15 Evidence that emigration rates decline as countries get richer can be found in the experience of Southern European countries in the 1980s. However, as documented in the Common Home national studies, structural economic challenges in countries such as Italy or Portugal have since dished doubt on this trend since migration is once again a strong feature of those national contexts.

16 Clemens (2014) suggested that emigration is likely to continue until per capita income reaches a level of PPP $7,000-8,000. Carling and Talleraas (2016) indicate that countries such as El Salvador, Morocco, and the Philippines, which are within that income range, are indeed still countries of mass emigration. While emigration is likely to reduce over time, this reversal is likely to be very slow, as shown by the case of Mexico (with a per capita income more than twice as high as this threshold).

17 This view is corroborated by existing research on global migration, which shows that the percentage of people on the move, while increasing in absolute numbers due to demographic growth, has remained relatively stable in relative terms, accounting for 3.1%, 2.7% and 3.5% of the total population in 1960, in the 1980s and in 2015 respectively (Carling and Talleraas 2016).

18 This stems from the concept of ‘lifestyle migration’ which refers to an increasing number of people who decide to migrate because of their desire to pursue a more fulfilling life elsewhere.

19 See for example the comparison drawn by Schewel and Legass Bahir (2019) between Ethiopia and other African countries with a similar HDI index such as Nigeria, Madagascar, Kenya, Chad, and others.
Finally, research has also shown that migration is often likely to continue even though initial levels of development in the country of origin have changed. This happens because multiple factors are at play. For example, increased access to information, as well as the presence of an established transnational migration infrastructure between particular countries contributes to lower costs and risks for new would-be migrants from those contexts (Massey et al. 1993). Following this logic, migration from a specific community is also likely to foster more migration from the same town or villages, as much as it makes migration a possibility in people’s minds. At the same time, policies (such as guest-worker or other recruitment programmes) or economic incentives in countries of destination – e.g. the organisation of the labour market, the presence of an informal economy, etc. – can play a very powerful role in facilitating migration (Hooghe et al. 2008).

As shown above, the relation between migration and development is complex and far from straightforward. It thus follows that to expect to employ development cooperation as a means to address the root causes of migration and to reduce migration is likely to yield mixed results at best, particularly in the short- to medium-term (de Haas 2007a; Clemens 2014, Clemens and Postel 2017). In addition to stimulating economic development in a country of high out-migration, with the aim of improving social and economic opportunities and, therefore, reducing the attractiveness of migration for the local population, development aid could also be used to directly raise the income of would-be migrants and deter them from migrating (Arroyo 2019).

The review conducted by Arroyo (2019) found that, up until a certain income, aid programmes contribute to facilitating migration rather than discouraging it, since it makes leaving more affordable while not really making local conditions more attractive. However, certain studies cited (Lanati and Thiele 2017, 2018a, 2018b as cited in Arroyo 2019) have argued that aid can have a positive effect in mitigating migration under specific conditions. In particular, the researchers found that assistance that focuses on strengthening the public sector and access to public services can play an important role in reducing migration aspirations. They have also suggested that rather than development-oriented assistance, it is humanitarian aid and emergency assistance that are more likely to encourage migration, since such support helps people in particularly difficult personal and economic circumstances to offset...
the costs of migrating. Others have argued that aid spent on improving governance can similarly mitigate migration aspirations as a result of improved institutions, greater political stability and less corruption, while other types of aid were found to have no impact on migration (Gamso and Yuldashev 2018). In that sense, several researchers have endorsed the distinction proposed by Clemens et al. (2012) between ‘early-impact aid’ and ‘late-impact aid’. While the former “encompasses flows such aid for industrial development and income-support programmes, which are likely to affect income growth rapidly and, therefore, to provoke new migration by helping potential migrants finance the cost of migration,” the latter, including “aid for health care, education infrastructure or governance, can take many years to impact positively income growth […] but can improve the non-monetary dimensions of well-being that are key for migration intentions” (Arroyo 2019:7).

1.4.2. How migration affects development

From migration to development

- Migration can positively contribute to the development of all countries and communities if certain conditions are in place, but its role is not always positive, depending on the contingent social, political, and economic climate and on prevailing ideology and values.

- Migrants contribute much to the development of their countries of origin by sending remittances back home and many developing communities rely on this as a key source of livelihood.

- Migrants are also a major development resource in their country of destination, including refugees and displaced people, who contribute to the economic and development of the destination country by bringing new skills, languages and tools with them (on the condition that they are given favourable conditions to contribute, such as work permits).

- The current global trend views migration mainly as an opportunity for development in economic terms and typically focuses on the development of countries of origin from a Western perspective, failing to consider the perspective of the Global South.

The effects of migration on development is an equally if not more controversial topic in academic and policy circles. Assessments of this relationship, which is essentially impossible to measure in all its aspects, have historically shifted between the positive and the negative as a reflection of changing political and economic circumstances in countries impacted by migration (de Haas 2010a; Nyberg Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen 2003). For example, neoclassical economists in the 1960s and early 1970s saw migration in positive terms, as an instrument to organise global economic production efficiently, for the benefit of both countries of origin and destination. In their view, migration acted as an ‘equaliser’ of opportunities since it allowed people to move to countries with higher wages and improved social benefits while benefitting the economy of countries of destination. Following this logic, it was also believed that emigration would also eventually stop once standards of living between sending and receiving contexts had become similar.

In the late 1970s and 1980s, in a context shaped by the 1973 economic crisis as well as persisting underdevelopment in post-colonial countries, researchers expressed a more pessimistic view (de Haas 2010a). Migration certainly contributed to the well-being of countries in the Global North by supplying cheap labour but also contributed to aggravating underdevelopment in countries of origin in many ways: by depriving local and regional economies of human and material resources, by increasing inequalities within sending communities and by disrupting traditional relations of social care and support. As a result, within this view, migration only leads to further migration. Others, echoing the changing perspective of European countries in times of economic stagnation, suggested that migration had become more of a problem than an opportunity due to shrinking economic capacity to absorb it and to new security concerns – a trend that would gain strength in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 (Nyberg Sørensen et al. 2003).
During the 1990s and early 2000s, in conjunction with a period of sustained global economic growth, prevailing views on the role of migration in development swung back towards the positive.\textsuperscript{22} It is during this period that ‘migration and development’ became a very prominent topic in global development discussions, particularly under the aegis of international and inter-governmental organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) or the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Olesen 2002; Lavenex and Kunz 2008; Faist 2008). Such organisations began to promote a new development paradigm – the so-called ‘migration-development nexus’ (Nyberg Sørensen et al. 2003) that recognised the positive development impact of migration and of migrants as actors of (economic) development in their countries of origin, namely through financial remittances.

According to Carling and Talleraas (2016), this paradigm became popular in research and policy for various reasons. First, interest in the potential of economic remittances grew as data revealed that money remitted by migrants constituted a larger flow than development aid to developing countries. Second, the idea of shifting development funding from government actors to the private sector and the grassroots aligned well with both the neoliberal agenda of global financial institutions as well as with civil society. Third, discussions on the potential of migration to impact positively on the economic development of countries of origin allowed international stakeholders to discuss migration without addressing its most contentious aspects. It is in this context that global fora such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), created in 2007, were established. It is also in this period that discussions on the merits of temporary or ‘circular’ migration began to gain momentum – an option seen to accommodate both countries of destination, which were primarily interested in filling in temporary labour shortage needs and had no interest in establishing longer-term legal migration channels, and countries of origin, which were concerned with the effects of brain drain (Skeldon 2010; Lavenex and Kunz 2008).

While this paradigm promoted a positive relationship between migration and development, its vision has also proved problematic and partially disconnected from reality. Institutional understanding of the migration-development nexus was (and remains) generally very narrow, since it primarily focused on crude financial impact and considered development as simply GDP growth and investment (Lavenex and Kunz 2008; Olesen 2002). Several studies have indeed shown that remittances can be a key source of income for families in countries of origin, particularly where safety nets are lacking, inequalities are high or labour markets are dysfunctional (Brown 2006; Adams and Cuecuecha 2013). In some cases, when directed towards education and training, healthcare or recreation, remittances can also substantially improve people’s well-being and social and economic opportunities (Ratha 2013). However, remittances should not be seen as the silver bullet to tackle poverty and inequality. Just like those who migrate are not the poorest, so too are those who receive the largest share of remittances not the poorest. This has the potential side effect that non-migrant families may also have to cope with inflation and price hikes resulting from external influx of money (de Haas 2010a). Data also indicate that while higher absolute levels of remittances go to lower-middle-income countries, it is the poorest countries who are most dependent on remittances (Gammeltoft 2002). Clearly, remittances alone are not sufficient to promote development where structural constraints exist unless they are linked to other development actions promoted by governments and international institutions – i.e. the existence of an enabling environment for business, clear and adequate legal and policy frameworks, good governance, etc. (Castles and Delgado Wise 2007; Castles 2007). In that sense, overestimating the impact of migrant remittances risks unfairly investing migrants with responsibilities that should primarily be of states and governments (de Haas 2007a; 2007b). Finally, this paradigm did not extend the same level of recognition of migration’s contributions with respect to the countries of destination, nor did it include the issue of the protection of the rights of migrants as a component of the development process.\textsuperscript{23} The very limited scope and quality of the circular mobility projects that were developed in the 2000s between Europe and third countries reflected more the concerns of developed countries to recruit cheap labour – e.g. in agriculture – rather than to maximise the development benefits of migration for all parties involved, migrants included (Wickramasekara 2011).

Over the last few years, discussions on global developments have tried to move beyond this limited understanding of migration and development. The overarching contemporary framework is the above-mentioned 2030 Agenda for Sustainable

\textsuperscript{22} The first global development framework to recognise the role of migration and its immense contribution to sustainable development worldwide was the Declaration and Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development at Cairo in 1994. The ICPD was the biggest conference ever held on population, migration and development with 11,000 delegates from 179 countries and some 4,000 participants in the parallel NGO Forum. Two of the ten chapters of the Programme of Action were entirely about migration and development. Adopted by all 179 participating states/governments, the ICSP Declaration and 20-year Programme of Action (extended in 2007) continues to serve as a comprehensive guide to people-centred development progress.

\textsuperscript{23} A notable exception in this debate was the International Labour Organization (ILO), which promoted a broader, rights-based approach to development (Lavenex and Kunz 2008).
Development with its SDGs, launched in 2015. While explicit reference to migration and development is laid out in SDG Target 10.7 on safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility, more than 44 SDG Targets across 16 of the 17 SDGs apply to migrants, refugees, migration and/or migration-compelling situations (Taran 2016). The New Urban Agenda adopted in Quito in October 2015 provides even more explicit attention to migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons in its global development and governance framework for cities – where most migrants and refugees reside. Moreover, in 2016, in the wake of severe and protracted conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia and the collapse of effective protection for refugees in neighbouring countries, UN Member States adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (UN Resolution 70/1), calling for improved global governance of migration and for the recognition of international migration as a driver for development in both countries of origin and of destination. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), adopted at an inter-governmental conference in Marrakesh, Morocco in November 2018 and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) elaborated on those principles and propose ways of implementing them through political dialogue and non-binding commitments. Both Compacts were adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2018.

The potential of both the Agenda 2030 and the above Compacts as positive tools for migration and development is still completely untested. However, the polarised discussions regarding the adoption of the GCM in Marrakesh in November 2018, which resulted in a number of European countries refusing to endorse the agreement, do not bode well for future global cooperation on those issues. In Europe, still reflecting an inward-looking trend triggered by the 2008 global financial crisis together with the 2015-16 internal solidarity crisis, the mood on migration and development has once again turned sombre. As we shall see in the upcoming two chapters, such pessimistic attitudes are reflected both in the negative rhetoric around the contribution of migrants and migration to Europe as well as in the current European approach to migration and development, particularly in its external policy.

1.4.3. Caritas’ understanding of migration and development

Caritas on migration and development

- Emigration is linked to poverty as a multidimensional concept.
- Poverty reduction per se is not a solution to migration in countries of origin.
- The challenge is not reducing migration but providing opportunities to realise integral human development for everyone and everywhere, so that people migrate voluntarily and not out of desperation but in pursuit of their ‘life project’.
- Migration, under the right conditions (e.g. respect of human dignity and human rights), can contribute to integral human development for the benefit of all (migrants, families, communities, countries of origin and countries of destination).

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24 152 countries voted in favour of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration during the United Nations conference in Marrakesh, Morocco on 10 Dec. 2018. This led to the migration pact’s adoption even though five nations voted against it (the United States, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Israel) and 12 countries abstained. Of the abstaining countries, six were EU Member States (Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia and Romania, Slovakia) (Gotev 2018).

25 This section is largely based on Caritas Europa (2010) as well as internal discussions and debates within the Caritas network, both in Europe and globally and on input from Caritas Africa’s 2019 publication, entitled “In Dignity: The Faces of Human Mobility in Sub-Saharan Africa”.

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22
When assessing how development (or the lack thereof) affects migration, it is important to draw from the experiences of our partners from Caritas Africa,26 who argue that migration should be understood as a complex phenomenon with multiple drivers and root causes and also as a major development challenge, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa – and especially when it comes to forced displacement.

In Caritas’ view, therefore, migration remains linked to poverty inasmuch as poverty is understood as not only economic poverty. Poverty also encompasses exclusion or the lack of opportunities to participate in society or to access decent work, good governance, education and healthcare, freedom of expression and participation or the ability to avoid the consequences of climate change. For this reason, Caritas also adopts a broad understanding of the concept of forced migration. Caritas believes that people fleeing conflicts and persecution have a particular claim and right to international refugee protection. However, Caritas also argues that a growing number of people are ‘forced’ to leave their countries of origin not only because of conflicts and persecution but also because of other existential threats, such as those mentioned above.

For this reason, Caritas does not believe that poverty-reduction is per se a ‘solution’ to migration, especially since this leads to an ‘oversimplified assumption that if migration challenges development and if poverty feeds migration, then development aid can be the ‘solution’ to reduce poverty and ‘stop’ migration’ (Caritas Africa 2019:25). For Caritas, the solution is to facilitate integral human development and to enable individuals (and their families) opportunities to realise their life projects. This correlates closely with the capability approach described above, namely, that people benefit from the freedom to achieve well-being, which we understand in terms of having real opportunities to do and be what they want (Robeyns 2011; de Haas 2009), i.e. to achieve their life projects.

Caritas organisations view “migration [is]… a means for people all over the world, rich and poor, to achieve their life projects and, as such, …[is] part of our common future”; moreover, since “[m]igration is a given…efforts should therefore focus on better managing, better preparing, better welcoming and better coordinating this reality” (Caritas Africa 2019:8).

In Caritas’ view, therefore, both people who migrate and those who remain – whether in country of origin or in country of destination – have the right to find wherever they call home the economic, political, environmental and social conditions to live in dignity and to achieve a full life. Everyone should enjoy integral human development, both before and after migration. Caritas believes in helping people stay (through strategies of adaptation, resilience and risk reduction) but also, when necessary, in helping people move, either to fulfil their life aspirations or to get out of harm’s way (through accompaniment, awareness about opportunities, relocation, humanitarian visas, temporary protection, etc.) (Caritas Africa 2019). Hence, structures and practices are greatly needed that create virtuous environments, enabling people to achieve their full potential and their integral human development. In other words, people should have the right not to migrate.27 For that to happen, the fight against poverty and inequalities should therefore lie at the heart of development policies and programmes.

When assessing the contributions of migration to development, Caritas believes in the potential of migration to contribute to the integral human development of migrants and their families as well as to the sustainable development of their countries of origin, transit and destination. Such a vision implies that migration, regardless of its drivers, is an opportunity for our societies to build a more prosperous, global Common Home, where everyone can make her or his contribution, live in dignity, and strive to achieve one’s life project. For this reason, Caritas calls for a human response of solidarity and cooperation to assume responsibility for integral human development worldwide and for the protection and participation of people on the move – migrants, refugees, and internationally displaced people (IDPs). Finally, regardless of the legal status in a country and of actual ‘contributions’, all migrants, refugees and IDPs possess inherent human dignity and human rights that must be respected, protected and fulfilled by all states at all times.28

26 Caritas Africa comprises 46 national Caritas members across sub-Saharan Africa.
27 Pope Pius XII (1952) dedicated an encyclical, Exsul Familia, on “migrants, aliens and refugees of whatever kind who, whether compelled by fear of persecution or by want, is forced to leave his native land”, reaffirming that migrants and refugees have a right to a life with dignity, and therefore a right to migrate.
28 It is worth mentioning the four verbs. Pope Francis put forward for the World Day of Migrants and Refugees 2018, namely welcoming, protecting, promoting and integrating migrants and refugees (Pope Francis 2017): These four verbs guide the work of Caritas and are likewise in support of the Share the Journey campaign, led by Caritas Internationals.
CHAPTER 2
MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN INTERNAL DIMENSION

2.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the development contribution of migration and migrants to Europe, both in terms of area of origin and of destination. It also highlights the challenges, barriers, opportunities and promising practices that affect the extent of such contributions. In order to provide a more general picture that goes beyond the 11 countries as part of the MIND project, this chapter features a variety of statistical data on the European Union – in its current configuration (EU-28) – and its Member States. However, in order to provide more in-depth information on specific issues, it also relies on the findings across several domains of the 11 national Common Home studies.

2.2. The migratory context in Europe

2.2.1. Migration and asylum in the world

Today, approximately 260 million foreign-born persons reside in countries other than those where they were born or hold original citizenship (UNDESA 2017a). Even though this may seem a large figure, it only accounts for 3.5% of the world’s population. Furthermore, while the absolute number of migrants has certainly grown over time, reflecting the increase in global population, the share of migrants has remained stable for the last half century.

A second major feature of international migration today is that it takes place primarily within regions, and notably within regional economic communities. The European Union is a prime example of this pattern, but by no means the only one, as several other cases indicate, e.g. the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) (Chetail 2019).

Current official figures, contained in UNHCR’s ‘Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2018’ (UNHCR 2019a) identify 25.9 million refugees as well as 70.8 million people forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of conflict, violence, persecutions or human rights violations. The latter include, in addition to internally displaced people, 20.4 million under UNHCR’s mandate, 5.5 million Palestinians registered by UNRWA (the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East), and 3.5 million asylum seekers still awaiting a decision on the status of their application by the end of 2018 (UNHCR 2019a). Refugees and stateless persons comprise about 12% of the global migrant population. 67% of the world’s refugees currently come from five countries: Syrian Arab Republic (6.7 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), South Sudan (2.3 million), Myanmar (1.1 million) and Somalia (0.9 million) (UNHCR 2019a). Putting this in proportion, the global totals of recognised refugee populations remain

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1 This global estimate accounts for refugees and asylum seekers, but does not consider short-term, temporary migrants, nor itinerant cross-border traders – many in Africa – moving across various countries, although remaining legally resident in their home countries. As noted by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), “The estimates are based on official statistics on the foreign-born or the foreign population, classified by sex, age and country of origin. Most of the statistics utilized to estimate the international migrant stock were obtained from population censuses. Additionally, population registers and nationally representative surveys provided information on the number and composition of international migrants.” (UNDESA 2017a).

2 One of several regional treaties and agreements that recognizes the freedom of movement and regional free mobility, the European “Schengen” Agreement came into force in 1985 with the objective of creating a single external border for the European Union. The African “ECOWAS Protocol” on the free movement of persons, established in 1979, is another such example. Its aim was to facilitate free trade and the movement of persons, goods and services within the sub-region and to “convert borders from walls into bridges” (Okunade and Ogunnubi 2018).
around 10% of global migration stock figures. It is also worth noting that Europe is home to a small minority of refugees and asylum seekers when compared with the rest of the world. The overwhelming majority (84%, or more than 17.1 million) of the world’s refugees under UNHCR’s mandate in 2018 were hosted in countries of the Global South, with more than 33% of the overall total being hosted by Least Developed Countries (UNHCR 2019a). With the notable exception of Germany (1.1 million), all other refugee-hosting countries in the top ten are from developing regions: including Turkey (3.7 million), Pakistan (1.4 million), Uganda (1.2 million), Sudan (1.1 million), the Islamic Republic of Iran (979,400), Lebanon (949,700), Bangladesh (906,600), Ethiopia (903,200) and Jordan (715,300) (UNHCR 2019a).

### 2.2.2. Migration in and to Europe

Migrants and refugees have long been important features of European history, as European countries have experienced both immigration and emigration for centuries. According to Eurostat data, as of 1 January 2018 there were 22.3 million people (or 4.4% of the EU-28 population) with citizenship of a non-EU Member State residing in one of the EU-28 countries. In addition, 17.6 million persons lived in one of the EU Member States on 1 January 2018 with the citizenship of another EU Member State (Eurostat 2019a). Regarding the country of birth, there were 38.2 million people born outside of the EU-28 living in an EU Member State on 1 January 2018.4 There were also 21.8 million persons who had been born in a different EU Member State from the one where they were resident (Eurostat 2019a). In total, 60 million people, or 11.7% (of the total EU population of 512.6 million people), residing in EU Member States are considered international migrants as per the statistical definition used by the UN.5 However, this figure is a significant undercount, as it does not account for short-term, temporary, posted, or seasonal migrants. The data on foreign-born population by countries is presented in figures 2 and 3. This includes citizens of EU countries born abroad to an EU citizen parent or parents.

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3 International migrant stocks are estimates of “the total number of international migrants present in a given country at a particular point in time” (UNDESA 2017c:9). United Nations (UN) data on these stocks are based mostly on the country’s population that is born abroad, and (where this information is not available) on holding foreign citizenship (UNDESA 2016:4; UNDESA 2017c). Data on migrant stocks are often reported together with data on migrant flows. Although both terms account for the number of migrants, what they measure is different. Migrant flows data account for the number of migrants entering or leaving during a specified time period (usually one calendar year) (UNDESA 2017c; Migration Data Portal n.d.a).

4 This figure includes a significant number of persons born to EU citizens abroad and entitled to citizenship of their parents’ country/ies.

5 International migrants: The midyear (1 July) estimate of the number of people living in a country or area other than that in which they were born (UNDESA 2017b).

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**Figure 2. Foreign-born population in EU and EFTA by country of birth, at 1 January 2018**

![Figure 2](source: Eurostat 2019a)
Figure 3. Foreign-born population in EU and EFTA by country of birth, at 1 January 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION</th>
<th>Foreign-Born TOTAL</th>
<th>% of the population</th>
<th>Born in another EU Member country</th>
<th>% of the population</th>
<th>Born in a non-Member country</th>
<th>% of the population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria (AT)</td>
<td>8,822,267</td>
<td>1,690,619</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>761,967</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>928,652</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (BE)</td>
<td>11,398,589</td>
<td>1,916,272</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>886,613</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>1,029,659</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (BG)</td>
<td>7,950,034</td>
<td>156,505</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>56,627</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>99,878</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia (HR)</td>
<td>4,105,493</td>
<td>528,982</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>67,781</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>461,201</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic (CZ)</td>
<td>10,610,055</td>
<td>467,580</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>189,009</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>278,571</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (CY)</td>
<td>864,236</td>
<td>181,369</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>121,805</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>59,564</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (DK)</td>
<td>5,781,190</td>
<td>690,549</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<td>1,425,200</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>1,007,319</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat 2019a
In 2017, a total of 4.4 million people immigrated to an EU-28 Member State, while 3.1 million people emigrated from one of these Member States. The total number of immigrants included an estimated 2 million non-EU citizens, 1.3 million EU nationals with citizenship of another EU Member State, around 1 million people who moved to an EU Member State of which they had the citizenship, and approximately 11 thousand stateless people (Eurostat 2019a).

Regarding the distribution of immigrants between men and women to the EU Member States in 2017, there were slightly more men than women (54% compared with 46%). The Member States reporting the highest share of male immigrants was Lithuania (70%); by contrast, the highest share of female immigrants was reported in Ireland (53%). Immigrants into EU Member States in 2017 were, on average, much younger than the total population already residing in the country of destination. On 1 January 2018, the median age of the total population of the EU-28 stood at 43.1 years compared with 28.3 years in 2017 for immigrants to EU-28 (Eurostat 2019b). According to the 11 Common Home studies, half or more of these countries respective migrant populations are from EU Member States. Not surprisingly, in many cases the largest numbers of migrants come from neighbouring countries, such as Slovaks and Germans in the Czech Republic, Czechs in Slovakia, and persons from neighbouring ex-Yugoslavian Balkan countries in Slovenia. The proportions of migrants-foreign born in populations span a range from more than 20% in Belgium to less than 5% in Bulgaria and Slovenia; figures that reflect the diversity of migration throughout the EU. With respect to third country nationals, the main nationalities in the EU Member States and EFTA countries vary widely. Overall, as of January 1, 2018, the countries of citizenship that figure most often in the top five are China, Morocco, Syria, Turkey, Russia and Ukraine, according to available data (Eurostat 2019c).

In 2017, about 3.1 million first residence permits were issued in the EU Member States. Among them, Poland issued the highest number (683 thousand), followed by Germany (535 thousand) and the United Kingdom (517 thousand). The main reasons for coming to Europe, according to these permits, are employment opportunities (32.2%), family reunification (26.5%) and educational opportunities (16.9%) – employment being a more common reason for men and family reunification for women. Other reasons include for instance international protection or permits without the right to work and amount to 24.5%. Family-related reasons also represented the highest share of permits issued in each of the EFTA countries. In 2017, approximately half of all first residence permits were issued to citizens of Ukraine (21.1% of the total number of first residence permits issued in the EU-28), Syria (7.1%), China (6.2%; including Hong Kong), India (5.2%), the United States (4.7%), Morocco (3.4%) and Afghanistan (2.7%) (Eurostat 2019d).

The situation and numbers of migrants in Europe in irregular status or in undocumented situations is difficult to estimate. Data collection is further complicated by the fact that state authorities across Europe use different criteria when defining people in an irregular situation, including lawful residence, presence, and employment (Düvell 2011; Triandafyllidou 2016). The sole well-founded survey to produce estimates across the EU was conducted by a two-year EU-funded research project “Clandestino,” published in 2009. No such study has been carried out since. Combining several methodological approaches and comparing data from 2002, 2005 and 2008, the study concluded that the undocumented population in the EU-27 (then without Croatia) could reasonably be estimated within a range of 1.9 to 3.8 million (in an area of a total population of over 500 million) in 2008 (Kovacheva and Vogel 2009:7). This estimate represented 6 to 12% of the total migrant population at the time. The research project also showed that, contrary to the notion of irregular migration at entry, most (im)migrants in undocumented situations arrive at and enter EU Member States via regular channels, either with a visa or not needing a visa for entry. Most migrants only subsequently fell into irregular situations by overstaying authorised time periods and/or taking up employment without authorisation.

6 These total figures do not represent the migration flows to/from the EU as a whole from/to third countries, since they include flows between different EU Member States.
7 A third-country national is a foreigner who has the nationality of a non-EU country (OECD/European Union 2015:302).
8 When national laws and administrative practices of a Member State allow for specific categories of long-term visa or immigration status to be granted instead of residence permits, such visas and grants of statuses are also included in the statistics (Eurostat n.d.).
9 The EU defines irregular migration as the “movement of persons to a new place of residence or transit that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries” (European Migration Network n.d.).
10 The overview of the overall project and all the country reports are available at http://irregular-migration.net/
11 However, a recently issued Eurostat data reported that 618,780 persons were found to be “illegally present” in the EU in 2017 (Eurostat 2018a).
2.2.3. Asylum seekers and refugees in Europe

Since the beginning of the 20th century, Europe has experienced the displacement of millions of people as a consequence of devastating inter-state conflicts across the continent. For example, between 1989 and 1992, the number of asylum applications rose from 320,000 to 695,000, but then decreased to 455,000 by the end of the decade (Hansen 2003 in Van Mol and de Valk 2016). These figures reflect the displacement compelled by the turmoil around the collapse of the Soviet Union and its allied governments in Eastern and Central Europe and the start of the Bosnian war. Asylum requests in Europe increased to 471,000 again in 2001 (Castles et al. 2014 in Van Mol and de Valk 2016). During this period in the early 2000s, the top five countries of origin were the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (836,000), Romania (400,000), Turkey (356,000), Iraq (211,000), and Afghanistan (155,000) (Castles et al. 2014 in Van Mol and de Valk 2016).

By 2006, asylum applications had decreased again to below 200,000 (EU-27) and they did not significantly increase again until 2012 (Eurostat 2019e), largely linked to the Arab Spring and geopolitical unrest in the Middle East and North Africa which prompted an increase in the number of arrivals of asylum seekers.12 In 2014, the number of asylum applicants grew by 191,000, 44% more than in 2013, to reach a peak of 626,000 (similar to the 1992 total). Between 2013 and 2014, the number of Syrians arriving to Europe more than doubled, from 50,000 to almost 123,000 (Eurostat 2015a). At the same time, the EU-27 countries, for which data is available, granted protection status to around 185,000 asylum seekers, up by almost 50% compared with 2013 (Eurostat 2015b).13 The number of persons seeking asylum in the EU-2814 spiked in 2015, reaching over 800,000 persons.15

Amongst the asylum seekers who were able to file applications in the EU, Syrians, at the time, received by far the highest recognition rates – reflecting the extremely critical situation in their countries of origin (Eurostat 2019f). As mentioned in the global overview, the number of refugees in European countries, however, remains very small in comparison to the frontline countries bordering Syria and Iraq, such as Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan, as well as to worldwide totals.

2.2.4. European migration and diaspora within and outside Europe

Most European countries, as already mentioned above, have a long-standing history of emigration. The countries included in the Common Home studies are no exception. Several of these countries have experienced large emigration flows to other EU countries and elsewhere (i.e. to Australia, Canada and the United States), with significant numbers of their populations abroad and significant diasporas of descendants of nationals. Historically, these figures can be quantified in many millions in the cases of Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Portugal and from hundreds of thousands to several millions for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia as well as all other EU Member States. As the respective Common Home studies note as examples that there are an estimated four million ‘Americans’ of Dutch origin, five million of Portuguese ancestry as well as over 700,000 Americans of full or partial Austrian descent.

However, several Common Home studies have also found that national governments had little data or estimates on their country’s diaspora. Few of them have given substantial institutional attention to tracking, maintaining links with, and encouraging ongoing diaspora engagement with the original ‘home country’ or country of origin of the diaspora. Figures from the 11 Common Home studies show significant emigration today, although of vastly different scales between some countries with relatively modest numbers and some with large emigration. While emigration may be more modest from Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands today, it is more substantial for Bulgaria and Portugal amongst others. For instance, Portugal and Italy are striking examples, with 25% (or 2.27 million) of Portugal’s work force living abroad, and Italy’s emigrant population having grown by 60% since 2006 and now standing at over 3 million. In Eastern and Central Europe, ever since the dissolution of the Soviet regime, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia as well as Poland and the Baltic states have also experienced high emigration rates. Although numbers differ by sources, figures cited in the Bulgaria Common Home study indicate that more than ten times as many Bulgarians reside abroad (about 1.3 million) compared to the number of immigrants in Bulgaria (about 150,000) (Krasteva 2019:47).16

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12 This was coupled with the newly consolidated and expanded EU regime of free movement, which “facilitated the mobility of high- and low-skilled workers and generated flows from Central and Eastern Europe to Western and Southern Europe”. (Migration Data Portal n.d.b) as well as immigration from North and Central Africa, Latin America and Asia to Southern Europe.
13 The source includes data for all Member States except Austria. The term ‘recognition status’ includes refugee status, subsidiary protection status, and authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons.
14 This figure is still subject to contention as some asylum seeker arrivals in the EU were counted twice; first when entering Greece then again when entering Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia after having travelled from Greece through non-EU countries in the Balkans.
15 The UNDESA data shown below indicates that almost 1.5 million Bulgarians reside abroad.
16 The UNDESA data shown below indicates that almost 1.5 million Bulgarians reside abroad.
Figure 4. Emigrant population as a share of the total population in EU-28 Member States, 2017 (%)

Source: Made by GMPA based on UNDESA Data (UNDESA 2017d; UNDESA 2019).

Figure 5. Emigrant population as a share of the total population in EU-28 Member States, 2017 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Emigrant Population, 2017 *</th>
<th>Total Population, 2017**</th>
<th>Total emigrants as equivalent to share of total population of origin country, 2017 (%)</th>
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</table>

Source: Made by GMPA based on UNDESA Data (UNDESA 2017d; UNDESA 2019).
2.3. The European internal policy framework on migration, development and integration - understanding EU and Member States’ competences

The national legislation and policies that affect migrants and migration in each country were examined in the Common Home studies. Therefore, this section examines several EU-level legal and policy frameworks that, in addition to national instruments, directly impact migrants’ integral human development and that limit the potential of migration to contribute to sustainable development in Europe. The emphasis on the EU level reflects the fact that, with the creation of the European Union, certain competences over legal and policy domains impacting migrants and migration (i.e. entry and border control, integration, asylum) have been transferred from Member States to the EU, or are now shared between the two entities. This section, therefore, provides an overview of migration and asylum law and policy (conditions of entry, admission, reception, etc.), as well as of integration-related law and policy (conditions of reception, access to services and social entitlements, and the protection of basic rights).

2.3.1. An overview of European migration and asylum policy: internal freedom of movement and migration from third countries

The establishment of the European Union and the Single European Market has transformed migration between EU Member States as well as between the Union and third countries. In fact, the very notion of EU migration policy has developed in parallel with the process of European economic integration and with the establishment of the internal ‘four freedoms’: free movement of goods, services, labour and capital (Barnard 2017). Intra-European mobility was largely codified decades ago, and a series of EU directives and regulations provide the operational legal framework. Free movement of persons is a fundamental principle of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2008), set out in Article 45 under Title IV, Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital, elaborated by EU secondary legislation and case law of the Court of Justice. One of the most impactful consequences of European integration has been the creation of the Schengen Area, which abolished passport controls for all persons crossing internal borders within the Union.

Generally speaking, EU citizens are entitled to seek employment in another EU country, work there without needing a permit, reside for that purpose, stay after employment finishes, and enjoy equal treatment with nationals in accessing employment, working conditions, and all other social and fiscal advantages (Barnard 2017). While internal mobility was clearly promoted with a strict economic rationale in mind, and was initially exclusively linked to work, its scope has since been broadened, since EU citizens can also move for study purposes as well as upon retirement. Freedom of movement and EU social security coordination also incorporate people moving amongst Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland as well as the EU-28 (European Commission 2019). The Single European Labour Market incorporates – whether formally or not – all workers within the EU-28 and is deemed a highly successful model for the regional labour mobility regime, allowing the free circulation of Member State nationals across all Member States. Currently, nearly half of all foreign nationals residing in EU Member States are citizens of other Member States (Eurostat 2017a).

Clearly, such a legal framework has also had important consequences for citizens of third countries. First, the creation of an internal area of freedom of movement has resulted, for those countries part of the Schengen Area, in the establishment of a common EU external border. Unlike EU citizens, most third country nationals – particularly those of African and Asian countries – require a visa to enter the Union and all need a residence permit issued by an EU Member State to live in, work in and travel across the EU (European Commission n.d.a.). Member States at the outer limits of the Union remain responsible for managing and controlling their portion of the EU’s external borders, often in cooperation or with the support of EU institutions and agencies, such as the European Commission, or upon retirement. Freedom of movement and EU social security coordination also incorporate people moving amongst Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland as well as the EU-28 (European Commission 2019). The Single European Labour Market incorporates – whether formally or not – all workers within the EU-28 and is deemed a highly successful model for the regional labour mobility regime, allowing the free circulation of Member State nationals across all Member States. Currently, nearly half of all foreign nationals residing in EU Member States are citizens of other Member States (Eurostat 2017a).

17 Relevant directives address safeguarding the supplementary pension rights of employed and self-employed persons moving within the Community (98/49/EC - 1998), right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (2004/38/EC, acquisition and preservation of supplementary pension rights (2014/50/EC), measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of movement for workers (2009/94/EC), as well as other EU regulations (European Parliament n.d.a).
18 The Schengen Agreement entered into force in 1995, following the conclusion of the agreement in 1985 and its implementing Convention in 1990. Today, the Schengen area comprises 26 members, including 22 EU Member States plus Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein (which have associate status). Ireland and the United Kingdom are not members of the Convention, while Denmark opted out of certain provisions. Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus are expected to join in the near future, while Croatia started the application process in 2015 (European Parliament n.d.a).
19 However, certain differences in treatment between economically active and inactive citizens persist, particularly with respect to access to welfare benefits: the former, by virtue of their contribution through taxes enjoy full equality of treatment from the start, whereas the latter cannot access social assistance during the first three months of their stay and, “in principle, cannot have recourse to social welfare benefits for the first five years, given the requirements of self-sufficiency” (Barnard 2017:407).
Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX). Over the past two decades, EU institutions and its Member States have sought to harmonise rules regarding border control procedures and conditions of (visa) entry across the Union. One of the consequences of this development is that the management of irregular migration – particularly in connection with border crossing – has also become a shared competence between Member States and the EU. The EU’s involvement is most evident in its (shared) competence relative to the return policy, including its right to conclude readmission agreements with third countries of origin to return irregular migrants, as well as in the growing role and capacities of the FRONTEX agency.

With respect to legal migration, European Member States retain the right to determine volumes of admissions for non-EU citizens seeking employment which is generally based on annual predictions of labour shortages, in particular, economic sectors. Visas for employment, as well as work permits are granted by Member States and remain tied to residence and work in a given country (European Parliament n.d.b). Nevertheless, the EU has acquired broad responsibilities in setting the conditions that govern entry into and legal residence of third-country nationals in a Member State. A number of directives address facilitating and regulating the admission and residency conditions for various typologies of skilled third country nationals (e.g. highly skilled workers, researchers, students, seasonal workers). A notable example is the EU Blue Card Directive (2009) which has established a European-wide work permit for highly skilled non-EU nationals to work in any EU country (UK, Ireland and Denmark excluded). The Seasonal Workers Directive (2014) lays out requirements and conditions for recruitment and employment of third-country nationals as seasonal workers for a short period in Member States. The Single Permit Directive (2011) seeks to establish an EU-wide, harmonised and simplified procedure through which non-EU citizens can apply for work and residence permit in a Member State and also sets out a number of common rights to be granted to permit holders (e.g. equal treatment regarding working conditions, non-discrimination and partial access to social security). The overarching legal framework also allows third country nationals legally resident in any EU Member State to circulate legally alongside nationals of Member States. In addition, in its 2003 Family reunification directive (Official Journal of the European Union 2012), the EU has also set out conditions for family reunification for third country nationals residing lawfully in a Member State which includes refugees.

The establishment of the European Union has also had important consequences for asylum in Europe, resulting in the creation of an overarching European system. Several regulations and directives form the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (European Commission n.d.d) developed between 1999 and 2005 to harmonise EU rules on asylum procedures and reception conditions, amongst others. The 2003 Dublin regulation (Official Journal of the European Union 2013a) determines in which country an asylum procedure is processed – the "first entry criteria" determining that the application should be handled in the first country of arrival of an asylum seeker (unless s/he has family ties or a legal status in another country). Since 2012, with the establishment of a Joint Resettlement Programme (European Commission 2009), the EU has also sought to encourage resettlement in Member States, that is, to receive refugees from outside the Union whose protection needs have already been established by the UNHCR. In 2011, EU institutions and Member States also agreed to establish the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which has been tasked to foster inter-governmental cooperation on asylum among Member States and to support countries in the implementation of CEAS (European Commission n.d.e). In 2015, the European Commission, in the midst of the European solidarity crisis, adopted the European Agenda on Migration (European Commission 2015), which has since become the main guiding framework for European policy on migration and asylum.
The Agenda proposed a set of immediate actions as well as a longer-term overarching strategy to manage migration to and within the EU. Short-term provisions included expanding FRONTEX-led operations in the Mediterranean, with the aim of “coordinating operational border support to Member States under pressure, and helping save the lives of migrants at sea,” while in parallel “targeting criminal smuggling networks” through various operations. In addition, in order to mitigate the impact of new arrivals on the asylum reception capacities of Italy and Greece, and to “ensure a fair and balanced participation of all Member States to this common effort”, the Agenda also proposed an EU-wide “temporary distribution scheme for persons in clear need of international protection” (relocation). The Agenda also emphasised, once again, the importance of adopting a common European approach to resettlement while also calling for increased cooperation with “third countries to tackle migration upstream” (discussed in Chapter 3 in more detail).

In addition to short-term measures, the European Agenda on Migration (2015:6) laid out a longer-term strategy based on four pillars and tenets:

1. Reduce incentives for irregular migration, by targeting traffickers and smugglers, addressing “the root causes of irregular and forced displacement in third countries” and increasing returns of irregular migrants, in cooperation with third countries;

2. Secure Europe’s external borders, by stepping up border management capacities of EU Member States and third countries, as well as by expanding FRONTEX’s role and capacities;

3. Put in place a ‘strong’ common asylum policy, by ensuring coherent implementation of CEAS, increasing responsibility sharing among Member States and reforming the Dublin regulation on the first-entry criteria;

4. Design a new European policy on legal migration, in particular, by modernising the Blue Card scheme, promoting dialogue with Member States and social partners regarding economic migration needs, and promoting more effective migrant integration policies.

Since 2015, these four policy priorities have guided EU legislative and policy action on migration. However, as we shall see in the sections on challenges and opportunities, progress on the different pillars has been very uneven.

### 2.3.2. An overview of European integration and social policy: access to services, social entitlements and rights for migrants and refugees

Besides migration policy (affecting conditions of entry), integration and broader social policies are other key policy domains that impact on migration’s role in contributing to sustainable development in Europe and on migrants’ ability to realise their integral human development. These policies affect migrants mainly in regular situations, as well as refugees and, to a lesser extent, asylum seekers and migrants in irregular situations. These differences in treatment can be attributed to the various rights accorded to the migrants relative to their different legal statuses.

Unlike migration policy, migrant integration remains a national competence. However, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, EU institutions now have the mandate to “provide incentives and support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals” (European Commission n.d.a.). In practice, since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), the EU has been able to “set priorities and goals to drive EU policies, legislative proposals and funding opportunities” in the realm of integration (European Commission n.d.a.). The Tampere Programme, established in 1999, included a policy goal of granting third country nationals rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens (European Commission 2002). The 2004 EU Common Basic Principles (Council of the European Union 2004:17), which laid out a set of 11 principles and stressed the importance of integration as a “dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States,” marked an important step in guiding EU action in the area of integration. The Common Agenda for Integration (European Commission 2005), developed by the European Commission in 2005, provided a framework for implementing the emerging EU integration policy, laying out a number of supportive EU mechanisms and instruments to promote immigrant integration. The European Agenda for the Integration of Third Country Nationals (European Commission 2011:2), adopted in July 2011, affirmed the EU’s “commitment to further developing the core idea of integration as a driver for
economic development and social cohesion, in order to better enhance migrants’ contribution to economic growth and cultural richness.” The Agenda focused on promoting actions, especially at the local level, targeting specific issues of concern such as low employment of migrant women, over-qualification of migrants, heightened risk of social exclusion and gaps in educational achievement. It also explored pre-arrival measures of integration in countries of origin and established a number of funding lines to support national and local efforts.

The June 2016 Commission Action Plan on the integration of third country nationals (European Commission Press Release 2016) remains the current policy framework supporting Member States in developing and strengthening national integration policies, generally directed to both migrants in regular situations and refugees.27 The plan focuses on the following domains:

1. **Pre-departure and arrival measures**, with actions aimed at preparing both migrants and local communities for the integration process (concerns also resettlement);
2. **Education**, with actions aimed at promoting and increasing language training and early childhood education, fostering civic education, promoting recognition of academic qualifications and integration into higher education;
3. **Employment and vocational training**, with actions aimed at encouraging fast migrant integration into the labour market and promoting migrant entrepreneurship, including supporting early recognition of academic qualifications of non-EU citizens, and launching specific actions for the labour market integration of refugees and women;
4. **Access to basic services such as housing and healthcare**, with actions aimed at promoting the use of EU funding for “reception, education, housing, health and social infrastructures for third country nationals”, including the promoting of peer learning on housing challenges (geographical isolation and ghettoisation) and care provision to vulnerable third country nationals;
5. **Active participation and social inclusion**, with actions aimed at promoting intercultural dialogue and cultural diversity, supporting exchange between migrants and the receiving society, enhancing migrants’ participation in cultural, social and political life and fighting discrimination (via the adoption of an anti-discrimination directive).

When it comes to more general rights and entitlements, in principle, the fundamental human rights and labour rights of all migrants and refugees in Europe are recognised in national law and international treaty commitments of the EU Member States. All EU Member States have ratified at least seven of the nine fundamental United Nations Human Rights Conventions, all of which lay out rights in their respective domains that apply to all migrants and refugees. All EU Member States have ratified the eight core International Labour Conventions on fundamental principles and rights at work. EU Member States have generally ratified many, if not most, of the approximately 80 International Labour Standards considered up to date.28 All of these labour standards are considered applicable to all persons in an employment relationship, whether formal or informal and regardless of legal status, notwithstanding a very few specific exemptions. The European Convention on Human Rights, ratified by all EU Member States, also reiterates the application of fundamental human rights to all persons in European countries.

Ten EU Member States have ratified one or both of the ILO Conventions specifically regarding migration: ILO C-97 on migration for employment of 1949 and C-143 on migrant workers (supplementary provisions) of 1975. While none has ratified the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, legal studies conducted in several EU Member States concluded that existing national legislation was largely in conformity with the standards in that Convention. Fundamental standards of non-discrimination and equality of treatment that generally apply to migrant workers are incorporated in EC Communications and in EU directives on discrimination, notably the “race equality directive” of 2000 (FRA 2012).29 Transposition of this directive into national law explicitly included nationality as prohibited grounds for discrimination in a number of EU Member States.

Unfortunately, while all migrants, regardless of their legal status, are entitled to a wide range of rights embedded in international and EU law, access to these rights is often impaired in cases of undocumented migrants, who tend to fear denunciation, arrest and deportation. This is intricately connected to the Schengen Borders Code (Official Journal of the European Union 2016a), which requires non-EU nationals to possess valid travel documents, authorising them to cross the borders or a valid visa to enter the EU (Caritas Europa 2016a:27). Naturally, many asylum seekers are unlikely to meet the visa requirement conditions due to inconsistencies for asylum seekers under the Schengen Borders Code with UNHCR guidelines as well as with current protection needs.

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27 The European Commission released a new publication on 17 July 2019 entitled: “Sustainable inclusion of migrants into society and labour market” which also has a section on EU Funding for inclusion of migrants which gives further insight into current practices related to the various funding streams and opportunities around the future design of EU funds (European Commission n.d.f.).


29 This refers to directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. Other existing EU non-discrimination directives can be found at (European Commission n.d.g.) and (FRA 2012).
Consequently, “asylum seekers are compelled to attempt irregular entries into the Schengen area via dangerous sea and/or land routes, which also increases demand for the services of smugglers” (Caritas Europa 2016a:27). In several countries, stricter policies to counter irregular migration and to increase the return of undocumented migrants have led to pressure being exerted on public services staff and law enforcement agents, even obliging them to report the legal status of migrants they encounter to immigration enforcement officers. In many instances, this prevents undocumented migrants from accessing their rights to health or education, for example, or of reporting experienced crimes and abuses out of fear of being arrested and deported.

2.3.3. EU funding instruments on migration and integration

The prominence of migration within the EU’s policies and financial instruments is very clear in the Commission’s proposal for the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027. This is the financial planning instrument of the EU that sets the maximum allocation of resources for each major category of EU spending over a seven-year period. The main purpose of the MFF is to align EU spending with its political priorities. The European Commission has already put a legislative proposal for the 2021-2027 MFF (i.e. the headings, instruments, structure, legal basis) on the table on 2 May 2018 (European Commission 2018a) and the European Parliament passed the non-legislative resolution of 30 May 2018 on the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework and “own resources” reform (European Parliament 2018a), followed by another resolution of 14 November 2018 (European Parliament 2018b), indicating the Parliament’s position with a view to an agreement. However, the MFF still needs to be adopted by the Council of Ministers by unanimity. As this was not achieved prior to the May 2019 European Parliament elections, this will be one of the first tasks after the new make-up of the EU institutions. The new regulation is expected to cover migration under several headings and funds:

- Integration of third country nationals (including refugees and asylum seekers) through the European Social Fund + (ESF+) under Heading II – ‘Cohesion and Values’;
- Asylum, legal migration and integration, and countering irregular migration including returns through the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) under heading IV – ‘Migration and Border Management’;
- Securing the common external borders of the Union under the Integrated Border Management (IBMF) also under heading IV – ‘Migration and Border Management’; and
- Addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement and to supporting migration management through the NDICI under heading VI – ‘Neighbourhood and the World’.

Not only the EU’s strategic objectives in the field of migration are mainstreamed in multiple components of the new MFF proposal but the resources allocated to migration according to the new MFF are also expected to be expanded. Migration and security related funds are thus significantly reinforced; the Commission’s proposal establishes an increase of over 2.6 times the amount compared with the current overall Union budget for the management of migration and external borders (European Commission 2018b:1).

2.4. How immigrants and emigrants contribute to integral human development in Europe

When examining the contribution of migrants in and towards countries of destination in Europe, it is clear that migrants already contribute substantially to the well-being of European societies in a variety of fields. The following section builds on the data and examples of the 11 Common Home studies and includes many of Caritas’ dimensions of integral human development (cf. Chapter 1) such as the economy and the labour market, welfare and social security, culture, and politics. However, in order to understand the scale and scope of such contributions, they need to first be contextualised considering Europe’s changing economy and demographic structure.

2.4.1. Migration, demography and work

A prelude to any discussion on migration in Europe must automatically incorporate a reflection on the changing European demography and economy. A better understanding of how European societies are changing further highlights the importance, if not the necessity, of migration for the continent. Clearly, those changes are, at the same time, the conditions that make migration so valuable for Europe while also providing various incentives to sustain (both intra- and extra-EU) migration.
As explained above, intra-European mobility for work is a cornerstone of the European integration project. The demand for skills and labour in the context of the deliberately constructed EU system of free movement of persons – incorporating also EFTA member countries – is seen as a key factor sustaining regional mobility and underpins the architecture of the free movement regime as a whole (Barnard 2017; Chetail 2019). The importance of the work element in intra-European mobility becomes evident when examining the economic status of European migrants. While individual motivations for moving for the first time within the EU include work-related, family, and study reasons, data also shows that, at the EU level, the employment rate of EU-28 movers, at 76%, was 3 percentage points higher than that of nationals, implying that the majority of those of working age who are resident and employed in another EU country other than that of their citizenship are economically active (European Commission 2019a:13). Moreover, in 2017, 2.8 million posted worker operations took place in the EU with the average duration of stay of less than four months. The number of postings issued in the EU has increased by 83% between 2010 and 2017 (European Commission 2019b).

More generally, it is also important to place the current migration phenomenon in the context of demographic change, and the overall ageing of the European population. Consistently low birth rates and higher life expectancy are transforming the shape of the EU-28’s age pyramid towards a much older population structure – a development that is already apparent in several EU Member States. The proportion of people of working age in the EU-28 is shrinking while the relative number of those retired is expanding. The share of older persons in the total population will increase significantly in the coming decades, as a greater proportion of the post-war baby-boom generation reaches retirement age. This, in turn, will lead to an increased burden on those of working age to provide for the social expenditure required by the ageing population for a range of related services (Eurostat 2019b).

The population of the EU-28 on 1 January 2017 was estimated at 511.5 million people. Young people (0 to 14 years old) made up 15.6% of the EU-28’s population, while persons considered to be of working age (15 to 64 years old) accounted for 64.9% of the population. Older persons (aged 65 or over) had a 19.4% share (an increase of 0.2 percentage points compared with the previous year and an increase of 2.4 percentage points compared with ten years earlier). The old-age dependency ratio for the EU-28 was 29.9% on 1 January 2017; as such, there were just over three persons of working age for every person aged 65 or over.

The growth in the relative share of older people is also explained by increased longevity. But consistently low levels of fertility over many years have contributed to a decline in the proportion of young people in the total population. Clearly, Europeans have generally been having fewer children in recent decades. (This pattern partly explains the slowdown in the EU-28’s population growth). Amongst the EU Member States, France reported the highest total fertility rate in 2017, with 1.90 live births per woman, followed by Sweden, with 1.78 live births per woman and Ireland, with 1.77 live births per woman. By contrast, the lowest total birth rates in the EU in 2017 were recorded in Malta (1.26 live births per woman), Spain (1.31 live births per woman), Italy and Cyprus (both 1.32 live births per woman), Greece (1.35), Portugal (1.38), and Luxembourg (1.39). The challenge is that a total fertility rate of around 2.1 live births per woman is considered to be the minimum replacement level in developed countries required. In 2017, however, the average fertility rate in the EU-28 was 1.59 live births per woman (Eurostat 2019g), well below the level required to sustain the current population number.

UN projections indicate that by mid-century – 2050 – the working age population of the EU as a whole will be supporting nearly double the number of elderly people as it does now, providing significant challenges for the sustainability of pension systems, health care, and social safety nets. In the years to come, the size of the working-age populations (WAP) will decline in most EU Member States. This is likely to have a negative impact on economic growth, measured as the increase in the total volume of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). At the same time, the decline in the share of the working-age population will affect all EU countries. The shrinking share of the population in working age is called the demographic burden and may have a negative impact on the standard of

30 In 2017, there were 17 million EU-28 migrants (EU citizens (all ages) living in an EU Member State other than their country of citizenship) in the EU, amongst which 12.4 million were of working age (20-64 years). The stocks of EU-28 migrants are heavily concentrated in a handful of Member States. Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, France and Spain host 74% of all migrants. Romanian, Polish, Portuguese, Italian and Bulgarian nationals made up over 50% of EU-28 migrants in 2017. Around 89% of the working-age migrants in 2017 were active (employed or looking for work), amounting to 9.5 million (European Commission 2019a:13). In addition, there were 1.4 million cross-border workers in the EU. These are EU or EFTA citizens living in one EU Member State and working in another (European Commission 2019a:13). A posted worker is defined as “a person who, for a limited period of time, carries out his or her work in the territory of an EU Member State other than the state in which he or she normally works” (Official Journal of the European Communities 1996). It is still difficult to appreciate the full scope of the phenomenon. Data on posted workers are not systematically collected in all Member States, and even where they exist, are not easily comparable. Therefore, at EU level, only estimates are available. In 2015, through the European Commission’s analysis of Portable Documents A1 (a PD A1 is a formal document stating that the holder pays social contributions in another Member State), the estimate of the number of posted workers in the EU was 2.05 million (Eurofound n.d.).

31 The combination of young and old-age dependency ratios provides the total age dependency ratio (calculated as the ratio of dependent people, young and old, compared with the population considered to be of working age; in other words 35 to 64 years old), which in 2017 was 33% in the EU-28, indicating that there were approximately two working-age persons for every dependent person (Eurostat 2019b).

32 The most widely used indicator of fertility is the total fertility rate: this is the mean number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if she were to pass through her childbearing years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates of a given year. In most of the EU Member States, the total fertility rate declined considerably between 1980 and 2000-2005; by 2008, values had fallen below 1.30 in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia (Eurostat 2019g).

33 Amongst the EU Member States, France reported the highest total fertility rate in 2017, with 1.90 live births per woman, followed by Sweden, with 1.78 live births per woman and Ireland, with 1.77 live births per woman. By contrast, the lowest total birth rates in the EU in 2017 were recorded in Malta (1.26 live births per woman), Spain (1.31 live births per woman), Italy and Cyprus (both 1.32 live births per woman), Greece (1.35), Portugal (1.38), and Luxembourg (1.39). The challenge is that a total fertility rate of around 2.1 live births per woman is considered to be the minimum replacement level in developed countries required. In 2017, however, the average fertility rate in the EU-28 was 1.59 live births per woman (Eurostat 2019g), well below the level required to sustain the current population number.
living, measured as GDP per capita (Population Europe 2019; Hilgenstock and Kócán 2018).34

Thus, migration is important when considering solutions to addressing Europe’s demographic changes. Nevertheless, it is also important to recognise that, while the demographic rationale – i.e. the necessity of Europe to attract young migrants to replace its workforce to sustain economic growth – has gained consensus among European policy elites, it is also not sustainable in a longer-term perspective. This is because such an argument is built upon the assumption of a steady inflow of young people and disregards the fact that new residents will also age. Migration’s contribution to development should therefore be viewed beyond demography. These and other aspects will be discussed in more detail in the following sections on the various contributions of migrants and migration to European development.

2.4.2. General contribution of migration and migrants to the economy and the labour market

In Europe, migrants represent growing portions of populations and of work forces in many countries. According to the European Parliament Research Service, “Most first residence permits issued to non-EU migrants in the EU-28 were issued for employment-related reasons in 2017 (Luyten and González Díaz 2019:3). An OECD report, states that “from 2004 to 2014, migrants provided 70% of the increase in the European workforce, while representing close to 25% of the entries into the most strongly declining occupations in Europe” (OECD 2014b cited in Zidar 2019:19). The Austria Common Home study states that in 2017, 15.3% of the workforce was foreign-born (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:19). The Czech Republic study reports that according to their reading of OECD data, there were 470,000 foreign workers and entrepreneurs in the country in 2016, representing nearly 9% of the total workforce – “a proportion that has no doubt increased since 2016 with continuing immigration of working-age persons and the ongoing ageing and decline of the native-born workforce” (Jungwirth 2019:22).

All the national Common Home studies show that migrants play a crucial role in sustaining development through employment, job creation, and innovation. Besides the demographic challenges, these contributions are particularly important for countries experiencing high emigration of young, highly educated and/or skilled persons, such as Bulgaria, Italy, and Portugal. However, for most EU countries, native ‘loss of talent’ is partially compensated by the immigration of skilled persons from elsewhere in Europe and other regions. Yet, this also contributes in some cases to ‘brain drain’ in the origin countries. For example, Slovenia attracts many people from the neighbouring Balkan countries who are heavily motivated by economic opportunities and factors (Zidar 2019:15).35

An OECD report noted that migration between OECD countries (including all EU Member States) is selective towards highly skilled migrants, reflecting competition between OECD countries to attract “the best and the brightest”, including from other developed countries. It highlighted that, “In most OECD countries, the number of immigrants with tertiary education exceeds the number of highly qualified expatriates to other OECD countries […]and that, [o]n this measure, most OECD countries would appear to benefit from the international mobility of the highly skilled” (Dumont and Lemaître 2005:17).

One commonality between all the country studies is that migrants are found to be working in every sector of economic activity. In most of the 11 countries under review, migrants are primarily present in low-skilled sectors (i.e. agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and small-scale commerce), but their presence in high-skilled and high-tech domains (i.e. research, IT, medical professions) is also significant. Migrants are crucial contributors to key national economic sectors of industrial activity such as construction, agricultural and/or forestry. Migrants are increasingly playing a more important role in services, particularly health and home care, hotel and catering as well as in small and medium enterprises. In several of the countries under review, migrants were key to the revival of flagship economic sectors that supported the country’s industrial redevelopment, such as the Slovak automotive industry (Letavajová and Divinský 2019:50). In Italy, Chinese entrepreneurs revitalised the declining Italian textile sector by converting the sweatshops to produce ready-to-wear fashion clothing (Ceschi 2019). These and other migrant dependent industries supported the countries weathering the global economic crisis starting in 2008 with little or no decline in GDP and almost no increase in unemployment.

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34 The EU-28’s population is projected to increase to a peak of 528.6 million around 2050 and thereafter to gradually decline to 518.8 million by 2080. During the period from 2017 to 2080, the share of the population of working age is expected to decline steadily by 2050 before stabilising somewhat, while older persons will likely account for an increasing share of the total population: those aged 65 years or over will account for 29.3% of the EU-28’s population by 2080, compared with 19.4% in 2017. As a result of the population movement between age groups, the EU-28’s old-age dependency ratio is projected to almost double from 29.9% in 2017 to 52.3% by 2080 (Eurostat 2019b).

35 After World War II, a significant number of people from elsewhere in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia migrated/moved to the then federated Socialist Republic of Slovenia (one of the six republics in the Federal Republic). In the following decades, migrants from elsewhere in Yugoslavia contributed to the industrialisation of the Slovenian economy through their work in the transport, construction, steel, and healthcare industries. Migrants from the Western Balkans to Slovenia sharply increased during the 1960s and 1970s as they were drawn to employment in the coal mining, wood processing, and metalurgy industries. Current data shows that migrants from the Western Balkan countries, especially young people, are generally highly educated and integrated in a variety of employment sectors in the country, often as experts and qualified professionals (Zidar 2019).
Migrants also contribute to the sustainability of key public sectors in select countries. For example, the Czech Republic study notes that migrants are "paramount in sustaining the effectiveness of the Czech healthcare system, both as medical doctors and as medical staff and the care sector in general" (Jungwirth 2019:23). In Italy, migrants play a key role in sustaining the viability of specialised sectors such as textile manufacturing as well as more general domains such as agriculture and construction. Accordingly, more than 70% of migrant workers are hired as manual workers in the country (Ceschi 2019:20). Similar trends apply to Portugal (Góis 2019:35) and the Netherlands (van Reisen, Schoenmaeckers, and van Dillen 2019:24) where migrants tend to concentrate in labour-intensive sectors such as hospitality, construction, agriculture and low-skilled services (e.g. in cleaning, domestic work).

Overall, the Common Home studies show a range of different levels of migrant participation in employment and differential treatment at work. Several studies also noted differentiated employment rates and conditions of work correlating with the migrants' origins. While migrants from other EU Member States have employment and unemployment rates similar to natives in similar age groups, migrants of other non-EU or 'western' origins have modestly lower employment rates and higher unemployment. Migrants from non-western countries – generally Africa, Asia, and the Middle East have more differentiated rates. However, information, where available, indicates that native-born children of these different groupings experience rates of employment and unemployment closer to those of immigrant parents than of natives, suggesting that discrimination in access to employment (and in access to quality education and training too) may be major factors in the differentiated employment outcomes (Ceschi 2019:27; Gois 2019:8, 41; Fleischer 2019:34; Jungwirth 2019:28; Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:43-44; Lappalainen 2019:44; Letavajová and Divinský 2019:36; van Reisen et al. 2019:31).

### 2.4.3. The contribution of migration and migrants to entrepreneurship

Migrants also participate in the labour market as entrepreneurs. They capitalise on connections with other migrants and have access to, and familiarity, with markets in their countries of origin. The Germany Common Home study highlights that migrants may have certain advantages when it comes to establishing a business, and particularly an innovative one, due to their own transnational living experience, stock of knowledge and networks of relations (Fleischer 2019). Migrants, regardless of their activity domain, can use their knowledge to develop innovative products and services. As entrepreneurs, migrants create businesses and new jobs in a variety of sectors (Letavajováv and Divinský 2019). According to the European Commission (n.d.h), "Entrepreneurship creates new companies and jobs, opens up new markets, and nurtures new skills and capabilities." This is important for countries of destination (and of origin, cf. Chapter 3) since ethnic entrepreneurship creates new services and consumption demands and fosters innovation.

Further analysis of the Common Home studies shows that migrants are significantly represented in the establishment and operation of small and medium business enterprises. 'Ethnic' entrepreneurship in Germany is creating new jobs and triggering stronger economic growth, having a generally positive fiscal impact with net contributions to social security and the welfare system (Fleischer 2019). Second-generation migrants are becoming visible as innovators, thinkers and entrepreneurs in the Czech Republic where migrants have opened Vietnamese bistros and restaurants, 66 of which are in Prague alone (Jungwirth 2019:24). Migrants engage in a wide range of business activities in Austria, including, but not limited to, restaurants, shops, supermarkets, as well as craft stores (Kratzmann and Harri 2019:22). The situation is similar in Belgium and Bulgaria where many migrants have opened specialised food stores (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:29). In Bulgaria, this includes restaurants and barber shops as well (Kratseva 2019:25). While migrants are known to have start-up rates higher than national cohorts, particularly in the commercial sector (restaurants and shops), an important reason for this cited in most Common Home studies is due to high levels of discrimination in accessing regularised employment sectors. This, coupled with the non-recognition
of their educational and technical diplomas and qualifications acquired in countries of origin or transit, effectively results in impeding or excluding migrants in accessing jobs that are commensurate with their actual skill levels.36 This may indicate why some migrant groups (i.e. retirees from several Western countries) in Slovenia invest in real estate, while others (i.e. the Chinese community) engage in entrepreneurial activities. In the Netherlands, migrants are known to have started businesses in “the construction industry, with many East European migrants, and the food industry with entrepreneurs and self-employed people from all over the world, but mainly from Southern Europe, Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle-East” (van Reisen 2019:24). The Italian study emphasises the resilience of migrant-owned businesses during economic downturns, these businesses have increased in number while Italian businesses have declined (Ceschi 2019:38).

Clearly, migrants contribute in a variety of different ways when engaging in their local economies (Zidar 2019). Migrants in Portugal are promoting entrepreneurial initiatives that foster their inclusion, add dynamism to the Portuguese economy, and innovate the Portuguese corporate panorama (Góis 2019). In this regard, the Portuguese government is providing various opportunities to stimulate immigrant entrepreneurship, which is a vital component toward realising integral human development (Góis 2019). The European Commission is likewise trying, via the Europe 2020 strategy and its Entrepreneurship 2020 action plan, to “ease the creation of new businesses and to create a much more supportive environment for existing entrepreneurs to thrive and grow” (European Commission n.d.i). To facilitate entrepreneurship among migrants already present and residing in the EU, the Commission promotes networks and best practice exchanges relative to migrant entrepreneurship across EU countries.37 Migrants and refugees have also been involved in non-profit social economy enterprises. A notable example is Mezze, Lisbon’s first Syrian restaurant (Góis 2019:54) and featured in a UNHCR Youtube video (2018a). The restaurant was set up by a non-profit association, Pão a Pão, established by three Portuguese nationals and a Syrian immigrant to support refugee integration with a concrete action. Benefitting from a crowdfunding campaign, the restaurant, employing some 15 Syrian refugees, has become one of Lisbon’s most popular restaurants and a successful example of a social economy enterprise.38

2.4.4. Contribution of migration and migrants to welfare and social security

Analysis of the Common Home studies also show that migrants contribute to the country of destination’s national welfare system and net contribution to social protection. This is most visible and impactful where the migrant population is younger and larger. Moreover, Common Home studies tend to support the long-standing claim that migrants contribute overall more than what they cost (Liebig and Mo 2013). This fact in itself defies the common perception spread in Europe of migrants as free riders and welfare exploiters. Data shows the opposite is true.

According to the Austria Common Home study, 63% of all migrants in Austria between the ages of 15 and 64 are in the workforce. Migrants contribute to the welfare system through their contributions to social security, wages, as well as taxes (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:22). The Belgium Common Home study states that Italian, Moroccan, and Turkish migrants aided Belgium in developing its welfare state (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:29). The Bulgaria Home study states that “the majority of immigrants engaged in business and jobs pay social security contributions, thus contributing to Bulgaria’s welfare system” (Krasteva 2019:25). The Czech Republic study argues that migrants do not burden the welfare system. Rather, migrants, in general, contribute as much as they receive from the welfare system (Jungwirth 2019:24). The Germany study states, “…that the immigrants’ net contribution to social security and the welfare system helps to counteract problems linked to the continuous ageing of the German population” (Fleischer 2019:24). Similarly, the Portugal Common Home study shows a positive financial balance between foreigners’ contributions and the social benefits they receive from the welfare system (Góis 2019:28).

36 Further challenges related to this, according to the Slovakia Common Home study, are the complex bureaucratic hurdles and frequent changes in legislation which affect migrant entrepreneurs’ ability to navigate the system and comply with requirements (Lavraiová and Dvrsnič 2019).

37 Some examples can be found at: https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/24461.

38 Mezze aims to match the newcomer’s skills with long-term employment whilst providing workshops and discussion groups with the Portuguese public. One of the aims of the Pão a Pão non-profit association is to help young people and women, in particular, integrate into the Portuguese workforce (Góis 2019).
The fact that, at present, migrants are younger on average than the native population means that migrants’ contributions support pension and social security systems in countries of destination and will continue to do so in the future after many ageing natives retire. This is illustrated in Austria, where Austrians received €970 more per capita in 2015 than they paid in, while foreign citizens contributed €1,490 more than they received (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:22). As noted in many of the national Common Home studies, migrants not only contribute to national social security systems, but sometimes are not even able to access benefits or benefit from the portability of their contributions when they move to another non-EU country or return to their country of origin.

There are some caveats to migrants’ participation in the social security schemes, for instance, in cases of migrants being employed in the black economy despite such arrangements not necessarily being to their preference. There can be many factors contributing to this phenomenon, such as difficulties legalising the status or the exploitation by employers taking advantage of potentially vulnerable people. The Portugal Common Home study refers to this situation particularly affecting domestic migrant workers who are employed “under the table” and are thus unable to contribute to the national welfare schemes. At the same time, this disqualifies them from being eligible for Portugal’s social protection system. Quite simply, migrants in such situations may find themselves to be in more precarious situations than those in declared work.

2.4.5. The contribution of migration and migrants to community building, culture and politics

With respect to contributions to culture, the Common Home studies highlight several domains and ways in which migrants enrich European societies, from gastronomy to arts and literature, from sports to music. Such impacts are more marked in older countries of immigration, such as in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, but they are becoming more visible in Italy, Portugal, as well as in Eastern European countries. In most countries under review, however, political contributions remain limited due to the high requirements for obtaining citizenship and voting rights. As noted in the Austria study,

In Germany, the involvement of migrant communities has shaped German media, which features television programmes and newspapers in many different languages. Important contributions to literature have been made by migrants as well, with one notable example being Nervid Kermani, who won the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade in 2015 (Fleischer 2019:26-27).

As the Italian study concludes, in the cultural sphere, immigrants from various cultural, social, linguistic and religious environments enrich the national society with new cultural elements, thus promoting cultural diversity and changing the social atmosphere. They bring new impulses, incentives and innovations into everyday interpersonal and social ties as well as into official institutional contacts at local, national and international levels. Similarly, many use social and cultural capital raised abroad in their country of origin. They create economic, social and cultural bridges between the two countries, and may stimulate further compatriots to migrate. In countries of origin that are unstable (threatened by war and conflicts, undemocratic regimes or economic crises), the diaspora can influence social and political events through active engagement in reforms and reconstruction (Ceschi 2019).

Many of the Common Home studies mention the presence of professional football players of foreign background and the various artists, musicians, writers, poets, and actors of foreign descent that have become well-known in their destination countries. For example, the ‘Red Devils’, the Belgian national football team, has several foreign-origin players (Lafleur and

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39 This implies only migration between the country of origin and country of destination. However, as transnational migration becomes generally more accepted, a person may have lived in numerous different countries in a lifetime. Hence, migrants can create economic, social and cultural bridges between numerous countries and not just two (origin and destination).
Marfouk 2019:31), and the two top scorers in the German national football team were foreign-born (Fleischer 2019:27). Individual musical artists that have made substantial cultural contributions include children of migrants such as Stromae in Belgium (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:31). In the case of Germany, migration has contributed to the shifting of the music scene to include multiple styles of international music, such as Turkish Saz Rock, Balkan beats, and American Hip Hop sounds blended with more traditionally ‘German’ music (Fleischer 2019:27). Germans with migration backgrounds have made significant contributions in the film and television industry, including Fatih Akin, Bora Dagtekin, and Sibel Kekilli (Fleischer 2019:27).

Many Common Home studies cite examples of immigrants or children of immigrants in prominent political positions as well. In Belgium, persons of Turkish, Congolese, and Moroccan origin and their children occupy seats in parliament. Two notable political leaders from Turkish and Moroccan migrant backgrounds are Meyrem Almaci and Zakia Khattabi who are the respective leaders of the Belgian Flemish and Francophone Green parties (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:31). Peter Bosman, a Ghanaian-born Slovenian doctor and politician, also became mayor of the city and municipality of Piran. His appointment marked him as Slovenia’s first black mayor. In 2011, he became a member of the Committee of the Regions of the European Union.40

Migrant and diaspora groups are also involved in politics, directly and through empowering migrants to become involved in politics. In Belgium, a young Maghrebi woman named Fadila Laanan, who served as leader of a migrant organisation called Jeunesse Maghrébine, later went on to become Secretary of State of the Brussels regional government (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:32). As stated in the Austria study, migrants’ organisations can be “bridge builders between countries and regions,” as they can encourage engagement in both countries of origin and destination countries as well (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:24). Furthermore, they play a crucial role in helping migrants integrate into the culture and society of the host country.

Examples of such activities documented in the Common Home Studies include the ‘Make Food Not War’ initiative in Portugal which was launched to support refugees from the Middle East. It featured ‘Master Chef’ cooking programmes in which people from Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Eritrea shared their various culinary traditions (Góis 2019:53-54). In Sweden, migrant associations have focused on preserving languages of origin and traditions, working to preserve cultural identity while in a new country while supporting migrants during their integration process (Lappalainen 2019:37). In Austria, the Association of African Students in Austria (VAS), a network of support for African students, supports their labour integration by organising several training events, such as a forum on job placement together with the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) as well as several workshops together with the Austrian Economic Chamber (WKO) (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:50).

40 Caritas Europa interviewed Peter Bosman in 2018 as part of the MIND project regarding paths for integration. His interview can be found here: https://www.caritas.eu/a-surer-path-to-integration/
2.4.6. The contribution of European emigrants to European countries

It is important to note that many of the countries under review in the Common Home studies are in fact countries of emigration. As shown by the different studies, migrants contribute to fill the economic vacuum left by the native emigrant population in countries, such as Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. However, the emigrants from those countries are often making significant economic contributions elsewhere, often in other EU Member States or even in countries, such as the United States, Canada or Australia.

While much emphasis and analysis is often on remittances leaving European countries, all EU Member States benefit economically from significant inflows of remittances – as much as €14.8 billion annually for Germany, €9.4 billion for Belgium, and €8.6 billion for Italy. Figure 6 shows the share of remittances inflows as a percentage of GDP for EU countries, ranging from 0.15% for Greece to 4.47% for Croatia. Many EU countries, as countries of origin, receive remittances from their nationals working abroad, often in neighbouring or other EU countries). For the EU-28, total remittances inflow to the 28 countries (including from other EU member countries and from non-EU countries) make up 0.7% of EU-28 GDP.

According to the Common Home studies, all the countries under review receive significant financial inflows. For some countries, remittance inflows far exceed outflows – such as for Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden. For nearly half the countries in the EU-28, remittance outflows are greater than inflows, as in Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, UK (see figures 6, 7 and 8). The sources of inflows and the destination of outflows are distinct for each country. For some, if not most EU countries, large portions of inflows come from other EU Member States and similarly large portions of outflows are transferred to other EU Member States. To the extent that remittances are considered a resource for development for recipient countries, the data show that they certainly are for most EU Member States. It is also important to remember that financial remittances are not the only contributions emigrants make to their countries of origin (as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). For example, the Portuguese and the Italian Common Home studies note that emigrants, including returnees, have contributed to transferring knowledge and stimulating trade with other countries (Góis 2019; Ceschi 2019). As will become clearer in Chapter 3, the activities of European emigrants mirror, to a large extent, those non-EU diaspora communities, including in other domains such as political engagement and voting from abroad (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019).

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41 In the case of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Portugal, emigrants remit more money to their home country than is sent out by immigrants, thus clearly contributing to economic growth and sustaining local consumption.
Figure 6. Remittances inflow to EU countries as % of GDP, 2017

Notes: GDP at current prices.
For Denmark and Spain - World Bank data on personal remittances received (% of GDP).
Source: made by GMPA, based on Eurostat data of November 2018 (Eurostat 2018b); personal remittances statistics; and Eurostat data for GDP.

Figure 7. Personal remittances inflows to the EU countries, 2017, millions EUR


Figure 8. Personal remittances outflows from the EU countries, 2017, millions EUR


42 For the complete list of acronyms of European Member States and their explanation, please visit https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Country_codes
2.5. Realising the integral human development of migrants and maximising the benefits of migration for the development of countries of destination: challenges and barriers

2.5.1. National-level barriers

This section presents challenges and actual barriers faced by migrants in countries of destination as they endeavour towards integral human development. It also considers emerging obstacles described in the Common Home studies relative to recognising migration’s contribution to the development of countries of destination. The basic, yet key, assumption of this publication is that the integral human development of migrants and of societies in countries of destination are intrinsically connected. Therefore, any barriers threatening migrants’ well-being are not only deplorable from a moral standpoint but also limit the potential of migration as a positive force in the development of countries of destination and of origin. This section takes stock of the findings of the 11 Common Home studies and focuses on the internal dimension, namely relative to countries of destination.

The barriers and obstacles identified in the countries under review are generally similar. They can be categorised along two levels: the national and the EU level. The national level barriers are further clustered as follows:

1. Rising hostility, xenophobia and discrimination towards migrants and refugees: a broken narrative;
2. Barriers to labour market inclusion for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers;
3. Barriers to social and cultural inclusion;
4. Barriers to inclusion of migrants in irregular situation;
5. Barriers to political participation, decision making, civil society and activism.

The EU-level barriers are also broken down further and include:

1. The securitisation of migration;
2. Insufficient progress on legal migration, insufficient protection of the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants;
3. Stalled reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS); and
4. Concerns about EU funding goals and priorities on migration, asylum and integration in the upcoming MFF.

2.5.1.a. Rising hostility, xenophobia and discrimination towards migrants and refugees: a broken narrative

Of the four categories of barriers/challenges that emerged from the data, one major area of concern is the rising hostility, racism and discrimination towards migrants and refugees. Negative attitudes about migration, as well as ensuing hostility, are identified to varying degrees as concerns in the overwhelming majority of the countries under review, with the only notable exception of Portugal. Animosity and angry backlashes, particularly online and in the media, have intensified following the refugee arrivals and the resulting “solidarity crisis” of 2015. While studies have argued that public attitudes toward migration have a tendency of remaining relatively stable over the years and are overall quite positive (Dennison and Dražanová 2019), research in Italy (Dixon et al. 2019), Germany (Helbling et al. 2017), France (Beddiar et al. 2017) as well as across Europe (Dennison and Dražanová 2019; Glorius 2018) has also shown that EU citizens are increasingly sceptical about the prospects of successfully integrating newcomers from outside of Europe, and tend to associate migration increasingly with security concerns rather than freedom of movement. These trends seem to imply that the general public is, at best, sceptical about the potential of migrants to contribute to European development. Analysis of a 2017 Eurobarometer (European Commission Press Release 2018a) has also revealed

43 For example, the Italian Common Home study (Ceschi 2019: 27) also cites a 2018 survey finding that 57% of the country’s people believe that “the impact of immigration on the country has been negative” with such a sentiment consisent amongst group “regardless of geographic area, social class, educational level, profession, and even political ideological affiliation.”
that EU citizens substantially overestimate the number of third
country nationals in Europe – indicating further evidence of the
prominence that migration – as a ‘problem’ – has assumed
in public debate.

Besides general attitudes as recorded in polls and surveys,
few countries in Europe appear to have been spared incidents
of serious violence against migrants. The recently issued
Human Rights Watch Annual Report provides a substantial
summary of notable anti-migrant actions in 2018 (Human
Rights Watch 2019a). It notes “instances of racist intolerance
or violent hate crimes in many EU states including Bulgaria,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Spain,
and the United Kingdom,” while not specifying that many of
the victims would have themselves been migrants, refugees
or persons of immigrant origins. Expressions of discrimination
(including racial and religious profiling), hostility and
violence toward migrants and refugees across Europe are well-
documented in the media44 as well as in other reports by the
EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) (FRA 2019a, 2019b,
2018a, 2018b, 2017, 2016), the Council of Europe’s European
Commission on Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) (ECRI
2019:8-12)45 as well as by national human rights monitoring
bodies and national and European civil society organisations.46
While the national Common Home studies generally did not
delve into direct violence against migrants and refugees, the
Bulgaria study specifically mentions acts of violence against
migrants and refugees and the organised action of ‘vigilante
migrant hunters’ who intercept and (illegally) detain migrants – mainly asylum seekers at the country’s borders
(Krasteva 2019: 48).

The reasons for these worrying trends are difficult to pinpoint,
especially as patterns vary between localities and countries. In
spite of indications that a rise in immigration may coincide
with rising xenophobia in certain localities and/or countries,
the fact remains that such a correlation would be difficult
to prove, especially considering the examples that some
communities who are the most fearful of migrants have never
previously had any contact with migrants. In Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia, the immigration flows
for 2017 were 25.6 thousand, 51.8 thousand, 7.8 thousand,
and 18.8 thousand respectively (Eurostat 2019a). However,
all four of these Common Home studies reported increased
xenophobic public sentiments in their countries (Krasteva
2019:36; Jungwirth 2019:39; Letavajová and Divinský
2019:37; Zidar 2019:33). Moreover, countries such as the
Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden, which have long been
countries of immigration but have not experienced a similar
surge of arrivals as Germany and Italy over the past four years,
have nonetheless experienced similar trends of rising hostility,
racism and discrimination. For example, the Netherlands
Common Home study notes the presence of discrimination
within hiring, education, and housing, as well as rising trends
in negative migration narratives from media outlets. The fact
that many Dutch people do not personally know migrants
exacerbates this tendency to distrust migration due to limited
personal experiences and based on what is seen on television or
on social media (van Reisen et al. 2019:31).

Four major elements can elucidate how these sentiments have
gained popularity: first, the new role of the media and the
anonymity associated with the internet; secondly, the rise of
populist politics in the digital age; third, the existence of actual
growing social and economic inequalities among communities
and across European countries (European Commission
2019c); and fourth, the absence of an anti-discrimination
directive protecting outside the workplace.

With respect to the first, several of the national Common
Home studies highlight the troubling role of the media and
(especially) the ‘new’ media in spreading disinformation and
one-sided stories, as well as promoting negative stereotypes
about migration and migrants while ignoring positive accounts
(Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:8). The mainstream press,
capitalising on people’s fears and sense of vulnerability, do
not hesitate to run sensationalist and, often grossly inaccurate,
accounts in order to make their outlets more marketable.
For example, the Austrian Common Home study notes that
Austrian coverage of refugees and migration is substantially
more negative than that of media coverage in neighbouring
countries, with 37% of the coverage classified as “obviously
negative” in the year 2015 (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:38).

Tabloid newspapers have the largest impact on propagating
this alarmist and biased outlook, yet other news outlets also
use generalisations and non-objective angles in their reporting.
Part of the problem seen in media coverage on migration is the
absence of migrants’ voices in the narrative (Kratzmann and

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44 See, for example, Smale 2015; Nadeau 2017; Tondo and Giaffrò 2018; DW 2019).
45 In line with its mandate, ECRI also conducts regular monitoring – based on study visits and follow-up missions – of the situation on racism and intolerance in each of the Council of Europe member states. The findings can be accessed as ECRI’s page on country monitoring (ECRI n.d.).
46 Given the broad scope of this report it is impossible to here refer to all specific situations. But see, for example: InfoMigrants’ monitoring activities (InfoMigrants n.d.); Human Rights Watch’s report on xenophobic violence in Greece (Human Rights Watch 2012); Amnesty International report on violence towards migrants and refugees along the Balkan Route (Amnesty International 2019); Amnesty Report on the situation in Sweden (Amnesty International 2018); ENAR’s European-wide interactive map (ENAR n.d.).
In the case of Germany, the Common Home study notes that the main media narrative focuses on the idea of “there are too many migrants” and that the language used in reporting emphasises images of crisis and strain on the host countries’ resources (Fleischer 2019:32). Especially following 2015, the media has been playing a strong role in shaping people’s attitudes towards migrants in Slovakia as well, in some cases spreading distrust and fear of migrants through biased reporting (Letavajová and Divínský 2019:50). Research across several European countries has underscored that migrants and refugees are often just a passive subject in articles covering migration, and that their voices are often made invisible or framed within stereotyped narratives of migrants as either ‘thugs’ or (in better-case scenarios) as ‘victims’ (CCME and WACC Europe 2017). At the same time, the spread of fake news and misinformation is clearly enabled by the explosion in popularity of social media, which has led to the growing fragmentation and insulation of information channels and to a general deterioration of content production standards. Additionally, people have the added cover of anonymity when using the web, creating an environment where individual writers and entire groups of people can abuse others without having to stand publicly behind their statements. Increasingly, people with extreme ideas have been using the internet as a platform to rally support to move violence to the streets, where attacks occur either by single individuals or by increasingly groups. Even more worrying is the lack of professionalism and awareness of these potential threats among key sections of police and intelligence services (Fekete 2012:11). Clearly, the role of the internet and the media is relevant, especially because studies have found that, whereas ‘real’ interpersonal contacts with migrants and refugees tend to decrease hostility or mistrust towards them, contacts mediated by the media often have the opposite effect (Panichella and Ambrosi 2018).

Different Common Home studies show how a new generation of reactionary populist politicians has taken the main public stage in several EU countries. Their rhetoric centres, in varying degrees, on protecting the national cultural identity and values, on promoting the social and economic interests of country nationals first, and on publicly denouncing migrants – particularly non-EU ones – as the source of all societal ills (Schmuck and Matthes 2017). In Italy, such rhetoric has been forcefully promoted by political parties such as the League Party and, to a lesser extent, the Five-Star Movement. The impacts of this narrative include discrimination against migrants in numerous domains, including in housing and family benefits, including maternity support. Italy’s international policy has also been affected by this xenophobic trend, especially in terms of the Mediterranean search and rescue operations (Ceschi 2019:28) and the criminalisation of acts of solidarity. 

The Bulgaria Common Home study discusses the use of xenophobic language even by mainstream political parties, and identifies this practice as responsible for impacting people’s negative perceptions of migrants, more so than real-life experiences as an “overwhelming majority of [Bulgarian citizens] do not know any migrants/refugees” (Krasteva 2019:48). If, until a few years ago, such politicians and political positions were clearly a minority in most EU Member States, this has recently changed dramatically across Europe, as last shown by their important gains in countries such as Italy, France, Belgium, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom in the context of the 2019 European Parliamentary elections (Walker 2019). Populist politicians have shown great skill in manipulating the public debate, particularly online, and have used misinformation on migration as a way to instil irrational fears and worries amongst the population so that they can emerge as the ‘saviours’ who would restore ‘law, security and order’ (Hameleers and Schmuck 2017; Bleich and Morgan 2019). In the Slovakian context, the majority of parliamentarians were against the European Commission’s proposed quotas for migration in 2015, and more recently, the government decided against participating in the December 2018 international Conference on Migration in Marrakesh and against supporting the Global Compact on Migration (Letavajová and Divínský 2019:38). The Netherlands Common Home study notes the increased popularity of Geert Wilders’ populist political party in 2017, which was aided by polarising discourse surrounding migration in the media (van Reisen et al. 2019:18).

However, negative emotions and irrational fears and misconceptions on migration can often coincide with and be fuelled by the economic and social difficulties local populations are facing, such as falling into or being trapped in situations of poverty or being excluded from the welfare system (Pichler...
Perceived competition between marginalised local populations and the visible migrant population can arise in the labour market or in accessing social benefits or other material resources (Polavieja 2016). This situation is more broadly linked to structural changes that are taking place both in Europe and globally, from the casualisation of work and the restructuring of economic production (delocalisation, sub-contracting, etc.) to the retreat of the welfare state in many European countries (Schierup, Hansen and Castles 2006). These structural changes have had devastating effects on the well-being of many Europeans. In these and other such situations, migrants often become the scapegoat for societal ills in public debate and in daily life (Danièle 1998). This is particularly the case in countries such as Italy, where a mix of dramatic economic decline and short-sighted social and economic policies have resulted in the native ‘working-poor’ being pitted against the migrant population in a desperate fight for survival (Ceschi 2019). While this is not evident in all the countries under review, many Caritas member organisations in the EU identify this as an increasingly pervading phenomenon.

In some countries, the arrival of migrants from previously remote lands is also felt and framed in negative cultural terms (Hellwig and Sinno 2017). For example, in Central and Eastern Europe, where migration from African and Middle Eastern countries is a new phenomenon often interpreted through pre-existing national imaginaries, e.g. the historical religious divide and conflict with the Ottoman Empire, Islamophobia has become a key issue of concern for many. The Slovakian report highlights some recent developments showing this phenomenon, the amendment to Act No. 308/1991 on Freedom of Religious Faith and on Position of Churches and Religious Societies being one. In 2017, this amendment blocked the Slovakian Muslim community from registering Islam as an official religion by raising the minimum number of adult citizens needed to do so (Letavajová and Divínsky 2019:38). Furthermore, politicians have made statements that exacerbate Islamophobia; the Slovak National Party, for example, has talked about “the threat of ‘Islamisation’” (Letavajová and Divínsky 2019:38). The Slovakian Prime Minister has also invoked fear of Muslim migrants in his speeches, saying that only Christian migrants would be accepted in Slovakia (Letavajová and Divínsky 2019:38). In the Netherlands, the “PVV” (Party for Freedom) is another example of a political party that emphasises anti-Islam discourse (van Reisen et al. 2019:18). Outside of political discourse, traces of Islamophobia are seen in popular perceptions in certain places. In the Czech Republic, a 2018 Pew analysis found that only 12% of Czech

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49 Interestingly, however, research has shown that populist politicians may contribute to reinforcing this perception amongst people even at times of economic prosperity, inasmuch as they will still try to ‘engineer’ a ‘sense of injustice and victimhood by portraying ordinary citizens as the victims of an alliance between powerful groups (the elite) and less powerful groups (refugees, immigrants, minorities).” (Mohn and Josten 2016:27).
respondents would be willing to accept a Muslim as part of their family (Jungwirth 2019:31). Similar cultural concerns — questioning migrants’ ability to adapt to Dutch values and principles — are commonly voiced in the Netherlands in relation to ‘non-Western’ migrants (van Reisen et al. 2019:31).

This convergence between hostile public opinion and conservative/reactionary politics, fuelled by the media and rooted in changing structural socio-economic conditions and their perception, is probably the most important single barrier to the promotion of inclusive policies for migrants and a virtuous relationship between migration and development in migrants’ countries of destination. In such a context, it is extremely difficult for progressive politicians to support and/or put forward pro-migrant legislation at all levels of government, including at European level. This has surely also contributed to the climate in the European Council that has since 2009 blocked the adoption of the anti-discrimination directive to ban discrimination on the grounds of age, disability, religion or belief, among other characteristics, in all areas of EU competence.50

In the current ‘post-truth’ climate, the general public has also become more sceptical of arguments put forward by Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and think tanks, even though they are based on evidence and data (Galasso et al. 2017). Mainstream media, institutions and CSOs are often seen as unreliable, as they are accused of being biased in their data collection and analysis in order to pursue their own political interests. Aside from populist politicians, politicians with more moderate positions are also becoming wary of supporting evidence-based policies, as they fear they will be rejected by their constituencies (Allen, Blinder, and McNeil 2019. As such, facts, figures, and evidence seem to be less convincing than emotionally charged gut reactions, making it more difficult to affect a change in sentiment amongst the wider public (Forstenzer 2018; Dempster and Hargrave 2017).

In this context, the slow progress on anti-discrimination legislation51 is particularly worrisome. The European Parliament adopted the directive proposal (COM(2008)462) against discrimination based on age, disability, sexual orientation and religion or belief beyond the workplace (European Commission n.d.d) in 2009, but since then the proposal has been stuck at the first reading stage in the European Council. EU non-discrimination legislation only exists at the moment to protect against the discrimination of women, and on grounds of race and ethnicity in the labour market (European Commission n.d.d).

2.5.1.b. Barriers to labour market inclusion for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers

Another common barrier identified in the Common Home studies is in relation to migrant and refugee access to the labour market. These barriers include insufficient protection of migrants’ rights at work, lack of skills recognition and limited support to entrepreneurship. Throughout the 11 studies, there is a clear pattern of countries reporting violations of migrant workers’ rights in their place of employment. For example, the limited enforcement of labour legislation is identified as a concern in the Austria study, especially at workplaces where migrants are employed. Lax enforcement is occasionally found to allow for discriminatory practices and poor treatment of workers to flourish in several low-paid and low-skilled occupations, where many migrant workers — of both European and third country origin — are concentrated (Kratzmann and Harrl 2019:7).

In the Slovakia study, the authors cite abuse in the workplace as another worrying element undermining the rights and well-being of migrants (Letavajová and Divinský 2019:35). Such abuse may take the form of illegal wage cuts, passport confiscation, as well as emotional and physical blackmailing and harassment. Undocumented migrants often find themselves in an even more precarious situation, since they are vulnerable to employers’ threats of reporting them to police authorities if they do not agree with working conditions and standards. Such abuses were most widespread for migrant workers from Ukraine, as well as in migrant communities where both employers and employees are at a disadvantage in the local labour market, such as the case for Vietnamese and Chinese immigrants. The Slovenia study identifies similar challenges and also highlights the increase in practices such as forced work, late pay or withholding wage-related benefits (Zidar 2019:27).

A third and connected theme is discrimination in access to employment. In this case, discrimination is often found to correlate, not only (and sometimes, not even necessarily) amongst migrants with a foreign legal status, but also with other distinguishing characteristics or markers such as ethnic and racial features, language or perceived religion. (ENAR 2017; FRA 2017; FRA 2018b). For example, the Belgium national study, quoting a 2009 IPSO survey, states that 44% of the population of immigrant origin in Brussels declared having experienced discrimination in job recruitment at least once in their lives (Lafleur and Marfoouk 2019:43). At the same time, the study also mentions that, regardless of legal status and

50 The proposal has been stuck at the first reading stage in the Council. Consequently, EU non-discrimination legislation only exists at the moment to protect against the discrimination of women, and on grounds of race and ethnicity in the labour market (European Commission n.d.d).
51 This refers to directives against discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic origin, against discrimination at work, equal treatment for men and women in matters of employment and occupation, and equal treatment for men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services.
actual nationality, “young graduate applicants with Turkish-sounding names have less chance to be invited to a job interview than young graduates with Flemish-sounding names” (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:43). On average, applicants with Turkish names need to send 44% more applications if they wish to receive the same number of positive answers received by those with Flemish names” (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:43). The Netherlands study also cites discrimination for employment opportunities as a major obstacle for migrants. Such discrimination is often reinforced by other inequalities experienced by migrants, such as their residential segregation in areas with low-quality housing, deficient public transportation between poor residential neighbourhoods and areas with employment opportunities, as well as limited recognition of migrants’ educational and professional qualifications (van Reisen et. al. 2019:31).

Several Common Home studies specifically mention the issue of labour inclusion of refugees and asylum seekers. For example, the Austria study discusses restrictions in the Austrian labour market that act as barriers for these populations, including the removal of the apprenticeship education option for asylum seekers. The only options for refugees and asylum seekers in Austria are sectors such as tourism, agriculture, and forestry, and only on a seasonal basis. The other work possibility for asylum seekers is self-employment (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:34). Other obstacles include the recognition of qualifications and education. The Bulgaria study also reported that complicated bureaucracy, high fees, translation costs, and lack of access to original documents hinder refugees’ ability to obtain work in their area of expertise (Krasteva 2019:32).

Due to their insecure legal status, people in irregular situations, additionally, frequently face difficulties exercising their right to access justice or to benefit from labour exploitation safeguards. For example, undocumented workers who are exploited, intimidated and not paid tend to fear interactions with labour inspectors as this could potentially lead to their deportation. The Employer Sanctions directive (2009/52/EC) targets one particular group of workers often involved in undeclared work or unauthorised employment by their circumstances of unauthorised residence and/or employment. However, inspections on workers in irregular situations result in sanctions on employers only in a small minority of cases. Furthermore, they address neither the causes nor the dimensions of undeclared work and informal economic activity in Europe, where undeclared work represents up to 20% of GDP in some countries (Williams et. al. 2017). Moreover, as argued by the Fundamental Rights Agency, “linking workplace inspections with checks on immigration status creates an environment, which is not conducive to identifying labour exploitation or abuse, as migrants in an irregular situation are discouraged from reporting on or testifying to such conditions” (FRA 2011:7). It is precisely the fear generated by these measures, the agency argues, “that prevent migrants in an irregular situation from claiming their fundamental rights or seeking redress when they are violated” (FRA 2011:7).
A third, interconnected topic is the lack of recognition of skills and qualifications for migrants seeking employment. According to the Czech Republic study, while many EU and third-country migrants have “a considerably higher share of university-educated people than the native Czech population”, they often “end up in low- or mid-skilled jobs in spite of […] higher qualifications” (Jungwirth 2019:38). The Italian study shows a similar and perhaps more extreme phenomenon of “downward inclusion” in Italy, whereas “the great majority of immigrants are still confined to low-wage and menial occupations”, with most migrants being denied “access to better paid, more protected and more qualified jobs (e.g. managers, department head, white-collar jobs, technicians and professionals)” (Ceschi 2019:27). The Belgian study, drawing on OECD data for 2017, similarly argue that lack of skills-recognition has led to overrepresentation of migrants in low- and medium-skilled jobs in comparison to native-born workers, e.g. 60% of migrants versus 50% of native-born (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:40).

A fourth barrier relates to the limited support to migrant entrepreneurship. The Italy study refers to this issue in detail; migrant entrepreneurs face problems such as only being able to enter limited economic sectors that may already be over-saturated or being limited to certain sectors that do not have enough upward mobility (Ceschi 2019:27). Additionally, Chambers of Commerce and entrepreneurial associations do not always give migrant entrepreneurs the support needed to launch successfully their businesses (Ceschi 2019:30). In the case of Slovakia, labour discrimination is inherent in some administrative procedures as well as in personal interactions, which could negatively affect migrant entrepreneurs. Language skills, difficulties in obtaining residence permits, and changes in bureaucratic procedures and legislation are other obstacles faced by migrant entrepreneurs cited in the Slovakian study (Letevajová and Divinský 2019:8).

A fifth barrier is the limited attention given toward completing transposition or an even implementation of existing directives for the purposes of work. Except for the Seasonal Workers directive (2014/36/EU), relatively little progress has been made on regular channels of migration for non-highly skilled workers. And a main intention behind this directive was “to reduce the presence of irregular migrants – who are often subject to exploitation and tend to live in precarious situations” (Luyten and González Díaz 2019:5). The EU also anticipated, however, an improvement in working conditions for migrants granted permits to work and live only temporarily in the EU.

Overall, considering the lack of explicit human rights and international labour standards application to all migrants, the current European migration policy regime results in enormous human costs and consequences for many migrant workers and their family members (FRA 2019c). Many workers, ‘natives’ as well as immigrants, especially in informal employment, experience a lack of decent work and a lack of protection for their human and labour rights (FRA 2015a). Fundamental standards of non-discrimination and equality of treatment were incorporated in the “race equality directive” of 2000 and generally apply to regular migrant workers regarding discrimination on racial, ethnic or national origin grounds (FRA 2012). Nonetheless, there has not been adequate attention to workplace protection of migrant workers under labour standards, nor to the labour inspection policies and practices necessary to monitor and enforce these standards (FRA 2018c).

2.5.1.c. Barriers to social and cultural inclusion

Based on the analyses of the Common Home 11 studies, many other overlapping obstacles faced by migrants in countries of destination exist beyond those previously mentioned. These encompass general limitations to accessing certain rights, including limited or complete lack of social protection, barriers to accessing education and healthcare. In addition, particularly in more recent countries of immigration, the findings illustrate limited opportunities for political and cultural participation in the life of the country. This lack of opportunity has contributed to the hardships faced by migrants in the integration and social inclusion process. On the one hand, newly arriving migrants face immediate barriers, sometimes even of a humanitarian nature; on the other hand, in the longer term, migrants face cultural, structural and economic barriers that hinder their capacity to participate fully in the country of destination.

Most of the studies outline their different national integration approaches and the essential components related to facilitating (or not) the participation of migrants and refugees within the communities and societies where they reside. A key point stressed across the studies is that integration is a process of mutual respect and accommodation between the migrant and refugee newcomers and the local community and society. However, it is conditional on access to services and the relevant societal spheres including access to employment, healthcare and education as well as to a secure residence status and other factors. Integration is a process that “starts from day one”.

National language courses are among the essentials for fostering integration. This includes advanced and profession-specific language courses to support employment insertion at all skills levels as well as orientation courses. Other essentials for integration include access to decent and affordable housing; healthcare services on an equal footing with natives/established citizens; and access to schooling for all children.
2.5.1.d. Barriers to inclusion of migrants in irregular situation

Another extremely pertinent issue evolving from the Common Home studies is the particular situation of migrants in an irregular situation. This is a sensitive issue, but one of vastly growing concern for Caritas, since the number of people stuck in precarious limbo situations due to their irregular status is on the rise. It is clear that when a government lowers protection levels for asylum seekers while at the same time is also unable to increase returns of migrants to their countries of origin or country of first asylum, that this results in an increase in undocumented migrants who are stuck in limbo situations without rights. The EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) notes, “The EU Return directive (2008/115/EC), contains only limited guidance on the fundamental rights guarantees for persons who are not removed (Article 14) and does not provide for any mechanism that could put an end to situations of legal limbo deriving from protracted non-removability” (FRA 2011).

In addition to the increased number of rejections in asylum applications and waiting periods for return, policy changes have also been resulting in certain countries restricting the rights they grant people and lowering protection levels. Because of stricter policies being imposed to counter irregular migration and increase the return of undocumented migrants, increased pressure is being exerted on public service staff and law enforcement agents, in some cases even obliging them to report the legal status of the migrants they encounter to immigration enforcement officers. Several EU Member States have resorted to criminalising provisions in immigration law, ostensibly to deter migrants from entering or staying in an irregular manner. This is evident by the case of the Italian Council of Ministers adopting a Decree on Immigration and Security (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana 2018) on 24 September 2018 (converted into law in December 2018). In this Decree, there is an abrogation of ‘humanitarian protection’ - namely, the residence permit issued to persons who are not eligible to refugee status or subsidiary protection but cannot be expelled from the country because of ‘serious reasons of humanitarian nature’ is pushing many migrants into destitution and homelessness. The human rights challenges connected to the criminalisation of irregular migration have been documented in various reports, including in a Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights paper (Elspeth 2010) and two reports by the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants on the management of the external borders of the EU (UN Human Rights Council 2013; UN Human Rights Council 2015).

52 For the sake of clarity, Caritas is not advocating for increased returns. Rather the opposite is true. Moreover, Caritas advocates for voluntary returns not forced returns. Nevertheless, the priority of EU Member States to foster return inevitably results in higher numbers of people in situations of limbo and irregularity.
53 France adopted restrictive asylum laws in early 2018 and news broke out in December that Denmark was interested in confining rejected asylum seekers to a remote island.
54 In addition, this decree is dismantling reception and integration at local level and is forcing CSOs to increasingly operate in big reception centres with no integration activities. It will also enhance the activities of the private sector and companies that are making money out of migrants’ reception.
Reports by the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migration (PICUM) and by the FRA have noted that fundamental rights to healthcare for migrants in an irregular situation are inadequately or not at all protected in EU Member States and in some cases restricted access to only fee-paying emergency treatment (PICUM 2016; FRA 2015b). Similarly, maternity care and child healthcare is unequally provided for migrants in irregular situations. In several Member States, other restrictions on fundamental rights for persons in irregular situations include allowing only some children with an irregular status to access state schools free of charge. Access to education for children in irregular situations is more restricted the higher the levels of education and the older the child. Blanket restrictions on access to marriage on grounds of irregular stay are problematic and disproportionate but this exists in some EU Member States. These impinge on the integral human development of migrants and their families who are surviving with an irregular status.

In addition to limitations in accessing public services, other important entitlements people in irregular situations frequently fail to exercise due to their insecure legal status include the right to access justice or to benefit from labour exploitation safeguards. Immigration enforcement policies are often prioritised over people’s fundamental rights. Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union spells out “prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings” as one of the aims for a common immigration policy (Official Journal of the European Union 2016b). The EU framework to “combat illegal migration” and specific control measures pose three major obstacles to realising the benefits of the migration and development nexus. First, these measures restrict or deny human and labour rights protection to a significant number of people residing in the EU. Secondly, they exacerbate the economic, legal and social problems they are supposed to resolve. Thirdly, the border externalisation component of the policy framework exacerbates repression and human rights violations of migrants and refugees in third countries. It also impedes access to refugee protection for persons fleeing warfare, persecution and/or situations of generalised human rights abuse. The increased criminalisation by authorities of irregular migrants and of those providing support to them further reinforces the difficulty to ensure that the rights and dignity of migrants, irrespective of their legal status, is being respected. In response, several academics are advocating the implementation of a “firewall”, meaning the separation of public services providing basic services from immigration enforcement services in order to create a safe environment for all migrants to have effective access to basic services and fundamental rights without fear of deportation. According to Crépeau and Hastie (2015: 165), as discussed further in the opportunity section, the Global Compact on Migration and its 23 objectives is a laudable intergovernmental attempt to ensure that the body of human rights already enshrined in international law is applied to all migrants; in that regard, objective 15 (provide access to basic services for migrants) is here particularly relevant and important.

2.5.1.e. Barriers to political participation, decision making, civil society and activism

Despite their willingness and interest in being actively involved in the decision-making processes that affect their lives, migrants generally face numerous barriers. They also struggle in contributing to political processes in their county of destination and at the EU-level despite the actions of diaspora, migrant-run organisations and civil society organisations. Moreover, migrant contributions to political life and decision-making are often not readily acknowledged or visible when they do have a chance to be more active (Lynch and Pfohman 2013).

Based on analysis of the 11 Common Home studies, migrants are able to access their right to participate in political decision-making processes to varying degrees. For example, refugees generally cannot vote in local or national elections as they lack the necessary legal status, making them ineligible to vote. Moreover, third country nationals in many EU countries, who have not yet acquired EU citizenship or naturalised in the country of residence, are also typically excluded from
the political process. This naturally poses a barrier to their representation in democratic processes and institutions across Europe, while also limiting their ability to influence politics and society due to a lack of political influence (voting rights). As long as migrants are facing difficulties accessing the right to vote, participating politically and gaining an official political position as a migrant, the more difficulty migrants will have in gaining recognition and being valued for the cultural diversity they bring to political, cultural and social realms.

Migrants also face obstacles related to the mobilisation of diasporas and limited access to funding. The involvement of diaspora and migrant organisations in issues such as development policy are limited due to a lack of funding or outreach from national or regional governments. For example, in the Belgium study, immigrant organisations were not considered “privileged partners” by the government and no separate budgets were allocated for co-development activities (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:54). The Germany study mentions the lack of communication and knowledge about funding opportunities, as well as limited volunteer capacity, as barriers to the involvement of migrant and diaspora organisations’ social involvement in countries of destination (Fleischer 2019:33). Other challenges identified in the Common Home studies included the lack of professionalisation and managerial expertise of most organisations and an overall lack of major support from national/local governments for capacity-building.

Considering the principles put forward in the Common Basic Principles, the participation of migrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures is vital, especially at the local level. Not only does this support the integration process but it also contributes to fostering the active participation of migrants in issues that affect them. For Caritas Europa, dialogue and shared rights and responsibilities, which include empowerment and active participation, are essential features of any successful integration process, so clearly governments need to devote greater attention to address these barriers to migrants’ political participation, decision-making, civil society and activism.

2.5.2. Barriers to the reform and implementation of EU-level legislation on migration and asylum

While considerable progress has been achieved on common immigration and asylum policies for the community since the late 1990s, results remain incomplete and sometimes contradictory. While intra-European mobility has largely been codified, legal migration and integration policy and practice remains a Member State competency. As a result, national approaches differ and are subject to changes as domestic political contexts evolve (and politicians change). With the 2015 European Agenda on Migration as a reference, it becomes clear that over the last few years, considerable progress has been made on fighting irregular migration, while both regular migration and asylum still lag considerably behind. The hostile political climate across Europe on migration has stalled and blocked several initiatives promoting the reform of legal migration policy and the asylum system. The drive towards border securitisation has also pushed the EU to increase the capacities of FRONTEX, as well as to step up its efforts to increase the volume and scope of returning irregular migrants. This is described in the next section on the securitisation of migration, which is followed by other barriers emerging at EU level, such as the insufficient protection of rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants and the lack of progress made on legal migration, the stalled reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and the concerns about EU funding goals and priorities on migration, asylum and integration in the upcoming MFF.

2.5.2.a. The securitisation of migration

The fight against irregular migration has been on the European political agenda since the late 1990s and early 2000s when the notion of an EU external border became a concrete reality. Limited avenues for regular migration from neighbouring countries and regions, together with a constant migratory pressure, and the portrayal of ‘irregularity’ as a threat to European security and stability by media and politicians have all contributed to making irregular migration a top priority for concerted action at the EU level. The European Agenda for Migration views irregular migration primarily as a security threat which needs to be managed via law enforcement actions. As a result, EU strategies in this domain have included policies, funding instruments and capacity-building actions (targeting Member States) primarily aimed at fighting
human smuggling and trafficking, improving the effectiveness of border management, and increasing returns of irregular migrants to their countries of origin.

Since 2015, Member States have clearly shown their eagerness to implement and reform rules related to border control and return. The 2016 regulation (Official Journal of the European Union 2016a) that sets out FRONTEX’s functioning and activities was amended in record speed between September 2018 and April 2019 to enhance its mandate in the midst of the heightened focus on security and border control (European Commission Press Release 2019a). FRONTEX’s new mandate is expected to significantly boost the agency’s budget, staff, activities and mission mandate. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency will have a standing corps of 10,000 border guards by 2027, its own equipment and a significant budget increase (the European Commission proposed €11.3 billion for 2021-2027). It is also foreseen that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will have a stronger mandate on returns and will cooperate more closely with third countries. Finally, the internal fundamental rights capacity of FRONTEX will be beefed up, with increased staff, fundamental rights monitoring, and a code of conduct. All of these developments are of serious concern for Caritas. On the one hand, they are an expression of a trend towards the securitisation of migration, i.e. a new pact on migration and asylum, including the relaunch of the Dublin reform (since Member States have been deadlocked for several years already), and to achieve the number of 10,000 European border guards by 2024, not 2027 as was foreseen (Valero 2019). Whether she will be able to achieve this remains open.55

Finally, another concerning piece of legislation related to the fight against irregular migration is the EU legislative framework against smuggling, referred to as the “facilitation package”. It includes the facilitation directive (Official Journal of the European Union 2002) defining smuggling as the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence; and the facilitation decision (Official Journal of the European Union 2002b) strengthening the penal framework to prevent smuggling. Research by the FRA regarding the Facilitation directive (Official Journal of the European Communities 2002a) and the Council Framework Decision (Official Journal of the European Communities 2002b) oblige Member States to punish anyone who assists a person to irregularly enter, transit, or stay in the territory of a Member State, highlights the risk that domestic EU Member State implementing such legislation may lead to prosecution and punishment of those who provide humanitarian assistance – such as charities or individual good Samaritans – or those who rent out accommodation. This EU facilitation package has been strongly criticised from various sides due to the increasing number of cases of criminalisation of NGOs and volunteers who are being accused of facilitating irregular migration because of the support they provide to migrants and refugees. In addition, numerous sea captains are facing punishment for rescuing migrants in distress at sea under the rules on facilitation of irregular entry (FRA 2019a). Several NGOs, such as Caritas Europa argue that the EU facilitation package lacks legal clarity and regrets that it does not provide binding safeguards to exempt humanitarian assistance from the scope of the package. Implementation at national level can thus lead to acts of solidarity done on a charitable and not-for profit basis to be wrongfully conflated with human smuggling (Caritas Europa 2019b).56

The proposal put forward by the EC (European Commission 2018c) aims to make return procedures faster and more efficient and boost the return rate (the number of people being effectively returned out of the total number of return decisions issued). Several NGOs, including Caritas Europa, have raised concerns that the new provisions, backed by the Council, would facilitate detention and increase its length, weaken procedural safeguards and appeals, and reduce voluntary return.57

55 Meanwhile, newly confirmed European Commissioner President Ursula von der Leyen stated in her speech to the European Parliament on 16 July prior to being confirmed that she wants a “fresh start” on migration, i.e. a new pact on migration and asylum, including the relaunch of the Dublin reform (since Member States have been deadlocked for several years already), and to achieve the number of 10,000 European border guards by 2024, not 2027 as was foreseen (Valero 2019). Whether she will be able to achieve this remains open.

56 See comments on the reform of the EU return directive from Caritas Europa (Caritas Europa 2018a) as well as from faith based organisations, including Caritas Europa (Caritas Europa et al. 2019).

57 See also Carrera et al. 2018, the UN Human Rights Council (2019) and the EU-funded Res soma project (Viosfliitie and Comte 2019).
2.5.2.b. Insufficient protection of the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants and slow progress on legal migration

Findings from the Common Home studies identified general gaps between policy and legislation (deemed generally acceptable or strong) versus their actual implementation or enforcement (which was deemed insufficient). In this regard, one barrier is the limited access to refugee protection and increasingly tighter restrictions being imposed.

Another barrier is the lack of safe and legal pathways to Europe for reasons of both protection and employment. Limitations to regular means of access to the EU territory has resulted in many people attempting irregular entry, whether asylum seekers or other migrants. They then face the prospect of criminal offense and detention as well as other vulnerabilities, for example extortion, sexual assault or other means of exploitation by smugglers and human traffickers (Caritas Europa 2016:29).

Regrettably, several governments are also using safe and legal pathways such as resettlement or private sponsorship to implement a “pick and choose” migration policy, selecting a small number of refugees to let in, while closing borders and preventing spontaneous asylum application within their territories. Increasingly, resettlement is being instrumentalised by many governments to be used as a ‘migration management tool’, privileging the resettlement of refugees hosted in countries of first asylum that cooperate with them to stop irregular migration (e.g. through the EU-Turkey agreement).

Regarding regular migration, the absence of EU law and policy broadly covering low skilled and medium skilled migrants (with the exception of seasonal workers) leaves a huge gap in the EU’s ability to deal with a large part of third country migration into Europe, for which needs for rights protection, regulation and cooperation are considerably more demanding than for high-skilled migration and intra-company transfers. While the elaboration of an evolving EU regime for migration (for immigration from outside the EU) should be essentially complementary, it has been divided between efforts starting early on to facilitate high skilled immigration to the EU space, on the one hand, and increasingly prevalent repressive measures aimed at “combating illegal migration” on the other. This has resulted in some progress in the adoption of several EU directives and communications spelling out rules concerning the entry and residence of categories of skilled workers; however, it has also been coupled with the failure to produce a sound and comprehensive EU law and policy framework on immigration generally and labour migration specifically (Carrera, Geddes, Guild, and Stefan 2017). As a result, the existing EU policy and legal frameworks dealing with legal entry, residence and employment of third-country nationals are characterised by “fragmentation, legal uncertainty and multi-layered migratory statuses across the Union” (Carrera, Geddes and Guild 2017:184).
The Commission has recently carried out a comprehensive analysis of the implementation of the EU acquis on legal migration (the regulations and directives mentioned above) called the “Fitness check on legal migration”, the results of which were released in March 2019 (ICF Consulting 2017). While the Fitness check underscores that the legal migration package managed to harmonise to a certain extent the admission criteria and the rights and entitlements for several categories of migrants, shortcomings, however, were also stressed. Substantial obstacles (financial, administrative) to family reunification remain at national level, especially for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. Legal pathways for low and middle skilled workers are lacking, despite increased labour demand. The Fitness check also underscores the challenge raised by the sectorial approach to EU labour migration that determines different rights and rules depending on the level of qualification of workers which can lead to confusion and discrimination amongst workers. Nevertheless, given the current negative political environment on migration, it is unlikely that new legislation or reform on legal migration will be brought forward in the near future.

2.5.2.c. Stalled reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS)

The 2003 Dublin regulation (Official Journal of the European Union 2013a), that determines in which country an asylum procedure is processed, has proven particularly controversial and challenging. The “first entry criteria” has put tremendous pressure on countries at EU’s external borders, such as Greece and Italy. Given, the discrepancies in the implementation of the CEAS in different countries, reform proposals were made by the European Commission (EC) in 2016 in order to further harmonise the system and discourage refugees or asylum seekers from moving from the first country of arrival – where they sought protection or were permanently resettled – elsewhere (the so-called “secondary movement”). In addition, as part of the CEAS reform, a new regulation to create a European resettlement framework (European Commission 2016a) was also proposed, as well as the creation of an EU asylum agency (European Commission 2016b).

Nevertheless, as of late 2019, no significant progress has been made on CEAS reform. Tensions amongst different states during the negotiations have made it impossible to find a compromise on a new Dublin regulation, thereby blocking the whole reform of the common European asylum system. Finding fairer rules on responsibility sharing and solidarity amongst EU Member States in the reception of asylum seekers and refugees is a sticking point in the negotiations. The ad hoc relocation mechanism established between 2015 and 2018 to relocate asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to other European Member States in order to alleviate the pressure these two countries on the periphery faced has torn EU countries apart and has been painful to implement. By 7 March 2018, a total of only 33,846 asylum seekers (11,999 from Italy and 21,847 from Greece) had been effectively relocated.

2.5.2.d. Concerns about EU funding goals and priorities on migration, asylum and integration in the upcoming MFF

Apart from the risks associated with duplicating funding mechanisms aimed at controlling migration and with directing part of the NDICI, which is a development fund, to migration management, other aspects of the draft MFF regulation compromise a human rights-based approach to migration and limit the potential of migrants contributing to development. For example, the European Commission proposes that 25% of the European Social Fund + (ESF+) should be allocated to social inclusion. However, it does not oblige Member States to earmark any of the 25% towards third country nationals, which could lead to important funding gaps for the integration of refugees and migrants. Similarly, the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) proposal does not require Member States to allocate a minimum share of their national financial envelope to the integration and legal migration objectives. Furthermore, one of the criteria for allocating the AMF across Member States implies giving 30% weighting to the area of asylum, 30% weighting to the area of legal migration and integration, and 40% weighting to the area of countering irregular migration including returns, which re-emphasises the EU’s tendency to prioritise an anti-immigration agenda rather than legal pathways (European Commission 2018c:3).
2.6. Opportunities and promising practices for integral human development of migrants in countries of destination

Despite the substantial challenges presented above, several national contexts highlight a number of opportunities with respect to promising national policies, multi-stakeholder collaborations as well as civil society practices. Mirroring the barriers highlighted in the previous section, the following areas of opportunity can be identified:

1. General opportunities based on existing legal frameworks for the protection of the rights of migrants and refugees;

2. General opportunities based on new and existing policy frameworks, such as Agenda 2030, the Global Compact on Migration, and the Urban Agenda;

3. Safe and legal pathways;

4. Countering negative narratives: promising practices that foster intercultural dialogue and understanding;

5. Positive examples of labour market inclusion policies and practices in destination countries;

6. Positive examples of social inclusion policies and practices in destination countries; and

7. Positive examples of political inclusion of migrants and/or diaspora organisations in destination countries.

2.6.1. General opportunities based on existing legal frameworks for the protection of the rights of migrants and refugees

Several countries among those reviewed by Common Home studies recognised that the starting point for integration is formal recognition of the human and labour rights of migrants and legal stipulation of equality of treatment, whether at work or in the community. Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden have all ratified one or both the ILO Conventions laying out migrants’ entitlement to protection of rights at work, social protection and equality of treatment with nationals in employment and occupation: ILO Convention No. 97 on migration for employment and ILO Convention 143 on migrant workers (supplemental provisions).

All Common Home study countries have ratified nearly all of the fundamental international human rights conventions, notably the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (ICCPR). The provisions of these conventions apply to all migrants and refugees (with a few
specified exceptions). Of particular importance is that States party to these conventions must present periodic reports to the respective treaty supervisory bodies – and all of those bodies have given particular attention in recent years to the treatment of migrants and refugees by the reporting countries, notably European states. All of the Common Home studies recommended that its country ratify the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

Similarly, all countries object of the Common Home studies are bound by the eight fundamental International Labour Conventions and most have ratified many of the some eighty up-to-date International Labour Standards covering all aspects of decent work, including conditions of work, remuneration, occupational safety and health, labour inspection, tripartite cooperation, maternity protection, and specific industry issues and standards as well as social protection. The rights and protections specified in all of these instruments are applicable to all migrants in an employment relationship, regardless of status. All ratifying countries are required to report periodically to the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, which also gives attention to the protection of migrants in reporting countries.

All of these ratified instruments are supposed to be domesticated in national law, providing for their implementation and domestic legal enforcement and judicial review, as well as for international reporting and supervision. Most of the national studies made some reference to the domestication of these international standards as good law and policy. However, most of the studies also lamented large lacuna in national legislative conformity and domestic implementation, particularly regarding refugees and migrants, thus indicating fertile ground for advocacy and action to improve protection of all migrants and refugees and thus for encouraging integration and social cohesion.

2.6.2. General opportunities based on new and existing policy frameworks: Agenda 2030, the Global Compact on Migration, and the Urban Agenda

One of the defining features of the Agenda 2030 (United Nations 2015) is that it has a global approach and it concerns the Global South as much as the Global North. In that respect, all of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and related targets, from inequality and poverty-eradication to access to healthcare, from decent work to non-discrimination, apply within the context of the European Union and its Member States. It also follows that since migrants are often in precarious social and economic conditions, achieving the Agenda 2030 in Europe is likely to have a major positive impact on their well-being as well. In fact, more than 43 SDG Targets across 16 of the 17 SDGs apply to migrants, refugees, migration and/or migration-compelling situations (GMPA 2018). Naturally, all country reports highlight the 2030 Agenda as a crucial opportunity to promote integral human development of all, including migrants and refugees.

Advocating for the well-being and the rights of migrants and refugees via the Agenda 2030 is a useful approach not only because it relies on a UN framework to which most countries have committed, but also because it frames such rights in terms of sustainable development and human rights, and therefore restrains the use of language that could favour particular vulnerable social groups at the expense of others. Nevertheless, the SDGs also contain specific migrant-targets: SDG 8.8 – migrant workers, women migrants; SDG 10.7 – facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies; SDG 10.c – remittances; SDG 17.18 – data monitoring and a series of actions related to migration throughout the 2030 Agenda.

Figure 9 provides information on the ranking of the study countries in relation to SDGs, based on the most recent data available (Sachs et al. 2019). Sweden is ranked No.2 worldwide while Austria occupies the fifth rank, Germany the sixth and the Cech Republic the seventh. Portugal, Slovakia, Italy and Portugal are at the bottom of the ranking. While this overall ranking cannot shed light on impacts on the integral human development of migrants and refugees present in the countries, more focussed research would therefore be necessary to assess whether it has provided a positive opportunity for them. In addition, countries are expected to regularly produce National Voluntary Reviews (NVRs) which provide an overview of the country’s progress towards achieving the SDGs.

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61 For more detailed information about the interconnections between Agenda 2030, the SDGs and migration see IOM 2018 and ODI 2018.
62 Nevertheless, the Agenda 2030 is not legally binding.
63 This an important factor, particularly in countries where the population of lower socio-economic status increasingly sees migrants as competitors, if not altogether responsible for their worsening social and economic situation.
64 For an exhaustive list of all SDG goals and targets that are relevant to migration see IOM 2018.
Figure 9. SDG performance ranking, 2019

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<th>Countries</th>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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The Global Compact comprises 23 objectives for better governing migration at local, national, regional and global levels. The GCM is not a normative instrument and some of its general policy recommendations represent lower standards than those in existing human rights conventions and international labour standards. However, it has several objectives linked to the migration-development nexus and related guidelines which countries can pick up. With respect to the migration context in Europe, relevant objectives include: enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration; empower migrants and societies to realise full inclusion and social cohesion; eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration; invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences. It remains to be seen if and how Member States, as well as the European Union, will be involved in implementing the Global Compact.

The Global Compact for Migration (GCM) – although legally non-binding – is the first, intergovernmental negotiated agreement to cover all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner (United Nations n.d.a.). It is grounded in concepts of state sovereignty, responsibility sharing, non-discrimination, and human rights, and recognises that a cooperative approach is needed to optimise the overall benefits of migration, while addressing its risks and challenges for individuals and communities in countries of origin, transit and destination (United Nations n.d.b.). Unlike the 2030 Agenda, its entire focus is on migration. The EU Policy Coherence Staff Working Document describes the GCM as “a historic opportunity to move towards a more sustainable governance of human mobility” (European Commission 2019d:23).

A very large proportion of migrants and refugees in Europe reside in cities and urban settlements. Therefore, a large part of day-to-day “governance” concerning migrants, refugees and returnees – and their relationship to development - takes place in cities. The New Urban Agenda adopted by UN Member States in October 2016 sets out the framework, commitments and guiding principles for governance, development and welfare of the world’s cities over the next two decades. It commits “to strengthening synergies between international migration and development at the global, regional, national, subnational and local levels”. It provides governance guidance for migration and development policy and practice in all cities and towns in Europe. It is especially relevant to realising the integral human development of migrants and refugees through its commitments to ensuring equal access for all and recognising the “need to give particular attention to addressing multiple forms of discrimination faced by… refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons and migrants, regardless of their migration status” (United Nations 2017: 9). In May 2016, following the adoption of the Pact of Amsterdam by EU Ministers Responsible for Urban Matters, the Urban Agenda for the EU was launched (EU Ministers Responsible for Urban Matters 2016). The Agenda – described as a “new multi-level working method promoting cooperation between Member States, cities, the European Commission and other stakeholders in order to stimulate growth, liveability and innovation in the cities of Europe and to identify and successfully tackle social challenges” – has set up a number of Common Home study countries.

Source: Sachs et al. 2019
of thematic partnerships, amongst which are the ‘Amsterdam Partnerships’ which tackle, amongst other objectives, the inclusion of migrants and refugees as well as affordable housing and urban poverty (European Commission n.d.k).

2.6.3. Safe and legal pathways

A record number of 70 million people were forced to flee their home countries worldwide in 2018 due to persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights’ violations (UNHCR 2019a). Safe and legal pathways for those people are scarce, meaning that many people are stuck for years in refugee camps, or embark on dangerous journeys to start a new life, possibly even hoping to reunite with their families already in Europe.

Considered one of the three durable solutions to displacement, resettlement is a very important humanitarian instrument for providing safe, sustainable protection for people in need. It refers to the selection and transfer of refugees from a state in which they have sought protection to another state where they are eligible for protection and where they are granted permanent residence status and the opportunity to eventually become a naturalised citizen, a factor known to contribute to successful integration. Governments select refugees for resettlement that are referred by the UNHCR based on the established UNHCR Resettlement Submission Categories targeting the most vulnerable (e.g. women at risk, children, victims of torture and elderly). Unfortunately, states decide voluntarily how many refugees they want to resettle and placements are few, especially since the USA decided to drastically reduce its programme in 2017. Between 2015 and 2017, according to the European Commission (European Commission 2019e), 27,800 people were resettle to Europe and by the end of June 2019, 32,071 refugees had been resettled as part of an EU scheme to resettle 50,000 people (European Commission 2018). While the UNHCR estimates that 1.4 million refugees are in need of resettlement in 2019, only 92,400 refugees were actually resettled the year before in 2018 (UNHCR 2018c). European States have stepped up their resettlement efforts in the last few years, with France, Germany and Sweden being the biggest contributors. As positive as this is, it remains, however, insufficient in regard to global needs. There is an important opportunity now for governments to further harmonise EU resettlement efforts and increase cooperation and to benefit from the regulation (European Commission 2016a) to establish an EU resettlement framework, which is currently under negotiation as part of the reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).

Other opportunities around the expansion of legal pathways exist as well and have been increasingly used in recent years in the aftermath of the Syrian war (even if their numbers remain low compared to the protection needs). These complementary legal pathways include, for example, the humanitarian admission programme, such as that implemented in Germany that provided 35,000 protection places for Syrians between 2013 and 2014 (European Resettlement Network 2018). Additional legal pathways include student scholarship schemes, humanitarian visas, and family reunification. Some EU Member States recognise the benefits that come with family reunification as a legal pathway and the importance of enabling equal opportunities as nationals.

While family reunification is an extremely important legal avenue for people in need of protection to enter Europe legally, several EU Member States have unfortunately restricted family reunification possibilities for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, which effectively narrows and restricts the potential opportunity presented with this legal channel.

Innovative private and/or community sponsorship schemes have also been implemented in Europe in the last few years, indicating a multitude of opportunities for the refugees as well as the local communities. “Although there is no common definition at EU level, sponsorships imply that a person, group or organisation assumes responsibility for providing financial, social and emotional support for a resettled person or family, for a predetermined period of time” (Luyten and González Díaz 2019). Based on research, this scheme is further defined as “a public-private partnership between governments who facilitate legal admission for refugees and private actors, who provide financial, social and/or emotional support to admit, receive and settle refugees into the community” (European Resettlement Network 2017:36). The benefits of this scheme are that roles, costs and responsibilities of the partnerships are split between the government and private actors who support and welcome refugees into their local communities for a certain amount of time, facilitating a welcoming environment and overall integration processes. According to the European Parliament (Luyten and González Díaz 2019), “The aim is to facilitate integration and community cohesion, while lowering the risk of disengagement with the system and thus reducing the number of irregular arrivals.” Some sponsorship schemes, branded as “humanitarian corridors”, rely on the granting of humanitarian visas, while others are anchored in UNHCR resettlement programmes, such as the recently launched German pilot project or the UK (Reset Communities and Refugees, n.d.) and Irish sponsorship schemes that are included within the government resettlement programmes.

65 The Resettlement Submission Categories described in Chapter 6 of the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook are: legal and physical protection needs; survivors of violence and/or torture; medical needs; women and girls at risk; family reunification; children and adolescents at risk; and lack of foreseeable alternative durable solutions. See UNHCR Resettlement Handbook (UNHCR 2018b).
66 See: https://www.neustartimteam.de/
67 See: http://www.integration.ie/en/ISEC/Pages/WP19000003
Under the “humanitarian corridors”, beneficiaries who first sought asylum in Lebanon or Ethiopia, for example, travel to the destination country after being granted by the state a humanitarian visa and upon arrival, they apply for asylum. Once the refugee status is granted, they can access state benefits like other refugees. Led by the Catholic organisation San Egidio, in cooperation with other organisations, including Caritas, humanitarian corridors have been rolled out in Italy, France, and Belgium so far, although up to 14 other EU Member States have had similar schemes in the past (Luyten and González Díaz 2019). The Catholic Church, implementing organisations and sponsors, financially support these schemes. In Italy alone, more than 2,000 people had arrived by May 2019 through the legal channel of humanitarian corridors.

Since the adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (United Nations 2016) and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) (UNHCR 2018d) – in which UN Member States agreed to develop and expand resettlement and complementary pathways – momentum is building to expand protection placements. The Three-Year (2019-2021) Strategy on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways, developed by the UNHCR, aims at increasing protection placements available to refugees by encouraging ambitious pledges and contributions from states especially during the first Global Refugee Forum in December 2019 (UNHCR 2019b). This is a key opportunity for EU Member States to devise and implement longer-term solutions that can be financially and politically sustainable in line with its values and commitment to human rights protection.

Despite promises and acknowledgement, however, little has happened to achieve objective 5 of the 2018 Global Compact for Migration, which is to “enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration.” The EC has welcomed the Global Compact as “a historic opportunity to move towards a more sustainable governance of human mobility (European Commission 2019d:22). Legal migration opportunities are of vital importance to countries of origin for several reasons: the magnitude of protection needs due to the massive displacement of persons through armed conflict and disasters; the development potential of migration; social safety net role of remittances; professional advancement of third country nationals; benefits of continuing diaspora engagement and minimising irregular migration. EU policy reiterates that expanding legal migration is also one of the strategies to counter smuggling and irregular migration (Knoll and Cascone 2018). Despite this positive assessment, however, obstacles clearly remain in terms of Member States’ willingness to expand regular channels for migration. Caritas is convinced of the necessity to create a longer-term solution to respond to people in need while also recognising the opportunities associated when more safe and legal channels for migration exist.
2.6.4. Countering negative narratives: promising practices that foster intercultural dialogue and understanding

As discussed in the section on barriers, the current public narrative on migration is problematic and the media play an important role in shaping negative public attitudes. The Changing the Narrative report 2017, produced by the World Association for Christian Communication – Europe Region (WACC Europe) and the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME) (CCME and WACC Europe 2017), has monitored communication about migration on a number of media outlets across seven European countries and discussed the findings with refugee group representatives and media professionals. In line with the spirit of the report, as well as of the MIND project, the refugee representatives highlighted the following points: the importance of promoting more stories focusing on positive contributions of migrants and refugees to European countries of destination; and the need to go beyond the refugee label to present “the person behind the label as someone with his or her own personal experiences, stories, and expertise.” Both groups underlined the importance of ensuring media professionals are properly trained, including in developing the cultural sensitivity needed to approach the topic. Moreover, to avoid the victim/villain dichotomy, they also called on journalists to ensure that their reporting – without being sympathetic and partial – is based on facts and neutrality yet also on an empathic understanding of the issues and people involved. Finally, the report concluded on reiterating the importance of bringing together the media, refugee/migrant organisations as well as civil society to work towards the common goals of fair reporting.

In the context of the Common Home research series, many studies feature promising practices that address the need to change the negative discussion surrounding migrants and refugees within each country. The Austria study describes a programme called ‘Radio Afrika TV’ as a promising practice. Radio Afrika TV has been in operation since 1997 with the aim of improving the African-European relationship and working on projecting a more differentiated and positive image of the African continent. The initial interest behind it was to connect the African diaspora living in Austria and provide fair information about Africa. Since then there have been many media activities such as the launch of a newspaper (the “Afrika Magazin”), TV programmes, and the implementation of integration projects such as INTEGRO, reaching about 200,000 people in Austria. The association’s chairperson also founded AfriPoint, a centre for communication, intercultural exchange and encounter which also offers an “expert-pool” for project implementation (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019). The Slovakia study also includes a promising practice targeting the negative narrative surrounding migration. Caritas Slovakia has organised a series of public debates entitled “Migration as an Opportunity – Helping on the Development of Our Society?” These debates started at the end of 2018 and will continue throughout 2019 and 2020 with the participation of a number of migration experts in ten Slovak cities. Caritas also visits high schools and organises workshops for students to help them to understand issues pertaining to migration and development (Letavajová and Divínský 2019:46).

Another example of a promising practice is the Good Market event (Dobrý trh) in Bratislava. The aim of this activity, launched in 2011, is to revive urban public space and encourage the opening of yards and streets to foster social encounter and interaction. The market is more than an event, as it supports alternative lifestyles, fosters creativity and a positive social environment, creating the conditions for accepting otherness. The market promotes small-scale producers and high-quality domestic products, as well as a range of ‘ethnic’ products from all over the world. The Good Market is also a cultural event during which a variety of cultural performances takes place (musical events, discussions and workshops for the public, art projects, workshops, public readings and other accompanying activities dedicated to the importance of cultural diversity in society). The main goal of this project is to promote NGOs tackling political extremism, fighting for human rights and supporting immigrants (Letavajová and Divínský 2019:45).

Beyond this, numerous examples have also been collected and detailed in the Caritas online toolkit, entitled: “Recipe book for integration”. Believing that all communities in the world should play an active role in welcoming, protecting, promoting and integrating (Pope Francis 2017), Caritas seeks to contribute to creating a “culture of encounter” towards fostering integration and more cohesive societies. The toolkit targets local communities – Caritas teams, parish groups, volunteers and others – and it provides some basic steps that can be collectively undertaken to build synergies between local services, actors, stakeholders, citizens, migrants and refugees in order to address bias, stereotypes and everyday practices that distance migrants from local community members and hinder their social and cultural inclusion. The section illustrating some promising “recipes for encounter” collected from local Caritas organisations lists numerous activities that could be undertaken to foster intercultural understanding at the local level, where integration actually takes place.

68 Those include Greece, Italy, Norway, Serbia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
69 The toolkit is available in English, Croatian and Spanish (Fantasia, Pfohman and Revelli 2017).
2.6.5. Positive examples of labour market inclusion and practices

Drawing on the definition of integration described above, the focus in this section is to present some positive examples of migrant and refugee labour market inclusion in countries of destination. A number of promising practices in the field of labour market integration have been noted in the Common Home studies, for instance, the Brno Expat Centre in the Czech Republic, which provides a range of services to migrant workers.

Indeed, promising practices regarding employment opportunities are central to migrants getting a first foot in the door, necessary for a sustainable and successful life in the country of destination. Building on this, many of the 11 studies further feature promising practices regarding assistance for migrant employment and labour market integration. The Bulgaria study discusses a specific business targeting refugees for employment and those holding a humanitarian status. “TELUS International Europe (a business process outsourcing and information technology outsourcing provider) is an interesting example of a Bulgarian company that employs 100 refugees and humanitarian status holders. In addition to employment, the company offers a wide range of social services as well as cultural, sporting and other events for its employees” (Iliev 2017 as cited in Krasteva 2019:44). The Magdas hotel (Magdas Hotel n.d.) in Vienna is also a well-known social economy project, which has gained international repute for its on-the-job training and support to refugees to become staff members in this hotel run by migrants.

The Portugal study also highlights the project “Promoting Immigrant Entrepreneurship” (PEI), aimed at encouraging entrepreneurship in immigrant communities, especially in the most vulnerable neighbourhoods. PEI helps immigrants develop personal, social and business management skills essential to business creation, while also promoting self-sufficiency and sustainability and facilitating connections with the entrepreneurship support programmes that already exist and are carried out by several entities. “PEI provides business training, consulting, tailored individual business support sessions, workshops, meetings, and events in order to develop entrepreneurial skills” (Góis 2019:53).

The Germany study also cites a promising practice regarding temporary employment opportunities for asylum seekers while their asylum determination procedure is ongoing. The Federal Association of Non-Statutory Welfare (BAGFW) supports...
the federal government in the implementation of its special Integration Measures for Refugees (FIM), which aims to create opportunities for refugees involved in asylum proceedings to work with municipalities and local authorities and with national or charitable service providers. This enables refugees to familiarise themselves with the German labour market while their asylum procedure is in progress. This temporary federal programme, which allows asylum seekers a non-profit job opportunity, has an annual budget of €300 million (2017-2020). Employment is possible for up to six months and asylum seekers can work for up to 30 hours a week (Fleischer 2019:46). However, the very low remuneration rate (at 80 cents per hour) undermines the value of this programme.

These and many other promising practices (cf. Caritas Europa’s publication on Welcome! Migrants make Europe stronger) regarding employment opportunities for migrants are central to migrants achieving sustainable and successful lives in their countries of destination. This is essential since effective integration leads to integral human development on the part of migrants and refugees who can then contribute to both their countries of destination and of origin.

2.6.6. Positive examples of social inclusion policies and practices

Promising policies in promoting social inclusion in general of migrants are clearly seen at a local level. For instance, cities actively advance inclusion by creating policies affirming their commitments to social inclusion. The Berlin “Masterplan for Integration and Security”, adopted by the Berlin Senate in May 2016, builds on the 2015 Senate Paper “Care and integration concept for asylum seekers and refugees” (Fleischer 2019). The newly established Berlin State Office for Refugee Issues soon followed. Many cities are exchanging and learning from each other, identifying practices that work and strategies for overcoming challenges. The four principles of the Berlin integration Masterplan are:

- Each individual has the right to dignified and respectful treatment, whether they were born in Berlin, have freely chosen to live in Berlin, have fled to Berlin or are only visiting the city briefly;

- Everyone in Berlin must adhere to the same legal framework. The promise of security in a democratic state based on the rule of law is indivisible and includes protection of those seeking refuge;

- Each refugee living in Berlin must be provided all the opportunities for social, societal and economic inclusion necessary to establish oneself as a fully-fledged member of society and their efforts to integrate must be fostered;

- All refugees are expected to actively endeavour to integrate and to participate in the community life of the city and to accept how others live in society as well as its democratic values.

The Masterplan charts the path to successful integration in eight steps including provision of benefits to refugees from day one, healthcare, housing, customised language training and education, and integration into the labour market. The Berlin city government has engaged in implementing the Masterplan components with an integrated and comprehensive “whole of government” approach (Fleischer 2019:37).

The Czech Migration Consortium and many of its 20 member organisations have become increasingly active facilitators of networking efforts leading to an inclusive drafting and implementation of integration strategies on the local level. A case in point is the Association for Integration and Migration’s EU-funded and currently ongoing project “MIS”.70 This provides, in selected locations, a detailed integration analysis among various groups of foreign citizens, builds a knowledge platform for relevant stakeholders (including a database of all projects that focus on local integration undertaken in the past two decades), and aims to trigger positive policy change with the goal of addressing standing challenges, i.e. to foster closer involvement of migrant-led organisations and to mobilise general political inclusion of foreigners residing in the Czech Republic (Jungwirth 2019:34).

The Belgium Common Home study cites the example of the city of Mechelen that has been active in promoting diversity and providing support in housing inclusion, language courses, employment, and psychosocial and administrative support for migrants and refugees (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:11). Other Belgian cities have developed exemplary policies and practices on the matter – such as Ghent and Liège, members of the European Coalition of Cities against Racism.71 As highlighted by a recent UNESCO report (2016:53),

Local authorities, however, need political will, institutional capacity, and financial resources to devise and implement effective policy to coordinate with other actors to welcome

70 See: https://www.migrace.com/en/organization/about
71 This was featured in the UNESCO-EGCAR ’Cities Welcoming Refugees and Migrants’ comprehensive report (UNESCO 2016) on city approaches to reception, services, inclusion and integration across Europe.
and integrate refugees and migrants (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:50).

Since access to health care services is a vital component of integration, Slovenia’s example of the Ministry of the Interior co-financing a guidebook to facilitate communication between patients who do not speak Slovenian and healthcare workers, is worth mentioning. Within the framework of the projects for assistance in the integration of foreigners into Slovenian society, the Faculties of Arts, of Medicine, and of Health Sciences of the University of Ljubljana as well as the National Institute of Public Health and the Medical Chamber of Slovenia cooperated jointly in the project to develop a pictogram guidebook with four booklets; each of which comprise a part in Slovene language and a text in one or two other languages. The material was prepared in Slovenian/English/French, Slovenian/Russian/Chinese, Slovenian/Arabic/Farsi and Slovenian/Albanian versions (Zidar 2019:37).

Teaching the country’s language to migrants in the country is a valuable promising practice that was featured in many of the Common Home studies. The Belgium study describes the existence of this practice in all three Belgian regions – Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. All three have adopted a similar approach that includes socio-economic assessment, language courses, and an introduction to citizenship and norms and values. “Investment in language courses in particular responds to a longstanding demand both by policy makers and many migrants themselves who consider language skills as indispensable to participate economically and socially in Belgium” (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:50). The Netherlands uses another approach in teaching the Dutch language to migrants. The national study highlights the promising practice – ‘Foundation Queridon’ – which combines language teaching with hospitality. In this language-café, refugees learn Dutch and cook typical meals from their home country. They demonstrate to Dutch and foreign visitors of the café the language skills they have learned and share their meal together (van Reisen et al. 2019:41). The Slovenia study also discusses a Caritas project with an emphasis on teaching the Slovene language.

Thus, teaching the country’s language to migrants in the country is a valuable promising practice, featured in many of the Caritas Common Home studies.

Another helpful practice is offering free legal aid and services to migrants and refugees, which the Centre for Legal Aid (CLA) – Voice in Bulgaria (www.centerforlegalaid.com) is doing. It is one of the few organisations in Bulgaria offering free legal aid to migrants and refugees. The work of the CLA involves direct administrative representation and litigation of individual cases of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees before administrative authorities and courts on the territory of Bulgaria and Europe. The CLA is very active in advocacy and awareness raising (Krasteva 2019:43).
2.6.7. Positive examples of political inclusion of migrants and/or diaspora organisations

Despite the barriers to migrants’ political participation, decision making, civil society and activism described in section 2.5.1.e, migrants are engaging politically, whether directly through politics, civil society engagement, diaspora and migrant-run organisations, activism or through other decision-making bodies. Numerous examples emerged from the Common Home studies regarding concrete practices that seek to foster the political inclusion of migrants and that build on the strength of diaspora organisations.

One example linked to the political inclusion of migrants is when local authorities in Brussels began a major push ahead of the municipal elections in October to mobilise more non-Belgian residents to vote, who have a particularly low voter participation rate (Salam 2018). Voting is compulsory for Belgian nationals and so more than 90% traditionally vote in local municipal elections. In contrast, less than 14% of non-Belgians go to the polls, with varying rate in different communes. In order to address this gap, Brussels local authorities, some NGOs, think tanks and the regional government, collaborated to address the low turnout by increasing voter registration among migrants (Salam 2018).

2.7. Conclusion

Chapter 2 began with an overview of the migratory context in Europe and continued by highlighting major contributions of migration and of migrants to integral human development in countries of destination in Europe. This was followed by a description of some of the main challenges and barriers that migrants face in the 11 countries object of review in the Common Home studies. The chapter ended, on a more positive note, with a review of the opportunities associated with migration and some promising practices that emerged in the national Common Home studies.

The section contextualising migration in Europe highlighted the fact that, migrants and refugees have long been important features of Europe, as European countries have experienced both immigration and emigration for centuries. In total, 60 million people, or 11.7% (of the total EU population of 512.6 million people) residing in EU Member States are considered as international migrants as defined by the UN. According to the 11 Common Home studies, half or more of their respective migrant populations are from EU Member States. Not surprisingly, in many cases the largest numbers of migrants come from neighbouring countries. In 2015, the number of persons seeking asylum in the EU-28 spiked, reaching over 800,000 persons. However, the number of refugees in European countries remains very small in comparison to the frontline countries bordering Syria and Iraq as well as to worldwide totals. Since 2015, the number of new arrivals has dropped significantly as a result of the externalisation of migration and more restrictive policies.

Besides confirming that migrants are already contributing substantially to the well-being of European societies, the next section provided evidence on the domains in which they are most active. With respect to the economy, in all countries under review migrants play a crucial role through employment, job creation and innovation. This is particularly important in countries with strong emigration and negative demographic trends (Bulgaria, Slovakia, Portugal, and Italy) but also in more dynamic countries such as Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden. In most countries, migrants are overwhelmingly present in low-skilled sectors (agriculture, construction, manufacturing, small-scale commerce), but their presence in high-skilled and high-tech domains (research, IT, medical professions) is growing. Migrant entrepreneurship is vital for creating new services and consumption demands. Contrary to popular perceptions, which generally focus on remittances leaving European countries, all the countries object of the Common Home studies receive significant financial inflows. In the case of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia and Portugal, more money is remitted in the country by emigrants than sent out by immigrants, contributing to economic growth and sustaining local consumption. Migrants generally also contribute to social protection systems more than what they take, defying the common perception of migrants as free-riders and welfare exploiters. Several domains were also identified in which migrants enrich European societies, from gastronomy to arts and literature, from sports to music. Such impacts are more marked in older countries of immigration, such as in Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, and Germany, but they begin...
to be visible in Italy, Portugal, as well as in Eastern European countries.

In spite of these notable contributions, migrants frequently face challenges in realising their full potential or preventing them from pursuing their life project. Chapter 2 thus identified a number of barriers that impede their integral human development in Europe. These have been categorised according to national level barriers and European level barriers. Relative to the national level, rising public hostility and negative attitudes towards migrants and migration has led to an impasse both at national and European levels, blocking pro-migrant legislative actions. Divisive rhetoric has legitimised attacks on migrants’ rights, the criminality of solidarity, as well as discriminatory practices across Europe. The many contributions migrants make to society are commonly undervalued or even denied, as a result. Other barriers include: a lack of access to and inclusion in the labour market; a lack of access to social provisions; limited social participation and political inclusion; and partial rejection or fear of migrants’ perceived “otherness”. In allowing discrimination, in creating social and economic marginalisation, in pushing people ‘outside of the system’, and in breeding resentment amongst newcomers, certain policies and practices are ultimately contributing to weakening the potential of migration to contribute to the sustainable development of Europe. The EU level barriers include: a focus on the securitisation of migration; insufficient protection of the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants and slow progress on legal migration; the stalled reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS); and concerns about EU funding goals and priorities on migration, asylum and integration in the upcoming MFF.

Chapter 2 also outlined some of the main opportunities identified in the 11 countries of destination, identified as contributing to facilitating migrants’ integral human development in Europe. Building on existing frameworks such as conventions and new policy frameworks such as Agenda 2030, the Global Compact on Migration, and the Urban Agenda(s) are some examples. Others include practices fostering safe and legal pathways, social and inter-cultural dialogue, integration policies and practices at work, policies and practices fostering the social inclusion of migrants, and practices that seek to foster the participation of migrants and/or of migrant and diaspora organisations in social and political affairs.

Based on this and deeper analysis of the commonalities in the 11 studies, three main findings emerged from the data. The first is that a longer-term, global approach to migration is needed that includes inclusive integration models, while also taking seriously the concerns of native populations. This is interwoven with the second finding on the rising hostility towards migrants that is eroding social cohesion in Europe and inhibiting people from recognising migrants’ many contributions to countries of destination and countries of origin. The final finding applies just as much to the external dimension as to the internal. It is a simple fact but one that proves rather scary to a large number of people in Europe (and elsewhere), among whom are also policymakers. Simply put, migration is a natural part of life and therefore opportunities must be assured so that people are not forced to migrate out of desperation, but rather via safe and legal channels in pursuit of their personal life projects.

Chapter 3 continues by examining the interconnection between migration and development relative to the external dimension.
As shown in the previous chapter, migrants and migration make significant contributions to integral human development to European societies and in Europe. Their contribution is equally important in and towards countries of origin outside Europe. As in Chapter 2, which identified a number of hurdles and opportunities that affect the development benefits of migration for both migrants and surrounding societies, Chapter 3 critically examines the role of policies and practices relative to integral human development in countries overseas within the context of the migration-development nexus.

A comprehensive analysis of the contribution of migration to development, as well as the impact of European policy on this process, is beyond the scope of this publication. When evaluating obstacles and opportunities, the chapter primarily focuses on a number of policy processes and programmes that involve, on the one hand, the European Union and its Member States and, on the other hand, focuses on African countries. These European-African relations provide a useful case study to understand the complexity of the migration-development nexus beyond Europe and they highlight the inherent contradictions in the European approach to migration. Moreover, considering the European Union’s new strategic agenda for the EU 2019-2024, and its focus on developing a comprehensive partnership with Africa, it makes sense to narrow the focus to African countries of origin.1

A vibrant African migrant diaspora already exists in most European countries, making significant contributions to both the countries where they live as well as their countries of origin. However, since several countries in Africa are major sources of irregular migration directed to Europe, the EU and its Member States have long been discussing ways to cooperate with countries of origin to reduce drastically irregular migration arrivals. In a context where most African countries remain the biggest recipients of Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by the EU and its Member States, it is not surprising that development objectives2 and migration management priorities have become part of a single narrative on ‘addressing the root causes of irregular migration.’ Yet, migration to Europe is only a part of the story, inasmuch as several African countries are, at the same time, countries of origin, transit and destination for migrants. In addition, intra-African regional migration plays just as an important role, if not more, as that of transcontinental migration in creating new opportunities to enable and enhance the integral human development of people and the sustainable development of countries.

The present chapter is organised as follows. First, it provides a general and brief overview of the migratory and asylum context in Africa. Second, it describes, in general terms, the main legal and policy frameworks on migration and development, both in Europe and in Africa. Third, it examines the potential of migration to contribute to sustainable development in countries of origin through an analysis of migrants’ financial and social contributions. Fourth, it identifies migration and development policy challenges and obstacles to advancing sustainable development externally to the EU and finally, it points to potential opportunities that may instead promote and foster this process. The chapter concludes with a summary of the key points of the above discussion.

1 For more information, refer to European Council 2019.
2 Since the early 2000s, the European Union has aligned its development priorities with poverty reduction and poverty eradication.
3.1. Migration from, to and within the African continent

Several African countries are, at the same time, countries of origin, transit and destination for migrants. Beyond the focus of media and policy on irregular migration, smuggling and the high death toll in the Mediterranean route, sound empirical evidence indicates that African migration is not essentially directed towards Europe. Instead, African emigration is foremost about migration within the continent – the majority of African international migrants (19.4 million, including all persons living in a country other than their countries of birth) today remain on the African continent (UN 2017:2), and in addition to these, the continent also hosts an estimated 2.3 million immigrants from outside Africa (mostly from Asia and Europe (IOM 2017:44). Data from 2015 indicated that there is a significant difference in proportions between intra-African migration (at the time concerning 18 million people) and Africa-European migration, which in 2015 involved approximately half that share of people (9 million). While the absolute number of African migrants appears to have increased over the last few decades, this higher number has mainly resulted from strong demographic growth across the continent (Flahaux 2017:34). Contrary to commonly held views, in relative terms “…emigration from the African continent has not increased, but instead slightly decreased between 1990 and 2015 […] because less than 3% of the African population live in a country other than its country of origin - […] even less than the average worldwide, as about 3.3% of the world population is a migrant” (Flahaux 2017:34).

In absolute numbers, in 2017, South Africa was the most popular destination amongst African countries, with approximately four million international migrants residing in the country (or about 7% of its total population) (UN 2017:26). In relative terms, African countries with high immigrant populations as a proportion of their total populations included Equatorial Guinea (17.5%), Gabon (15.9%), Libya (12.4%), Djibouti (12.1%) and Gambia (9.8%) (UN 2017:25-26). As for the major immigrant sources, the main African sending countries were Egypt and Morocco, with 3.4 and 2.9 million emigrants, respectively (UNCTAD 2018:44).

Most Africans, who do immigrate outside Africa, are those leaving from North African countries (see figure 10 below). North Africans most often migrate to Europe and the Gulf States rather than to other countries within the subregion or within Africa. This has been a defining feature of the migration dynamics of the region for several decades (IOM 2017:49). While migrants from the north-west (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) tend to move to Europe, those from the northeast (Egypt and Sudan) mostly go to Gulf countries (IOM 2017:49). In fact, the largest foreign-born African communities living in the EU-28 in 2011 were Morocco (0.5% of total EU-28 population), Algeria (0.3%) and Tunisia (0.1%) (Eurostat 2017b). Besides being an important source of emigration, North Africa is also the destination for many international migrants, as well as an important transit area for those seeking to reach Europe (IOM 2017:49). Within the subregion, Libya has the highest number of international migrants, at over 788,000 in 2017 (UN 2017:26) and between 2011 and 2016, approximately 90% of the estimated 630,000 people who crossed the Mediterranean to reach Italy left from Libya, the majority of them coming from Western and Eastern Africa (Nigeria, Eritrea, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Senegal, Mali and Somalia) (IOM 2017:50). Libya is confronted with severe protection challenges associated with the volatile security and political situation in the country, as well as its lack of an asylum system, which facilitates irregular migration to Europe. Serious human rights violations have been extensively documented along these corridors and include not only deaths at sea, but also in the desert, as well as exploitation, sexual violence, forced labour, extortion, and other human rights violations.3

Figure 10. Where the people of West Africa migrate to

Another important migratory route in Africa worth pointing out due to its concerning humanitarian situation is the Sahel,4 located between sub-Sahara and North Africa and connecting Europe and the Middle East. The Sahel is affected by extreme poverty, climate change, food and nutrition crises and armed

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3 See, for example: United Nations Support Mission in Libya 2018.
4 The Sahel region comprises Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, northern Cameroon, Nigeria, and Senegal.
conflicts. Despite this complex context, the Sahel has been increasingly used by smuggling and trafficking networks and most West and Central African migrants pass through the Sahel to cross the desert into Libya and Algeria. Since November 2017, the UNHCR, in cooperation with the EU and Libyan authorities, has conducted emergency evacuations of refugees and asylum seekers from Libya to Niger through the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM). While those evacuated from Libya were supposed to be effectively resettled in a safe country of refuge, many remain stranded in Niger awaiting reallocation which further exacerbates the fragile security context in the region (UNHCR 2019c).

While the above figures refer to a broad understanding of migration (which is inclusive of all those who are refugees and applicants for international protection, as well as migrant workers and members of their families), it is also worth highlighting the specific relevance of (what is generally classified as) forced movement in the region and the important role that African countries play in offering international protection to refugees. Regarding refugee populations by region of asylum, the UNHCR reported that at the end of 2018, there was a total of 6,335,400 refugees (including persons in a refugee-like situation) in Africa (excluding North Africa) which corresponded to 31% of the entire recorded refugee population in the world. Within the region, most refugees were based in East and the Horn of Africa (21% of the global refugee population). In the Middle East and North Africa, the UNHCR reported the presence of 2,692,700 refugees, or 13% (UNHCR 2019a:14).

With regard to refugee populations by country of asylum, as previously mentioned in this report, developing countries, including those in Africa, shoulder a disproportionately large responsibility for hosting refugees. Uganda has for a long time been the country hosting the largest refugee population in Africa and one of the biggest refugee populations in the world. At the end of 2018, Uganda hosted 1,665,700 refugees mainly from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (UNHCR 2019a:18). After Uganda, Sudan was the country with the fourth largest refugee population in the world in 2018, with just over one million refugees, mainly from South Sudan, seeking protection in the country (UNHCR 2019a:18). In its turn, Ethiopia was the ninth largest refugee host country and the third largest African host country in 2018, with a refugee population of 903,200 (UNHCR 2019a:20). Other countries in Africa hosting significant refugee populations (i.e. of more than 200,000 people) the end of 2018 included DRC, Chad, Cameroon, South Sudan, Tanzania and Egypt (UNHCR 2019a:20). When it comes to the largest refugee populations relative to national populations, Chad was in 2018 the African country with the highest proportion, followed by Uganda, Sudan and South Sudan (UNHCR 2019a:21).

As for the profile of the African refugee population by country of origin, South Sudan remained the third most common country of origin of refugees in the world in 2018 with 2.3 million South Sudanese seeking asylum somewhere (UNHCR 2019a:14). Other African countries were also part of the ranking of major refugee source countries, such as Somalia (fifth with 986,400 refugees), Sudan (sixth with 724,800) and DRC (seventh with 720,300), Central African Republic (eighth with 590,900), Eritrea (ninth with 507,300) and Burundi (tenth with 387,900) (UNHCR 2019a:15). While internal displacement is not specifically covered in this publication, it is a very important migration-related issue across the African region. Figures indicate that many of the countries with the highest numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world at the end of 2018 were in Africa. DRC occupied the third position worldwide (after Syria and Colombia), and the first position in Africa, with a total of 4,516,900 IDPs. DRC was followed by Somalia (fourth country worldwide and second country in Africa, with 2,648,000 IDPs) and Ethiopia (fifth country worldwide and third country in Africa, with 2,615,800 IDPs) (UNHCR 2019a:35-36). Nigeria, South Sudan and Sudan were also amongst the countries with the highest numbers of IDPs, both worldwide and within Africa (UNHCR 2019a:37).

Not only is African emigration not primarily directed to other continents, but it is also not primarily driven by despair, extreme poverty, conflict and violence (cf. Chapter 1). In fact, the poorest African countries seem to have lower levels of emigration (Flahaux and De Haas 2016), and there is a long-standing trend of labour migration within Africa, particularly within West Africa and southern Africa (Mberu and Sidze 2017:89). The top intra-African corridors in 2017 (see figure 11 below) were marked by labour migration in Burkina Faso-Côte d’Ivoire (commercial agriculture and informal trade), South Sudan-Uganda, Mozambique-South Africa (linking migrants to farms and mines), and Côte d’Ivoire-Burkina Faso (UNCTAD 2018:48). Intra-regional migration within ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), for example, is fostered by the visa-free policy in the region, the relatively small sizes of many of the countries as well as the networks among the ethnic groups spread in the subregion. Movement within ECOWAS is dynamic and diverse, but it is mostly due to labour mobility of seasonal, temporary and permanent migrant workers. Many of whom move, for example, from Niger and Mali toward Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire (IOM 2017:50). Research further demonstrates that “there is no significant exceptionalism observed in Africa’s international migration dynamics,” as they are consistent with the migration trends in other continents, such as in Europa, Asia and Oceania (Mberu and Sidze 2017/76).

5 The UNHCR defines a "refugee-like situation" as a category of people that includes “groups of people who are outside their country of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained” (UNHCR n.d.b).
Figure 11. Top 20 migration corridors involving African countries (in millions of people)

Source: IOM (2017:47)
3.2. The European Union’s external policy framework on migration and development

This section is divided into three subsections: the first presents the European Union’s policy framework on development and international cooperation; the second presents the European Union’s external policies on migration, and the third presents the Union’s policies spanning both migration and development. While these three subsections are often blurred with overlapping elements, the division is illustrates that some pillars and instruments of migration policies are explicitly linked to development objectives (e.g. maximising the benefits of migration, support to diaspora, etc.) while others are not (e.g. border control). In addition, some migration policies are implemented using development funds (e.g. trust funds) while others are not.

3.2.1. The European Union’s policy framework on development and international cooperation

The European Union is amongst the most important development actors worldwide. The EU and its Member States combined are the largest development assistance donor in the world, providing €74.4 billion in official development assistance (ODA) or some 50% of all global development aid in 2018 (European Commission Press Release 2019b). The European Union provides development assistance to 160 countries around the world, including African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, EU candidate countries, countries within the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood, as well as countries in Asia and Latin America (European Parliament 2019a).

Since the early 2000s, the Union has aligned its development priorities with poverty reduction and poverty eradication with the promotion of sustainable development now being “a cornerstone of EU relations with the outside world and [contributing] to the objectives of EU external action – alongside foreign, security and trade policy (and international aspects of other policies like environment, agriculture and fisheries)” (European Commission website n.d.l). Despite such scope and ambitions, the European approach to development has historically been scattered and fragmented – a reflection of the important role that single Member States have played (and continue to play) in this policy area.

EU action on development has its legal basis in the European Union Treaties, the 2017 European Consensus on Development (which replaced the 2005 consensus), the Cotonou agreement, as well as a number of bilateral association agreements (European Parliament 2019a). With the exception of external trade policy – the exclusive competence of the EU – development cooperation and development policy is a shared competence of the Union and its Member States (De Baere 2017). The EU conducts a common development policy on behalf of Member States but does not – and must not – prevent the latter from pursuing their own bilateral cooperation programmes, or from implementing EU-funded development programmes (European Parliament 2019a). Competence sharing is guided by the principle of complementarity, inasmuch as the European Commission and Member State policies are expected to reinforce each other (TFEU 2008).

Following the establishment of the European Development Fund (EDF) in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, much of the European drive to establish cooperation agreements with third countries came from the desire of France, and later the United Kingdom, to maintain ties with former colonies (Holland and Doidge 2012). These historical circumstances explain the Union’s geographically fragmented approach to development cooperation, despite its recent commitment to the importance of “sharing sustainable solutions to global problems” (European Commission 2019c:31). This geographically fragmented approach has also led the EU to favour engagement with select African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries at the expense of neighbouring countries in Central and Eastern Europe or regions such as Asia and Latin America where cooperation has generally remained more limited in scope. As shown by a number of partnership cooperation agreements, including the Lomé Convention (1975) or the Cotonou Agreement (2003), ACP states have traditionally been the most important development cooperation partners of the Union.
The European model of cooperation may be described as “a policy patchwork [...], albeit one with trade liberalisation as an increasingly common thread” (Holland and Doidge 2012:4). In fact, this model has often included a combination of direct development aid as well as trade facilitation and investments. In line with the prescriptions of the WTO and Bretton Woods institutions (particularly trade rules), the EU has generally promoted a free trade agenda in its relations with developing countries (and particularly with Asia and Latin America). At the same time, ever since the introduction in 1971 of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), EU cooperation with ACP countries has included the provision of a varying number of them – especially Least Developed Countries (LDCs) – privileged and non-reciprocal market access. Since the late 1980s, EU international cooperation has consistently included both economic and political conditionalities in partnership agreements.7 Political conditionalities are typically clauses on democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance. Economic conditionalities requested by the EU have generally referred to the adoption of specific macro-economic policies such as structural adjustment reforms, liberalisation and the adoption of a free trade agenda (Holland and Doidge 2012).

The current organisational structure and policy orientation of the European Union's international cooperation is the result of incremental transformations and policy developments (see figure 12 above). Currently, the European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) is responsible for administering development assistance. Since December 2009, development policy has become incorporated within the EU's emerging global foreign policy agenda – a trend reinforced by the creation of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs responsible for overseeing all aspects of EU foreign policy (including development policy). In December 2016, the adoption of the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (European Commission 2016c) confirmed this orientation.8

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7 The use of conditionalities implies attaching specific conditions in exchange for providing a particular service or benefit to a partner country.

8 At the time of writing this publication, the composition of the new European Commission was under discussion. Further changes to the Directorate Generals (DGs) are expected, but it is not yet clear how this will unfold or affect this area.
Since 2005, the EU has explicitly committed itself to Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). This commitment requires the EU and its Member States to consider the objectives of development cooperation in all their external and internal policies that are likely to affect developing countries, hence the mainstreaming of development goals in all EU policies that affect developing countries. As of 2009, the strategy on policy coherence included five main domains: 1) trade and finance; 2) climate change; 3) food security; 4) migration and development; and 5) synergies between security and development in the context of a global peacebuilding agenda (European Parliament 2019a). The European Union is also committed to aid effectiveness as well as promoting close relationships with partner countries when programming and implementing development actions (European Parliament 2019a). In this respect, the EU adopted a number of policy frameworks, in line with the OECD’s 2005 Paris Declaration which promotes ‘ownership, harmonisation, alignment, results and mutual accountability’ with regard to development aid.

Within the 2014-2020 framework, EU development policy was aligned with the 2012 EU Agenda for Change, which set “the promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance” and “inclusive and sustainable growth” as the two basic pillars of development policy. The Agenda for Change also states that resources should be primarily allocated to ‘countries most in need’ including fragile states and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (European Parliament 2019a). Like (most of) its Member States, the EU has also recommitted to achieving the target of 0.7% spending of its GNI on development aid, in line with the commitments made in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (approved in July 2015) which lays the foundation needed to implement the 2030 Agenda (European Parliament 2019a).

The New European Consensus on Development (Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission 2017) incorporated the principles, approaches and commitments of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development agreed by the international community at the UN Summit in September 2015 (cf. European Commission n.d.m). In addition to reinforcing the commitment to fight poverty, the new Consensus has set out the main principles of the SDGs and a strategy for reaching them. This should guide the development policy of the EU and its Member States over the next 15 years through their external and internal policies. Policy Coherence for Development was reiterated in the New Consensus for Development and is enshrined in fundamental law (Article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty) and in various Council Conclusions, most recently in May 2019 (Council of the European Union 2019). By reaffirming the EU’s commitment to PCD, the Consensus has recognised PCD as a crucial element of the strategy to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in partner countries to be applied across all policies and all areas covered by the 2030 Agenda (European Commission 2019c:30). In particular, SDG 17 consists of strengthening the means of implementation and revitalising the global partnership for sustainable development and target 17.14 consists of enhancing policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD).

The EU has mainstreamed private sector cooperation into the EU’s development cooperation policy in its new Consensus on Development, and has also created a European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) as the blending modality arm of the External Investment Plan (EIP) (European Commission n.d.n). This aims at using ODA to leverage additional private finance. The new blending trend has taken off across the EU and amongst the other members of the OECD DAC, as a way to bridge the multi-billion US dollar SDG financing gap. Consequently, the amount of EU ODA channelled through the European Commission’s seven blending facilities has risen over the last decade.

Since the mid-2000s, following a period when the Union prioritised cooperation with EU candidate countries and with the European neighbourhood, the African region has once again become the focus area of European development policy and action. In 2017, EU institutions were the second largest ODA donor to African countries providing 13% of the ODA received by Africa that year. Between 2010 and 2017, on average 42% of the EU institutions’ aid was directed to Africa each year (OECD 2019a). In 2017, for example, Africa was the recipient continent receiving the largest share of ODA from EU institutions and Member States (€20.18 billion), followed by Asia (€16.09 billion), Europe (€7.22 billion), America (€4.43 million) and Oceania (€213.28 million) (EU Aid Explorer n.d.). Another reason for renewed European activism can also be linked to China’s growing involvement in international cooperation with the African region, which has challenged the EU’s predominant role in the region. European cooperation with the African region has since prioritised the following objectives: strengthening African institutions and governance, in particular by supporting the African Union; supporting African regional integration and South-South

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9 Every two years, the European Commission assesses the progress of the EU in the area of PCD. The most recent assessment report was published in January 2019 (European Commission 2019d).
10 These are the Code of 2007 Conduct on the Division of Labour in Development Policy and the 2011 Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness.
11 Member States that joined the EU after 2002 are committed to increasing their ODA/GNI to 0.33% (European Commission Press Release 2019).
12 See European Commission 2016d. Amongst other things, this communication has integrated the SDGs into the European policy framework and EU priorities.
13 The term ‘blending’ refers to an instrument for achieving EU external policy objectives, which is complementary to other aid modalities and which pursues relevant regional, national and overarching policy priorities. “The principle of the mechanism is to combine EU grants with loans or equity from public and private financiers” (European Commission n.d.o).
trade; promoting social cohesion and sustainable peace; and
untying aid (Holland and Doigde 2012:222).

EU development cooperation is carried out through a wide
range of financial instruments and particularly through the
seven-year Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) is the largest
development-funding source within the EU budget for the
years 2014-2020 (see the breakdown of instruments in figure
13 below).14 In addition to its broad geographical focus, it also
includes two thematic programmes covering all developing
countries, the Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC)
programme, and the Civil Society Organisations and Local
Authorities (CSO-LA) programme. As mentioned above, the
European Development Fund (EDF) is the EU’s oldest and
largest development instrument overall and is (currently)
not part of the EU budget. With a current budget of €29.1
billion for the period 2014-2020, the EDF supports the
implementation of the Cotonou Agreement with ACP states
as well as cooperation with the EU’s Overseas Countries and
Territories (OCTs). With the Cotonou agreement set to expire
in 2020, and negotiations for a new Partnership Agreement
with ACP countries and the new EU budget under way, it
remains unclear what the new EDF will look like in the future.

Figure 13. EU’s External Financial Instruments under the MFF 2014-2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)</td>
<td>€19.7 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America, Asia, Central Asia, Gulf region, South Africa + global thematic support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)</td>
<td>€15.4 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 European Neighbourhood countries, Russia (regional and cross-border cooperation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)</td>
<td>€11.7 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkans and Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership Instrument (PI)</td>
<td>€955 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industrialised countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument for Greenland</td>
<td>€217 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)</td>
<td>€1.3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy and human rights promotion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)</td>
<td>€2.3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political stability and peace-building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)</td>
<td>€225 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear safety</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ elaboration, adapted from European Commission (n.d.p)

The EU’s financing instruments for external action will
change for the period 2021-2027 because of the ongoing
negotiations on the next MFF budget allocation (European
Commission 2018a). The MFF 2021-2027 negotiations began
in May 2018,15 and at the time of writing are still ongoing.
Complementing this package, in June 2018, the Commission
adopted 44 sectoral proposals categorised under seven
headings falling outside the MFF ceilings. Under Heading VI – ‘Neighbourhood and the World’ (see figure 14 below), one of
the Commission’s sectoral proposals was for a Neighbourhood,
Development and International Cooperation Instrument
(NDICI) (European Commission 2018g), of €89.2 billion
which proposed a merging of all the instruments listed in
the above table, except for the Instrument for Nuclear Safety
Cooperation (INSC).

The specific objectives of the NDICI should be to support
and foster cooperation with third countries, consolidate and
support democracy, the rule of law and human rights, civil
society organisations and address other global challenges
including migration and mobility and respond rapidly to
situations of crisis, instability and conflict. Inherently a

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15 This was when the Commission adopted a package of horizontal proposals on the next MFF. The Parliament’s position on the MFF was detailed in an interim report on the MFF package voted in November 2018 (European Parliament 2018b), and the Council will do so in the course of 2019, both in their capacity as co-legislators on this matter.
The development instrument, the NDICI as proposed by the Commission, should contribute to the collective EU objectives of providing 0.7% of GNI as ODA and 0.2% of GNI as ODA to Least Developed Countries within the timeframe of the 2030 Agenda (European Commission 2018g, Recitals 15 and 16). Furthermore, 92% of the NDICI funding should support actions that meet the ODA DAC criteria (European Commission 2018: Recital 15) and 20% of the ODA funded under the NDICI should contribute to social inclusion and human development (European Commission 2018: Recital 13). The Commission’s NDICI proposal establishes that actions funded under this financial instrument should apply development effectiveness principles and be consistent with relevant existing policy provisions. These include: the 2030 Agenda and SDGs, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the EU Global Strategy, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the new European Consensus on Development, the renewed EU-Africa Partnership, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the Partnership Framework with third countries on migration.

Figure 14. NDICI structure, as proposed by the Commission in June 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic pillar</th>
<th>At least 68 billion EUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Neighbourhood</td>
<td>At least 22 billion EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>At least 32 billion EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>At least 10 billion EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas and the Caribbean</td>
<td>At least 4 billion EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thematic pillar</td>
<td>7 billion EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights and democracy</td>
<td>1.5 billion EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society organisations</td>
<td>1.5 billion EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability and peace</td>
<td>1 billion EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global challenges</td>
<td>5 billion EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid-response pillar</td>
<td>4 billion EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility cushion</td>
<td>10.2 billion EUR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s elaboration, adapted from European Commission’s NDICI proposal (European Commission 2018g).
3.2.2. The European Union’s external policies on migration

Over the past two decades, the European Union has assumed a more prominent external role in the governance of migration with the main objective of reducing irregular migration to Europe from third countries. This is a general trend since the late 1990s, linked to the establishment of an internal area of freedom of movement, the creation of the Union’s external border along with the Member State’s perceived necessity to control EU borders and limit irregular migration, including by apprehending migrants at the border and returning them (cf. Chapter 2). External policies on migration are distinct from internal migration policies (cf. Chapter 2), in the sense that they explicitly target non-EU third countries and are (to a certain degree) co-decided in cooperation with them (Carrera, Radescu, and Reslow 2014). Largely, the evolution of external policies on migration has resulted from the ‘externalisation’ of EU borders. Externalisation means, in practice, outsourcing practical migration policy measures to countries outside Europe (Bartels 2019:14). In particular, as the UN Special Rapporteur observed, externalisation “operates to ensure that border control no longer takes place at the physical borders of the European Union, […] and involves shifting the responsibility of preventing irregular migration into Europe to countries of departure or transit” (Crépeau 2013:14).

Similarly, to the internal dimension, competence for external policy on migration and asylum is shared between EU institutions and Member States. Despite the reluctance of Member States, since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), migration policies have gradually become part of the EU’s external relations with third countries (Carrera, Radescu, and Reslow 2014:14). Currently, the EU has explicit external competence regarding the conclusion of readmission agreements with third countries (García Andrade and Martín 2015). The Union also has exclusive implicit competence on short-term visas and external border controls, and has gradually got involved in various migration and asylum domains. The resulting policy contestation and tension among EU institutions and Member States has led to the development of a field characterised by a number of ‘experimental’ venues and soft policy instruments of governance – much of it falling outside the EU Treaties (Carrera et al. 2014).

Figure 15. EU migration and asylum policy timeline: key recent external policy developments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Global Approach to Migration (GAMM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>The Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (Rabat Process)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development (Tripoli Process)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Joint Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Launch of Mobility Partnerships (MPs) with third countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>GAMM evaluation and revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>European Commission Communication on “Maximising the Development Impact of Migration”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Signature of mobility partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>A European Agenda on Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2015</td>
<td>Valletta Political Declaration and Action Plan for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2015</td>
<td>Launch of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2016</td>
<td>EU-Turkey Statement and Joint Action Plan on Syrian Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2016</td>
<td>Launch of new Partnership Framework with Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal under the European Agenda on Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2018</td>
<td>Proposal to explore regional disembarkation platforms following the European Council conclusions of 28-29 June 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s elaboration based on several EC policy documents
Since 2005, and following the 2011 evaluation and further revision in 2012, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) provides the broad framework for EU external action on migration in partnership with third countries (Zanker 2019; European Commission n.d.q). The GAMM is organised around four pillars: 1) the prevention and fight against irregular migration, strengthening border management and return; 2) the promotion of mobility and facilitation of legal migration opportunities and integration of legal residents; 3) the maximisation of synergies between migration and development of countries of origin; and 4) the promotion of asylum and international protection (García Andrade and Martín 2015).

EU external governance includes a wide array of instruments among which are political, legal and operational cooperation instruments (García Andrade and Martín 2015). The political instruments include migration regional dialogues, migration bilateral dialogues, Mobility Partnerships (MPs) as well as Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMMs). Legal instruments include EU Readmission Agreements (EURAs), Visa Facilitation Agreements (VFAs), Visa Waiver Agreements as well as migration clauses in association and cooperation agreements. The instruments on operational cooperation include: Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs), Regional Development and Protection Programmes (RDPPs) and FRONTEX and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) external tools.

While regional dialogues also exist with Eastern neighbourhood countries and with Latin America and the Caribbean, from the perspective of the EU, the most important ones are those with countries located in the Southern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan African regions. These include: the Rabat Process (North, West and Central Africa), the Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogues (all African countries, except Morocco), and the ACP-EU Migration Dialogue and the Khartoum Process (Eastern African countries). Those regional dialogues usually replicate the four pillars of the GAMM – with the exception of the Khartoum process, which has a stronger focus on trafficking – as shown by the participation of both the EU and Member States. So-called bilateral dialogues are often a preliminary step toward more substantial partnerships such as Mobility Partnerships and may focus on technical cooperation on readmission and visas or on visa liberalisation. Mobility Partnerships (MPs) were first proposed by the EC in 2007 to promote legal migration in discussions with third countries in exchange for securing the latter’s cooperation on combating irregular migration, increasing border management capabilities and on readmitting
nationals returned from Europe. Just like the regional and bilateral dialogues, Mobility Partnerships are a political instrument and do not produce legally binding international commitments on either side. Overall, progress on MPs has been rather slow – as of 2019, only nine MPs between the EU, certain Member States, and third countries had been signed. Common Agendas for Migration and Mobility (CAMMs) are similar to MPs but entail less commitment. They focus on establishing a dialogue with third countries for the purpose of capacity building, research and data collection as well as the exchange of best practices. So far, the only two African countries to have agreed a CAMM were Nigeria and Ethiopia in 2015 (European Commission Migration and Home Affairs Website 2019).

Over the last five years, the GAMM has been complemented by the already mentioned 2015 European Agenda on Migration (European Commission 2015), the Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP) (2015) and the 2016 Partnership Framework (European Commission 2016). These key documents, issued at the peak of the European solidarity crisis, have signalled the willingness of the Union to take a stronger role in migration management, including vis-à-vis third countries of origin and transit. The JVAP was the result of the 2015 Valletta Summit, a gathering of European and African leaders convened by the EU with the objective of “strengthen[ing] cooperation and address[ing] the current challenges but also the opportunities of migration.” (European Council, n.a.) The Plan was structured around five priority domains and 16 priority initiatives supported by different financial instruments available for cooperation including the newly-designed EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (European Commission Press Release 2015). The JVAP, reflecting growing European concern regarding migratory pressure (particularly from Sub-Saharan Africa), reiterated the GAMM objectives but also added the objectives of “addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement” and “improv[ing] cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration.” (European Council, n.a.) The Valletta Plan has also since become the overarching framework guiding existing regional and bilateral dialogues on migration with African countries.

Similarly, the 2016 Partnership Framework was driven by the political view that “external migratory pressure [particularly from Sub-Saharan Africa] is the ‘new normal’ both for the EU and for partner countries” (European Commission 2016e:5), and based on the March 2016 EU-Turkey statement as a template (Tardis 2018). The Partnership Framework was designed to allow the EU and Member States to engage in a “coordinated [or putting together] instruments, tools and leverage to reach comprehensive partnerships (compacts) with third countries to better manage migration in full respect of humanitarian and human rights obligations” (European Commission 2016e:6). A number of ‘compacts’ combining migration policies with other areas of competence of the EU, including development aid, trade, energy and security, have been signed between the EU and countries deemed strategic for their position – either as countries of origin or transit – along major migration routes to Europe. These include Senegal, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. These partnerships include a mix of short-term and long-term actions to address the ‘root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement’: fight against traffickers, increase returns of irregular migrants, improve capacities of third countries (including on border management), and foster sustainable development of third countries.

17 These included: Moldova, Cape Verde (2008), Georgia (2009), Armenia (2011), Morocco, Azerbaijan, Tienjin (2013), Jordan (2014) and Belarus (2016). Senegal and Egypt, with whom the EU sought such agreements, have so far refused, while discussions with Ghana have stalled (García Andrade and Martín 2015).
However, several external migration policies and actions are not in fact funded by development cooperation financial instruments. Den Hertog (2016:1) has shown that there “is no single or central EU fund for […] migration-related projects,” and migration-oriented “funding instruments are established under various EU policy fields, such as development cooperation, home affairs, neighbourhood, enlargement, and common foreign and security policy” (Den Hertog 2016:1). In addition, these actions are complemented by the external role of EU agencies such as FRONTEX and EASO, which have their own budget. The MFF 2021-2027, as proposed by the Commission, confirms Hertog’s assertion as it covers external aspects of migration under multiple financial envelopes related to various EU policy fields. For example, Heading IV – ‘Migration and Border Management’ – is composed of two financial instruments, namely, the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) and the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF). This heading is expected to total €33 billion (2.6 times the amount budgeted for the period of 2014-2020). It will be used to cover migration components related to the external dimension, such as measures to counter irregular migration, including returns and to secure the common external borders of the Union (European Commission 2018b:1). It will also address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement and support migration management through the NDCI under Heading VI – ‘Neighbourhood and the World’ (more on this is described in the next section).

### 3.2.3. Linking the European Union’s migration and development policies

Practically speaking, all development and external migration policies have an impact on the realisation of integral human development in countries of origin and transit outside Europe. In the same way, all development and external migration policies have some impact on the variety of migratory phenomena as they take shape in countries and regions. In Europe, the Union and its Member States have approached the interconnection between migration and development in two main ways. On the one hand, they recognise the development potential of migration and encourage migrants as actors of development, particularly towards their countries of origin; and on the other hand, they also causally link (the lack of) development to migration, and therefore reframe the role of European development policy as a tool to tackle the ‘root causes of migration’ (including forced migration) and to reduce migratory pressure towards Europe (Latek 2019; Arroyo 2019; cf. Chapter 1). The first approach has led to the inclusion of ‘migration and development’ objectives, particularly with respect to the ‘maximisation of the development benefits of migration’ in existing EU cooperation with third countries on migration. The second approach has led, in parallel, to the mainstreaming of migration issues and objectives in development cooperation policy and instruments – as well as international cooperation agreements – and to a reallocation of development aid based on migration considerations.

Since the early 2010s, the ‘root-cause’ narrative has gained a lot of traction in European policy circles. In 2015, the already mentioned European Agenda on Migration stressed in its first pillar, the need to address the root causes, particularly through development cooperation and humanitarian assistance (European Commission 2015:11). The creation of the EU Trust Funds (EUTFs) for external action, aiming to support emergency interventions in areas affected by strong out-migration, is a direct by-product of those discussions. Since 2014, when the first EUTF for the African Central Republic (or “Bekou Trust Fund”) was established, three more programmes have been launched: the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (also known as ‘the Madad Fund’) in December 2014 and in November 2015, the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRT);18 and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTFA) following the 2015 Valetta Summit.

The EU Trust Fund for Africa, or the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa), is the most important of such instruments for its scope and extension (European Council n.a.). In line with the related Joint Valletta Action Plan, the objectives of the EUTF are to: address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement of people; increase co-operation regarding legal migration and mobility; strengthen protection of migrants and asylum seekers; prevent irregular migration, the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking and combat these phenomena; and co-operate more closely to improve co-operation on returns, readmission and reintegration. The EUTF focusses on African countries along major migration routes to European countries “among the most fragile and affected by the migration crisis and [that] will draw the greatest benefit from EU assistance” (European Commission 2017a). It covers countries in the Sahel region and Lake Chad, Horn of Africa, and North of Africa.19 As of 3 September 2019, 210 programmes had been approved by the Operational Committees, for an amount totalling EUR 4,018.5 million (see table 16 below).

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18 The Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRT) is a key component of the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016.
**Figure 16. EUTF Fund Allocations by region (as of 3 September 2019)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Window</th>
<th>Approved</th>
<th></th>
<th>Contracted**</th>
<th></th>
<th>Paid amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decisions No.</td>
<td>Amount Euro million</td>
<td>Contracts No.</td>
<td>Amount Euro million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahel and Lake Chad</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1,953.2</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1,406.1</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Africa</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>659.2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total*</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>4,018.5</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>2,934*</td>
<td>1,494*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures have been rounded and may not exactly add up to the totals indicated.
** Includes five cross-window contracts for EUR 0.8 million

Source: European Commission n.d.r

In addition to the EUTF, with the adoption of the External Investment Plan (EIP) in September 2017, EU leaders have boosted investment in partner countries in Africa and in the European Neighbourhood countries. The aim of the EIP is to “contribute to the UN’s sustainable development goals (SDG) while tackling some of the root causes of migration; and mobilise and leverage sustainable public and private investments to improve economic and social development with a particular focus on decent job creation” (European Commission website n.d.n). Its main actions revolve around supporting partner countries by mobilising finance via the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), providing technical assistance to support the preparation of investment projects and developing a “favourable investment climate and business environment” (European Commission website n.d.n). In the view of the European Commission, the EIP should also be the financial backbone of the Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs, launched in September 2018 by the Commission’s President Juncker (European Commission 2019c:31-32). The Commission believes that the Alliance “holds great potential for unlocking sustainable investment jobs, with the perspective of creating up to 10 million jobs in Africa in the next five years alone” (European Commission 2019c:31-32).

As mentioned earlier, the new MFF will change the structure of EU’s financing instruments for external action. Migration is not only included under Heading IV – discussed in the previous section, but also under the new NDICI instrument. Heading VI – ‘Neighbourhood and the World’ of the new MFF also incorporates migration under its NDICI financial envelope. The NDICI proposal (European Commission 2018g) draws attention to the importance of cooperation between the EU and partner countries in reaping the benefits of well-managed migration, in effectively addressing the root causes of irregular migration and in enhancing border management and in working on returns (European Commission 2018g, Recital 8). One of the NDICI’s specific objectives is to address global challenges including migration and mobility (European Commission 2018g, Art. 3), and 10% of the NDICI is “expected to be dedicated to addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement and to supporting migration management and governance including the protection of refugees and migrants’ rights.” (European Commission 2018g, Recital 30). The NDICI also incorporates migration in the EFDS+ which, according to the Commission’s proposal, should have an objective of addressing the specific socioeconomic root causes of irregular migration (European Commission 2018g, Recital 34). Finally, the Commission’s proposal includes a performance-based approach, according to which, 10% of the financial envelope of geographical programmes should be allocated to partner countries on the basis of their progress towards, amongst other factors, cooperation on migration (European Commission 2018g, Art. 17). Along the same lines, the Finnish Presidency Programme, which outlines the priorities of Finland’s Presidency of the Council of the EU between July and December 2019, states that for the MFF to deliver effectively on the political priorities of the EU, funding should be allocated on the basis of preconditions concerning migration management.
Figure 17. EUTF Fund Allocations by region (as of 3 September 2019)

North Africa regional window
Approved: €659.2 million
Number of projects: 27

Sahel and Lake Chad regional window
Approved: €1,953.2 million
Number of projects: 101

Horn of Africa regional window
Approved: €1,406.1 million
Number of projects: 77

Source: Author’s elaboration based on European Commission n.d.r
This section introduces the existing policy frameworks on migration and development in the African continent. Several legal and policy tools outlined in the above sections, although initiated by European institutions, assume the active co-participation of African national, regional and continental governing institutions. Nevertheless, it is not possible to discuss migration and development in the African context, as well as to understand the implications of EU policy for African countries without mentioning the variety of continental and regional frameworks that touch upon migration, asylum, displacement, mobility and trade. This section is thus divided into two sub-sections: the first presents several continental and regional legislative and policy frameworks that relate to domains such as migration, asylum, displacement, mobility and trade; the second presents major EU-African policy processes with a focus on the priorities of African countries.

3.3.1. Continental and regional frameworks on migration and development

Just like Europe, the African continent has a long history of regional economic integration, dating back to at least the early 20th century with the first sub-regional economic communities (Chetail 2019). These policy developments reflect, on the one hand, the decision to embrace the principles underlying regional integration – including internal free trade, liberalisation and freedom of circulation – as a way to foster social and economic development (Abebe 2017). On the other hand, they also acknowledge the fact that, as shown in section 3.1 on the African migratory context, migration from African countries traditionally was, and still is, directed towards other African states (and particularly neighbouring countries and regions).
Since at least the mid-1970s, the African continent has seen the proliferation of regional integration projects aspiring to create areas for the free circulation of persons, capital, goods and services. There are now eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) recognised by the African Union (African Union n.d.a), those covering the whole continent and, in some cases, those with overlapping membership: the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the East African Community (EAC); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Each project has developed individually and now has its own functions, provisions and structures. However, since the Abuja Treaty of 1991, all RECs have been brought together under the umbrella of the wider African Economic Community (AEC) as stepping stones towards future continental integration. In the experience of RECs, similarly to the experience of the European Union, freedom of movement of persons is therefore seen as a key component of regional economic integration. RECs envisage addressing regional freedom of movement through a series of three steps specified in Protocols adopted by their members: 1) guarantee right of entry and abolish visa requirements for stays up to 90 days; 2) guarantee the right of residence within the territory of any Member State; and 3) guarantee the right of establishment in order to pursue economic activity in any Member State (Chetail 2019; Abebe 2017).
A further step to linking (regional) migration and development is the adoption of Agenda 2063, the African Union’s strategic framework devoted to achieving inclusive and sustainable development across the continent. Launched in 2013, the Agenda is described as “a concrete manifestation of the pan-African drive for unity, self-determination, freedom, progress and collective prosperity pursued under Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance” (African Union n.d.b). Marking a shift from previous long-term political priorities, which had emphasised the struggle for political independence, the new Agenda lays out a 50 year-long plan prioritising development alongside continental and regional integration, democratic governance and peace and security with the aim of making Africa “a dominant player in the global arena.” More recently, in January 2018, marking an important step towards continental freedom of movement, the African Union adopted the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence, and Right of Establishment. In line with most RECs, the continental protocol foresees, within the African Union, the establishment of the right of entry and abolition short-term visas (art. 6), as well as a guarantee of the right of residence (together with the right to family reunification) (art. 16) and a right of establishment for self-employment and business purposes (art. 17). In addition, the Protocol also envisages the adoption of an African passport as well as mutual recognition of professional qualifications and the portability of social rights (Chetail 2019). Such provisions are tempered by three safeguards, which allow states party to the RECs to forbid entry on grounds of national security and public order, to implement the rights of residence and establishment in accordance with their own domestic laws, and to temporarily suspend implementation of governing protocol. In March 2018, the protocol was supplemented by the Agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which aims at establishing “a single market for goods, services, facilitated by movement of persons in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent” (art.3 of the agreement). Signed by all AU 55 members, except for Eritrea, the agreement entered into force in April 2019 following the signature of Gambia, the 22nd country to ratify it.

Besides legal frameworks regulating regional and continental freedom of movement, African institutions have also adopted important legislation in the domain of asylum and forced displacement. In 1969, with the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted “the first regional refugee convention in the world and the only relevant binding instrument in the developing world” (Abebe 2017:3). Complementing the 1951 UN Convention on refugees, the OAU convention expanded the refugee domination to include

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19 The OAU was the institutional predecessor of the African Union (AU), which was officially founded in 2001 and launched in 2002.
“flight from aggression, occupation, foreign domination and events that lead to serious public disorder as grounds for claiming asylum” (Abebe 2017:6). Among other things, it made states receiving refugees directly responsible for ensuring their protection, either within their own territory or elsewhere (Abebe 2017). In 2009, the African Union also adopted the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention). With the primary objective of addressing internal displacement by “eradicating [its] root causes, especially persisting and recurrent conflicts [as well as]…natural disasters, which have a devastating impact on human life, peace, stability, security, and development,” the Kampala Convention established a continent-wide legal framework to both prevent displacement and provide assistance and protection to IDPs (Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa). The Convention sets out protection and assistance obligations for states party to the agreement, international organisations, humanitarian agencies, as well as the African Union itself.

In addition to legal instruments, the African Union has addressed migration and development within Africa through a variety of policy instruments, addressing issues such as migration management, internal freedom of movement, IDPs, refugees, trafficking and human smuggling. The most important of these include: the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (2006), the African Common Position on Migration and Development (2006), the AU Commission Initiative against Trafficking (AU.COMMIT) Campaign (2009), IGAD’s20 Regional Migration Policy Framework (IRMPF), and the Joint Labour Migration Programme (JLMP - 2015). The Migration Policy Framework and the African Common Position stressed the mutual benefits of well-managed migration for both countries of origin and destination. They raised concerns regarding the deterioration of social and economic conditions as well as conflict and insecurity as major drivers of internal Africa migration and called on African Member States to harmonise their legislation with international standards to ensure migrant rights are respected (Abebe 2017). Similarly, the JLMP, an AU-led project in cooperation with ILO, IOM and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), has sought to strengthen labour migration governance in Africa by directly involving a variety of stakeholders (governments, migrant workers, international organisations, trade unions, non-governmental organisations). On the other hand, initiatives such as AU.COMMIT and IRMPF and JLMP signalled, respectively: 1) the growing commitment of the African Union to tackle human trafficking with an integrated approach – prevention, the protection of victims and the prosecution of traffickers; and 2) regional activism on critical issues of concerns such as seasonal and circular migration, especially when linked to pastoralism and human security. Since 2018, acknowledging a change in migratory trends in Africa, the African Union’s Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018-2030) has become the new guiding policy framework on migration. Taking into account AU priorities and policies (including Agenda 2063), the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and international migration management policies and standards, the framework identifies eight main pillars: migration governance, labour migration and education, diaspora engagement, border governance, irregular migration, forced displacement, internal migration, migration and trade (African Union Commission 2018).

### 3.3.2. African engagement on migration and development with the European Union

As part of the African Union, of the grouping of ACP countries, or bilaterally, African countries have repeatedly engaged on the topics of migration and development with the European Union. Within the broad scope of the already mentioned EU-ACP Cotonou partnership agreement (ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement 2000), migration is specifically addressed in article 13. The article provides a framework for EU-ACP cooperation on improving the socio-economic conditions of the countries of origin of migrants, on ensuring integration and protection of the rights of migrants in regular situations in countries of destination, as well as on establishing return and readmission procedures for irregular migrants in the context of the country of origin. Besides Cotonou, since 2000 the EU and AU have also adopted several joint policy actions and declarations on migration and development. The 2000 Cairo Plan, complementing the Cairo Declaration (UNCTAD 2000) covered a wide range of issues, spanning; regional economic cooperation and integration; the integration of Africa in the world economy (via trade, public and private investment, industrialisation); human rights, democracy and good governance; peace building and conflict resolution; food security and sustainable development. Migration, asylum and internal displacement were all discussed in the context of human rights and good governance, anticipating art. 13 of Cotonou. In line with the emerging root-cause approach, the parties noted the “loss of skilled migrants from Africa” for countries of origin and “underlined the need for co-operation to address the root causes of migration” (UNCTAD 2000:10); they also stressed the importance of cooperating to establish an African-wide free movement regime.

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20 IGAD is the Intergovernmental Authority on Development – an inter-governmental African organisation comprising of eight Member States: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda.
The trans-continental migration-development debate gained further momentum in the mid-2000s, with the adoption of the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (2006), the Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration (2006) and the EU-AU Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children (2006) and the Joint Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility, and Employment (2007). The Euro-African Dialogue resulted in the already mentioned Rabat Process and its four pillars: organising mobility and legal migration; improving border management and combating irregular migration; strengthening synergies between migration and development; and promoting international protection. The Joint Declaration (Tripoli Process) was a pivotal moment in launching a discussion on the interconnections between migration, peace and security, and underscored the “the need to address migration and its root causes through wider development and poverty reduction strategies” (Abebe 2017:5).

The Ouagadougou Plan focused on trafficking, with specific attention to women and children, sex tourism and sexual exploitation. Finally, the Joint Partnership, established in the context of the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy, concentrated on improving migration management (the fight against irregular migration and trafficking, facilitation of regular migration) and, in particular, on collaborating for the creation of “more productive and better jobs in Africa, in particular for youth and women.” (Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment 2007). The Strategy also tackled the topic of financial remittances, paving the ground for the establishment of the African Institute for Remittances (AIR) – which was eventually launched in 2014 – with the aim of reducing remittance transfer cost to and within Africa, and to leverage the development potential of remittances for African countries (ADEPT 2016).

Migration and mobility have routinely featured in political discussions between the EU and especially North African countries.21 In the context of an emerging European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the signing of trade association agreements with Tunisia (1998), Morocco (2000), Egypt (2004) and Algeria (2005), the EU began to negotiate ‘mobility packages’ (visa facilitation) in exchange for cooperation on readmission of irregular migration and on border management (Tasnim 2019). These discussions have so far resulted in the signing of Mobility Partnerships between the EU and Morocco (2013) (European Commission Press Release 2013) and between the EU and Tunisia (in 2014) (European Commission Press Release 2014). More recent joint actions date back to the mid-2000s, in the context of the European solidarity crisis and the perceived growth of migratory pressure from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe. In addition to the establishment in 2014 of the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process), which mirrored the Rabat Process on the other side of the continent and specifically focused on trafficking, the other pivotal moments were the already-mentioned Joint Valletta Action Plan (2015) and the concurrent establishment of the EU Trust Fund for Africa, the Partnership Framework (2016), and the launch in 2018 of an Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs. The JVAP and the Partnership signal an important turn in understanding the root-cause approach, moving from ‘root causes of migration and displacement’ to the ‘root causes of irregular migration and displacement’,22 and therefore opens the way for a more security-focused approach to migration management. Among the signatory countries of the Partnership Framework, Niger is perhaps the country that has recently most intensified its cooperation with the EU, particularly on border management operations, the fight against human trafficking, job creation, and development aid (European Commission Press Release 2017a). Since 2018, Niger has also assumed a prominent role in the temporary protection and resettlement of refugees evacuated from Libya due to persisting political and social instability, particularly via the already mentioned Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) led by the UNHCR and financed by the European Union (UNHCR n.d.c).

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21 It is beyond the scope of this publication to present the specificities of the legal agreements and policies concluded between the EU and single African countries. For the same reason, it is not possible to examine here the myriad of bilateral agreements on migration and development concluded between African countries and single EU Member States.

22 This approach continues to inform current engagement with African partners on migration, as shown by the joint conclusions of the most recent JVAP’s Senior Officials’ Meeting, which took place in November 2018 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Joint Valletta Action Plan 2018).
3.4. Exploring the development potential of migration outside Europe and in countries of origin

The previous two sections presented the existing policy and legal frameworks on migration and development in Europe and in Africa. Before providing a critical analysis of how these frameworks affect sustainable development and migration outside of Europe, it is important to introduce the report’s findings showing how migrants and migration are already part of development processes.

To emphasise migrant contributions does not mean to obscure the fact that migration can also have detrimental effects on households and family units, as reported by several Common Home studies. Bearing in mind the many different motivations for migration, the reality is quite simply that migration results in physical distances to family, friends, and loved ones back home. Many families separate to find economic resources and employment abroad that will allow them to send money back to their family and community. The economic benefits of migrating for families – including the pursuit of life projects, remittances, or the promise of future migration – cannot properly compensate for the social and emotional effects and degradation that migration can have on family members left behind (Nguyen, Yeoh and Toyota 2007). Evidence across the Caritas network alone shows the consequences of adults leaving their children behind with grandparents or aunts and uncles with the goal of working and earning more money to improve their families’ quality of life. The main consequence of family separation induced from migration is the break-up of the family unit. Research done in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Asia reveal that family cohesion was largely lost after migration and families separated (Piperno 2012; Núñez Carrasco 2010; Nguyen et al. 2007). As a result, migrants may experience deterioration of their psychological well-being and status (Marchetti-Mercer 2012). Additionally, cognitive and personal development issues may also arise as a result, particularly among children (Ceschi 2019: 13). In spite of those challenges, the Common Home studies argue that migration has the potential of contributing in several ways to the sustainable development of all the countries involved for the mutual benefit of everyone. Just as in the case for countries of destination of migrants (cf. Chapter 2), so is the case for countries of origin. This contribution is most visible in the growing flow of economic remittances migrants send home, but it does not stop there. Migrants, individually and collectively, also promote development in their countries of origin through ‘social remittances’, e.g. skills-and-knowledge transfer. Migrant and diaspora organisations likewise engage in a variety of international cooperation activities, sometimes with the private sector, with local civil society, and with the support of the institutions of the country of destination. These aspects are described in more detail below. Understanding how migration already plays a role in development processes is crucial to then identifying policy challenges and opportunities that hamper the development potential of migration. Even with the right policies facilitating them, such contributions, however, still play a rather limited role in fostering global sustainable development, including in Africa, and need to be backed by robust action through active international development cooperation.

3.4.1. Economic contributions: financial remittances and investments

Financial remittances are perhaps the most tangible sign of migrants’ economic contribution to their countries of origin. Total global remittances were estimated at $689 billion in 2018 (World Bank 2019:3). Remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are projected to reach $550 billion in 2019, making remittance flows larger than foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) to LMICs. (World Bank 2019a:vii; see also figure 18 below). Remittances, however important, may be an indirect indicator of the far larger economic value generated by migrants/immigrants in their countries of employment-residence. The UN Secretary-General’s 2018 report on “Making Migration Work for All” highlighted an estimate by the UN International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) that migrant workers typically send home about 15% of their earnings as remittances. The remaining 85% – totalling about $2.5 trillion US dollars annually – stays in host countries, and is spent mostly on housing, food, transportation, taxes and other necessities (United Nations 2018:6; IFAD 2017:12).
Figure 19. Remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries, official development assistance and private capital flows, 1990-2018

Source: World Bank 2019b
Data shows that the most significant remittances sent by the EU-28 countries come from and go to other EU-28 countries. Nevertheless, non-EU nationals living in the EU still remit considerable amounts of money to third countries. In 2018, remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) reached $529 billion, an increase of 9.6% from 2017. Remittances are more than three times the size of official development assistance (ODA). Moreover, since foreign direct investment (FDI) has been on a downward trend in recent years, remittances were close to the level of FDI flows in 2018 (World Bank 2019a:1). Therefore, it is not surprising that the commitment stated in the EU PCD report of strengthening the development potential of remittances remains a political priority for the EU and its Member States (European Commission 2019a:24).

Financial remittances are an important source of development (in the broadest possible sense) for origin countries. They increase the income of receiving households and thus play an important role in poverty alleviation, children’s schooling and entrepreneurship (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:33). The crucial importance of remittances to family welfare was highlighted by a survey cited in the Portugal Common Home study, which found that 16% of households in Angola “rely entirely on remittances as income” (Góis 2019:33). However, remittances do not necessarily provide generalised benefits, as they may not reach the poorest people in a country and might in some cases contribute to an escalation of prices in recipient localities by increasing demand for commodities and services beyond existing supply, a phenomenon observed in Cape Verde (Góis 2019:33). In general, remittances can act as a sort of “co-insurance” that allows households in the country of origin to withstand financial hardships exacerbated by life events such as illness, deaths, unemployment, ageing, and other factors (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:25). Some basic opportunities that households may not have had enough income to invest in prior to having received remittances include education, health care fees, debts, and childcare (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:25).

While research shows that remittances are mostly used for basic necessities such as emergencies (30%), home purchases (21%), education (15%) and medical expenses (14%) – social projects (13%) and productive activities (3%) are also important (Ceschi 2019:25). In addition to remittances, migrants frequently contribute to their countries of origin through more structured business and private investment. As cited in the Austria Common Home study, an association called ALODO - Helping Hands, created by migrants from Togo, has invested in the water supply infrastructure and the construction of schools (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:40). In cases such as these, investments and economic contributions may overlap with or become part of co-development projects carried out in conjunction with local NGOs in countries of origin or with diaspora organisations. Most of the national Common Home studies cited examples of migrants engaging with business networks or developing entrepreneurship projects in their countries of origin, investing both individually and collectively. The Austrian study describes the results of a study on investments by migrants from India, the Philippines, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Ukraine which showed that many migrants invest in property or businesses in their countries of origin to maintain their social and business networks or provide support to family members (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:29).

Entrepreneurship and investment projects from migrants in their countries of origin often have crucial social components. For example, female migrants from Cape Verde to Portugal, called rebidantes have formed a transnational social community and business network, going back and forth between the two countries to sell Cape Verdean products in Austria and mass consumption goods from Austria in Cape Verde. A related project in Portugal, called Dias de Cabo Verde was designed to strengthen ties, foster communication and share knowledge between professionals in Cape Verde, institutions and diaspora members (Góis 2019:34-35). The Austrian study cites the example of Joadre, an organisation formed by a Nigerian migrant woman, with the goal of linking African entrepreneurs to the global fashion industry (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:29). Another example of migrants sharing skills with people in their countries of origin is found in a study of Egyptian migrants to Austria, many of whom used YouTube videos, workshops, lectures, and other mediums to share information regarding entrepreneurship and political action (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:25).

The Czech study notes the existence, since 2005, of the Czech-Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry which is involved in facilitating investment and development activities in Vietnam (Jungwirth 2019:26). Another interesting Austrian example is the Association of African Students in Austria (VAS), already mentioned in Chapter 2 (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:50). This support network for African students in Austria not only assists them in their integration processes but also encourages entrepreneurship in the countries of origin by providing networking and organising events, including through the African Diaspora Youth Forum in Europe (ADYFE). One of the objectives has been to transfer knowledge and to support students in their efforts to benefit from integration in Austria and, if possible, to support their country of origin. ADYFE, in collaboration with the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the Austrian Economic Chamber (WKO), supports entrepreneurs accessing quality jobs, trying to enhance entrepreneurship, and promotes joint activities between African, Diaspora and European companies.

23 Eurostat (2018b) indicates that nearly 60% of total out- and inflows in personal remittances in 2017, like in the previous years, went to/came from EU Member States, i.e. EU-28 residents predominantly (but not exclusively) remit among themselves.”
3.4.2. Social remittances, international development and socio-political engagement

In addition to financial contributions, migrants also provide vital social contributions to their countries of origin. Social remittances generally include “ideas, behaviours, identities, and social capital” exchanged between communities in different countries as well as “any opportunities arising from relationships between individuals” (Kratzmann and Harrl 2019:29). Due to the knowledge, extended local contacts, and networks of diaspora communities in countries of origin, they can typically identify local opportunities and initiate development processes directly. Migrants are thus not only important economic agents but also part of a crucial exchange of social investments, in both an individual and a group capacity. Migrants often operate through more or less formalised diaspora/migrant organisations. Unlike more recent countries of immigration, the ‘older’ EU Member States, such as Belgium, Germany and Italy have quite a rich history of such active diaspora engagement resulting from successive waves of immigration. These sorts of diaspora contribution to developing countries (of origin) has been well documented.

The Austria Common Home study cites the case of the Austrian-Ugandan Friendship Association where a schoolteacher shared her knowledge of didactic methods she had gained in Austria with her friends in Uganda. Another migrant from the same group helped his agricultural community back home by discussing his knowledge of new farming developments (Kratzmann and Harrl 2019:29). Somali diaspora groups in Sweden instead work on projects involving healthcare, sending equipment, building capacity and skills training, providing drought relief, performing crisis mapping work, aiding job creation, fighting for equality between men and women, and raising awareness of good governance practices (Lappalainen 2019:39).

The Solidarco Health Insurance Scheme is an experimental transnational social protection scheme that positively impacts the well-being of migrants’ relatives in countries of origin (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:53). Solidarco is a joint venture between the Congolese diaspora in Belgium and a Belgian Mutual Fund called Solidaris. Solidarco is an insurance scheme by which Congolese migrants residing in Belgium can purchase health insurance for up to seven relatives residing in Kinshasa against payment of a premium of €30 per month. While the payments are made to a European-based insurance company, health services can only be enjoyed by non-migrants in the destination country. To this end, the insurance company signed an agreement with local health centres in Kinshasa that are funded by the insurance company to provide basic health services to non-migrant family members at no extra cost to them. This scheme, which initially received funding from Belgian authorities as part of its development policy, was designed with two objectives in mind. First, it aimed at providing a solution to non-migrant family members who had no or limited access to healthcare in the country of origin. Second, and most importantly, it aimed to reduce financial hardship on the immigrants themselves. Indeed, health...
expenses of relatives in the country of origin are by definition unexpected and can be very high when relatives live in a country with a limited public health system and where patients often have no insurance and pay providers from their pocket when they need healthcare.

The Dutch Common Home study highlighted the “Work in Progress!” project, an alliance initiative between migrant organisations, the IOM, various NGOs in the Netherlands and local organisations in Somalia, Egypt and Nigeria (IOM 2017, as cited in van Reisen et al. 2019:40-41). This three-year programme, funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, prepares young people with training and provides small and medium business enterprises with business development services so that the business can grow and provide more jobs for the unemployed youth. In Somalia, they have set up a centre where unemployed youth can interact with experts from the diaspora in the Netherlands. They can obtain career advice and gain entrepreneurial skills to start their own businesses.

Some development projects spearheaded by diaspora groups are labelled ‘co-development’ projects and are completed in conjunction with other development actors or with the support of host country states. In Italy, since the early 2000s, there have been various co-development initiatives sponsored by the Italian IOM branch, Italian Cooperation, civil society organisations, and local authorities, all with the aim of engaging with diaspora members for development projects, mainly relevant for Africa (Ceschi 2019:26). An interesting example of such an approach was the partnership established between an association of Burkinabe migrants and an Italian company in the framework of a co-development project in Burkina Faso (Ceschi 2019:36). The migrant association, jointly with an Italian agricultural machinery company based in the same Italian locality, developed a pilot programme of rural intervention in Burkina. These types of projects are promising because they seem to project a win-win scenario. On the one hand, migrants benefit from additional funding, technical expertise and material means. On the other hand, companies are granted access to new markets and benefit from institutional and informal support provided by the diaspora infrastructure. The partnership has also led to the implementation of other co-development and socially responsible actions. Although these projects and practices are still in their infancy, and need to be evaluated carefully, they hold significant development potential.

In some cases, migrants help to shape social values and norms in their countries of origin. The Belgian Common Home study notes the example of Latin American female migrants becoming the main providers for their households and sending money back to their families in their countries of origin, thus helping change the traditional narrative of the man as the primary breadwinner (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:33-34). In another example of changing societal views, a migrant from Morocco incorporated his knowledge on climate change into agricultural projects he completed in his community of origin, thus helping the community fight against climate change (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:34).

Migrants also contribute to and influence the political life of their home countries, often advocating for increased recognition and support for other migrants abroad. Entrepreneurship and investment projects initiated by migrants in their countries of origin often overlap with charity work or advocacy for human rights causes. In the case of Joadre, its founder, Joana Adesuwa Reiterer, launched a project in Vienna called ‘NGO Exit’ as well as the NAWA festival both of which are initiatives to combat the trafficking of African women and to raise awareness of its occurrence (Kratzmann and Harrl 2019:29).

The Swedish study highlights the example of the Kurdish Human Rights Committee which advocates human rights in Iraq (Lappalainen 2019:39). The Dutch study mentions the case of the Afghani diaspora group, “Foundation SAN” which sends translated copies of the diary of Anne Frank to Afghanistan as well as aiding the country’s reconstruction efforts (van Reisen et al. 2019:27).

The Belgian Common Home study discusses the activism of Kurdish migrants who protested in Brussels against events that negatively affected the Kurdish community in Turkey with the intent to influence European foreign policy regarding these issues (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:36). Similarly, Congolese migrants in Belgium have been advocating for the advancement of human rights and democracy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for many years. Formed with the support of Belgian officials, the inter-Rwandan Dialogue and other reconciliation projects were launched by Rwandan diaspora members in Belgium (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:36). In the Czech Republic, a number of Ukrainian migrants participated in the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution and local associations collected money for their cause (Jungwirth 2019:26). Diaspora members can also influence the political views of their family members and friends in their countries of origin. For example, Cape Verdean residents with family members working in Portugal indicated in a survey that they had stronger preferences for high levels of political accountability than other Cape Verdeans (Gois 2019:35).
This section provides an overview of the main challenges and obstacles to realising migration's contribution to the development of countries of origin and achieving sustainable development outside of Europe. The first section focuses on the barriers and challenges limiting the impact of European ODA and development policy in promoting sustainable development outside Europe. The second section focuses on the barriers and challenges limiting the maximisation of the benefits of migration for the development countries outside Europe. Both sections focus on challenges that are primarily related to EU and Member States’ policies and practices.

3.5.1. How EU and Member States’ policies and practices negatively impact sustainable development outside of Europe

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is the main tool through which the European Union and its Member States can foster sustainable development outside Europe via international cooperation. The present sub-section outlines the main issues and barriers that threaten the role and objectives of European ODA and development policy and practice in general. These include: 1) insufficient, inflated and diverted aid; 2) the mainstreaming of migration concerns in development policy; 3) the lack of coherence amongst other EU and Member States’ policies and their negative impact on third countries; and 4) the problematic role of the private sector in development processes.

3.5.1.a. Eroding the role of ODA in promoting sustainable development: insufficient, inflated and diverted aid

Recent studies and reviews have highlighted a number of issues of concern regarding the quantity and quality of European ODA. These include insufficient ODA allocations – still far from reaching the 0.7% commitment; the persistence of inflated aid spending, and the diversion of aid from ‘real’ development purposes. The latest data, released in April 2019, confirmed that the EU and its Member States combined are still the largest ODA providers in the world. The average contributions of Member States amount to 0.47% of the EU Gross National Income (GNI), more than double the 0.21% average of non-EU members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (European Commission Press Release 2019b). Nevertheless, with the exception of Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, EU Member States have not yet matched the UN recommended ODA target of 0.7% of GDP/GNI – a reality that is noted with particular concern in several Common Home studies. They have also fallen short of the recommended allocation (0.2%) to least developed countries (LDCs) (CONCORD 2018b; OECD 2019b). An overview of 2018 levels of ODA provisions is shown below.
Unsurprisingly, the geographical distribution of Member State development aid is greatly uneven and found to be dependent on the political priorities of each Member State. Between 2004 and 2007, the EU enlarged with 12 new Member States – the vast majority of which were comparatively poor by EU standards and with no tradition of being aid donors, which therefore reduced the EU’s capacity to meet its 0.7% ODA target. All of the EU-12 post-2004 Member States, as well as some older EU Member States (such as Italy and Greece) have been unable to reach these targets, even before the financial crisis of 2008-09. Historically, Italy has provided very low levels of development aid contributions (OECD 2019b). An overview of 2018 levels of ODA provisions is shown below.

2018 (provisional data)
Source: GMPA using Eurostat (2019h) provisional data for 2018. The EU-28 aggregate refers to the ODA provided by the EU and its Member States ‘EU collective ODA’.
In addition to the quantity of ODA, quality is also a major issue. CONCORD (2018b) makes a distinction between inflated and genuine aid, which excludes debt relief, in-donor refugee costs, imputed student costs, tied aid and interest repayments. According to its estimates, ‘inflated aid’ in 2017 represented 0.09% of EU-28 GNI. Should this trend continue unabated, CONCORD estimates that the EU-28 will only reach the 0.7% target in 2057. The inclusion of in-donor refugee costs refers to the practice of EU Member States to count the cost of domestic refugee processing and support as part of development aid. CONCORD maintains that “labelling these kinds of expenditure as ODA is misleading, given that they provide no resources for developing countries and are not linked to the core purpose of ODA – which is to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries” (CONCORD 2018b:62). In the case of Germany, CONCORD (2018b) shows that Germany reached the international target percentage in 2016 only because of inclusion of refugee costs amounting to 25% of the ODA, ironically making Germany the largest recipient of its own ODA. Several Common Home studies cite concerns regarding their governments attributing expenditures for refugee resettlement and asylum costs to development spending even though these funds are expended entirely within the country (for domestic expenditure). The Netherlands Common Home study identifies a similar trend in ODA spending, stating that “this sharp increase of ODA expenditure in 2014 and 2015 can be ascribed to the increase in costs spent on refugee reception inside the Netherlands” (van Reisen et. al. 2019:39).

Tied aid – the practice of providing “official grants or loans that limit procurement to companies in the donor country or in a small group of countries” also contributes to inflated aid (OECD n.d.). Tied aid is problematic because it limits the recipient countries’ procurement choices, potentially impairing the ability to procure services or good of better quality or at more competitive prices (OECD 2019a). The proportion of total ODA that was untied increased from 41% in 1999-2001 to 79% in 2018 (OECD 2019a). Following the 2001 OECD Recommendation and the Accra and Busan Untying Commitments, the OECD reports that aid has been progressively untied for LDCs, to the extent that member countries reported that, on aggregate, 91% of aid was “untied” to those countries (OECD 2014). However, “a very high share (often over 75%) of contracts (volume and/or value) awarded to donor suppliers has been a persistent feature for some donors such as Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Korea, United Kingdom and United States” (OECD 2014:5).

Figure 22. Genuine, inflated and total ODA in in EU-15 countries as percentage of GNI, 2017 (in 2016 constant prices)

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on CONCORD (2018b:13).

25 According to OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) rules, resources spent on supporting refugees arriving in the donor country can be treated as part of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the first 12 months of their stay.
The diversion of aid — the practice of allocating development funding to objectives unrelated to development principles — is another issue affecting quality of ODA provided by both the EU and its Member States. Over the past few years, the increase of ODA spending on migration management (see the following section) and security-related projects has raised concerns regarding its added value to sustainable development. In itself, security spending is not problematic, inasmuch as, in line with Agenda 2030 and specifically with SDG 16 on peaceful and inclusive societies, strengthening "security that safeguards personal safety and protects from physical threat or fear of physical threat is vital for everyone, including people living in developing countries." (CONCORD 2018c:2).

However, evidence of donor spending shows that, within this domain, ODA is being increasingly used to tackle mainly those security issues that impact European immediate security such as preventing and combating terrorism and extremism, and preventing migration to Europe. This is in clear opposition to the pursuit of a development agenda in line with local partner priorities. Even more worryingly, taking advantage of greater flexibility under OECD-DAC reporting rules, this has resulted in EU donors funding programmes and projects of dubious development value such as the strengthening of military capacities, security and police forces in countries with poor track records on human rights, good governance and democratic accountability.

In parallel, a greater share of ODA is allocated to countries and regions within the European neighbourhood and/or of geopolitical strategic importance such as Morocco, Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Tunisia, Serbia, Ukraine (just to name a few) (CONCORD 2018c). In contrast, ODA to LDCs remains well below historic levels — when ODA to LDCs peaked in 2010, it represented only 32.5% of total ODA or 0.10% of their combined GNI (OECD 2019b). In the past few years, only a handful of donors have prioritised LDCs, whereas most of the EU Member States tend to focus primarily in the EU’s neighbourhood. For some countries, such as Austria, France and Germany, only one or two LDCs have been on their list of top 10 ODA recipients (CONCORD 2018c:19).

Similarly, countries such as the Central African Republic, or the Democratic Republic of Congo, who have experienced dramatic (internal) displacement and humanitarian crises and where conflict, violence, political instability constantly threaten human security, do not receive the same level of attention and support from EU donors (CONCORD 2018c). More generally, funding for peace and security programmes in countries not affected by conflict are regularly under-funded (Lazell and Petrikova 2019). This so-called security-development nexus, or ‘securitisation of aid’ (Brown and Grävingholt 2016), feeding on political pressure from European Union Member States, is likely to intensify both nationally and at the European level in the coming years. Since 2017, the new European Consensus on Development has included state security as an objective of development cooperation. It remains to be seen if and how such an objective can be compatible with the overall aim of promoting sustainable development.

Ongoing discussions on the MFF 2021-2027 have also raised additional concerns regarding the future of ODA in European policy. Besides the mainstreaming of migration (addressed in the section below), the NDCI as proposed by the Commission includes other components that further compromise aid effectiveness (ECDFM 2019; ECRE 2019; PICUM 2018). One of the key features of the new MFF is its aim to allow for more flexibility. While enhanced flexibility is required in the next MFF, it could jeopardise development objectives, as flexible and swift programming could create negative side effects in some countries such as the reduction of democratic scrutiny and accountability and limit ownership of development priorities by developing countries thereby jeopardising the long-term nature of European Financial Instruments for short-term priorities. Similarly, while the unification of several financial instruments with different objectives into one — the NDCI — is a positive step to simplify the complex management of the EU budget, it could mean that development resources are skewed towards other priorities. Although the European Parliament’s amendments to the Commission’s proposal have made important contributions toward keeping the NDCI’s primary aim of poverty eradication in line with the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, the political environment suggests that future negotiations might still compromise sustainable development.

26 On the one hand, reported ODA spending on conflict, peace and security (CPS) activities remains overall limited – in 2015 it accounted for just 1.6% of the EU-28’s total collective aid budget. On the other, CONCORD suggests that these figures do not reflect the growing importance of those policy priorities for the EU and its Member States. The low number can be explained by the under-reporting on the side of the donors (enabled by lack of transparency and accountability in the reporting process). These figures, moreover, do not include funding for humanitarian interventions or military and security spending (not part of ODA which is much harder to track) (CONCORD 2018c).

27 Among other provisions, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa supported a number of security related projects in the Sahel region in Africa. Those included, for example, a €29 million project in Mali – supported by the European Union Capacity-Building Mission (EUCAP) and implemented by France’s technical agency – to build the capacity of Malian security forces in combating terrorism and organised crime. See Laudel and Petrikova 2019, and CONCORD 2018c).

28 Eligibility criteria for ODA in the framework of the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation’s (OECD’s) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) only allow limited spending for peace and security activities, and in any case justify ODA spending on security and military activities only when there is a clear development purpose. Nevertheless, a 2016 revision of DAC rules resulted in the expansion of ODA eligibility for new areas of intervention related to peace-building such as capacity-building of state security actors (in the context of preventing violent extremism), financing of military equipment and services (when used for humanitarian or development purposes), development-related training of military personnel (for example on human rights), and costs related to civil policing. Similar discussions have taken place at national and EU level regarding the admisibility of military funding as part of ODA, most recently with respect to the ‘Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace’ (I4SP).

29 As the national level, CONCORD identified a similar trend in countries such as Germany, UK, Italy and France (CONCORD 2018c). For example, CONCORD noted how the UK, via its Conflict, Security and Stability Fund, channelled development aid to governments responsible for serious human rights abuses. In addition to funding Ethiopia’s security forces, projects also included the training of Bahraini police in crowd control techniques as well as support to Egypt in the areas of policing, criminal justice systems and treatment of juvenile detainees (CONCORD 2018a).
3.5.1.b. Eroding the role of ODA in promoting sustainable development: the pitfalls of mainstreaming migration concerns in development cooperation

In addition to the above concerns, the role of development assistance has been eroded by the gradual mainstreaming of migration considerations and priorities in European development cooperation. These considerations have been translated into three main types of measures: 1) the linking and partial subordination of development programmes to the ‘root-cause’ approach; 2) the inclusion of migration management measures in development cooperation; and 3) the use of migration conditionalities in international agreements as conditions for disbursing aid or providing technical assistance to developing countries. All these trends are problematic because they undermine the role of ODA in promoting sustainable development in countries and regions outside of Europe. As summarised by CONCORD (2018c:7), “instead of aiming for development as the overall objective, this new approach means to serve the interests of donors to impede immigration, through a combination of development work and migration-management interventions.”

First, ODA is being increasingly used (or at least presented) as an instrument to reduce migratory pressure from the African continent. As already discussed, although a mainstay of European (and African) development policy since at least the 1980s and 1990s, the ‘root-cause’ approach underwent a profound transformation during the 2000s and 2010s, where the ‘root causes of forced displacement’ were gradually replaced by the ‘root causes of (economic) migration’ (Carling and Tälleraas 2016). This important shift has also implied a change in the mode of European intervention. If forced displacement was typical in situations of conflict, violence or natural disaster, and therefore required emergency humanitarian interventions, migration responded to a much broader variety of factors and situations and could be addressed via development assistance. This understanding has informed policies such as the Cairo Plan (2000), the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (2006), the Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration (2006), and the Joint Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (2007). More recently, the Valletta Plan and the EU Trust fund for Africa (2015), as well as the Partnership Framework (2016) have integrated this understanding, however adopting a broader and more security-focused approach (‘root causes of irregular migration’).

As already discussed, the assumptions underpinning the ‘root-cause’ approach are problematic. Unlike the more direct relation between immediate insecurity, conflict and displacement – where humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and/or conflict prevention can have a direct impact in mitigating forced migration, there is no direct link between underdevelopment and migration, or between development and a lack of migration. Migration is often one strategy among many for people to cope with poverty, inequality, lack of social and economic opportunities, crises, protracted conflicts, violence, persecution, corruption, and climate change. There is no proven correlation between poverty eradication and the reduction of migration and, therefore, poverty reduction is not in itself a migration-reducing strategy. Therefore, the expectation that ‘real’ development policies may simply contribute to reducing migration from particular countries, especially in the short term, is in itself flawed.

So far, linking development policies and actions to the root-cause approach has not radically transformed its objectives in practice. For example, recent reviews of the EUTF have shown that, with some exceptions, the instrument has funded sound development programmes on topics such as employment-creation, food security and nutrition, as well as conflict prevention. Moreover, much of the funding went to finance programmes in Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Nevertheless, as CONCORD (2018c) and several others (Bartels 2019; Kervyn and Shilhav 2017; Castillejo 2016; Koch et al. 2018; Kipp 2018) suggest, such an approach remains of great concern because it opens the door to donors undermining the independence of the development agenda for years and decades to come. In fact, “the purpose of aid and its impact can be distorted when it is subject to the home affairs agenda of the donors, contradicting the poverty eradication objectives stated in the Lisbon Treaty and the development effectiveness principle of ownership” (CONCORD 2018d:8).

Depending on whose political interest prevails, aid may be directed towards those development programmes and policy areas most likely to yield (quick) returns in mitigating migratory pressure rather than to those most reflecting the broader needs of local communities. Many EUTF projects seem to oppose the basic principles of development aid since they neither align with local needs and priorities, nor adequately include local actors, nor have fully transparent project sections and include only limited monitoring and evaluation processes (Bartels 2019; CONCORD 2018a; ECA 2018; Kervyn and Shilhav 2017). A related concern is that regions and countries that are not strategic for migration reasons – either as countries of origin or as countries of transit – may be penalised in the allocation of development funding, even though they are part of the group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (Carling and Tälleraas 2016; CONCORD 31 Bartels (2019) found that African partner countries received only 13% of the total funding for EUTF projects whereas development aid agencies of EU Member States themselves received 37% of allocations, and international organisations, particularly IOM, obtained 32%.

30 CONCORD (2018a) provides examples of development programmes focused on job-creation and targeting specifically young males (more likely to migrate), to the expense of other programmes and other social groups (including women).

31 Bartels (2019) found that African partner countries received only 13% of the total funding for EUTF projects whereas development aid agencies of EU Member States themselves received 37% of allocations, and international organisations, particularly IOM, obtained 32%.
Such an approach would not reflect the objectives of the Agenda 2030, incorporated by the EU in its new European Consensus on Development (2017), and its ‘leave no one behind’ principle. Even more importantly, this combination of migration-development approaches appears to be in stark contrast with the development priorities of African countries which tend to shy away from embracing a root-cause approach and insist on pursuing poverty eradication as the main objective of development cooperation.32

Second, and potentially even more problematic, migration management measures have become an integral part of European development cooperation policies and actions, in contrast with the latter’s development objectives. Under the EUTF (European Commission Press release 2015), a relatively limited number of projects - less than 20%, according to recent data - have been funded with the purpose of containing and preventing irregular migration and enhancing effective returns (see figure 22 below). A significant share of EUTF resources have therefore financed valuable projects supporting humanitarian protection, resilience of vulnerable populations (including refugees and IDPs) as well as access to food and basic services in a number of countries in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa regions (Kervyn and Shilhav 2017; European Commission 2018h). However, the funding of security-oriented projects on migration via the EUTF remains nonetheless problematic. While it may be legitimate for EU institutions and Member States to pursue these policy objectives in the context of their foreign policy agenda – the architecture of the EUTF itself allowing for (limited) flexibility33 – it is nevertheless difficult to justify and sustain its inclusion as part of development policy. This is all the more problematic for programmes on fighting irregular migration and smuggling, on enhancing return border management capacities, and promoting readmission and return, for which there is no clear development added value. The tendency to shift policy from the traditional ‘security-development nexus’ to a ‘security-migration-development nexus’ has implications for the organisation of EU actors as well as the perception of developing countries, inasmuch as the “EU is modifying an existing partnership around one element – migration – that did not constitute the primary field of cooperation in the past” (Cuny 2018:3). Beyond the EUTF, it is clear that, in light of recent transformations in the architecture of EU external action - with the streamlining of EU external policy objectives as per Article 21 TEU and the creation of the EEAS - development policy and the EC’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are going to increasingly encroach upon each other (Broberg 2018). While this may be a positive development on a certain level - with CFSP contributing to the pursuit of development cooperation objectives - in practice leaves development instruments and actions open to being instrumentalised for other, more pressing CFSP concerns (CONCORD 2018c; Broberg 2018).

Figure 23. Distribution of EUTF funding by objective (updated until August 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Funding (£)</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addressing the root causes of migration</td>
<td>1,621,387,06</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection and humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>595,356,00</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight against irregular migration and trafficking in human beings</td>
<td>501,498,927</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns</td>
<td>289,800,000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advancing legal migration</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (transport, technical support, etc.)</td>
<td>18,900,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bartels (2019)

32 This diverging approach is evident from a comparative analysis of the European and ACP mandates for the negotiation of the new EU-ACP partnership agreement. (Council of the European Union 2018a:Title IV; ACP Group 2018). Moreover, a review of the literature identifies the following African development priorities: agricultural production and food security; access to basic services such as safe drinking water, electricity, health and education; expanding African trade; employment opportunities; and managing debt and mobilising resources (African Union Commission 2018; African Development Bank Group n.d.; World Bank n.d.; Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings 2019; Wilke and Simmos 2015; SDGC/A 2018:6).

33 As of August 2018, the funding of the EUTF included 89% of financial contribution by the European Commission and 11% by EU Member States. Within EC funding, 71.4% came from the EDF (under DG DEVCO), 7.9% from the DCI (DG DEVCO), 5.7% from the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) (DG NEAR), 2.5% from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) (DG HOME), and 1.3% from Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO) (Kipp 2018).
Moreover, the inclusion of such actions within a development framework creates conditions for disparity of treatment across regions. For example, there seems to be quite a discrepancy between the range of EUTF projects funded in the Horn of Africa, which largely focus on development and protection measures, and those in the Sahel, which include a larger share of projects devoted to return and border management (CONCORD 2018a). Programmes in countries such as Niger (Molenaar, Tubiana and Warin 2018), and Sudan (Henry 2017) have come under increasing public scrutiny because of the Union’s and its members’ ‘realpolitik’ of disregarding blatant human rights violations committed by the local governments - towards both migrants and refugees and the local population and civil society - in order to secure cooperation on migration. Even more controversial has been the financial and operational support to Libya by the European Union and its Member States, particularly Italy (Amnesty International 2017). The combination of measures, part of which are funded under development instruments and implemented by IOM (EU-IOM Joint Initiative 2019), include: capacity-building of the Libyan national coast guard and other relevant agencies for the purposes of fighting irregular migration and targeting criminal networks; improvement of human conditions in detention centres; supporting development of local communities; and promoting information and outreach campaigns targeting migrants in Libya European Commission (n.d.s.). Controversially, €46 million of ODA under the EUTF was allocated to support the Libyan Coast Guard, aiming to prevent migrants from leaving the country and entering the EU via the Mediterranean (European Commission Press Release 2017b). Such a move is problematic in terms of sustainable development not only because it diverts aid from its main purpose but also because it may lead to Europe supporting, and practically enabling, human rights violations (Human Rights Watch 2019b; United Nations Security Council 2017). Moreover, due to Libya’s continuing volatile situation, the obvious risk is that EU actions are not effective, and principles of development aid cannot be upheld (CONCORD 2018a).

Equally controversial would be the proposal, which has so far found no support amongst North African and Sub-Saharan African countries, to set up regional disembarkation platforms or ‘arrangements’ to process migrants rescued in the Central Mediterranean Sea (Council of the European Union 2018b; European Commission Press Release 2018b). Such a system, if realised, would not only result in the outsourcing of Europe’s protection obligations to third countries (as discussed in Chapter 2), but also undermine the right of asylum altogether should participating countries be unable or unwilling to set up and maintain effective protection systems.34

Currently, the more general risk is that this approach – a combination of migration-oriented development measures and migration management – becomes a mainstay of Europe’s overall approach to migration and development. Ongoing negotiations on the next European Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF), and particularly on its Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), point in this direction. The NDICI is inherently a development instrument but its regulation, as proposed by the European Commission, lacks a clear and visible commitment of the EU to implement the SDGs. The draft regulation, despite alluding to important development goals in its recitals, does not include sustainable development, the SDGs, ODA commitments, and poverty reduction in the objectives. It rather allocates 10% of the NDICI to migration (mainly to address the root causes of irregular migration), which can be considered as excessive given the assumption that development would reduce migration remains contested, and that migration and border management are already amply

34 For more information, see Caritas Europa’s position paper on disembarkation mechanisms (Caritas Europa 2018b).
covered by other MFF financial envelopes (ECRE 2019). Furthermore, the draft regulation also includes conditionality based on migration under the geographic pillar, meaning that part of the actions funded under the geographic programme should be allocated based on partner countries’ performance on migration management.

Third, aid is de facto being increasingly leveraged by the Union and its Member States to secure the cooperation of third countries on aspects of migration management they would be most reluctant to support, such as border control and return and readmission of irregular migrants (Koch, Weber and Werenfels 2018; Bartels 2019). This practice not only undermines the foundation of an equal partnership based on and trust mutual interest but also dramatically weakens partner countries’ ownership of development policies. Recent migration ‘comacts’ signed between the EU and Senegal (Bernardini 2018), Mali (Cuny 2018) and Niger (Tubiana, Warin and Saeneen 2018), have all included substantial development aid packages in exchange for cooperation on restricting people’s mobility along the migratory routes, for example, by tightening border checks and surveillance or by confiscating means of transport of smugglers, and on readmitting their nationals or third country nationals who transited through their territory.

As CONCORD (2018a) notes, the quid pro quo on migration and development is not always explicit in European cooperation with third countries, and Member States themselves are divided regarding the usefulness of leveraging aid in order to ‘better’ manage migration flows (Collet and Ahad 2017). Researchers have also pointed out that, while conditionality may have a strong symbolic value – and sometimes even create legal obligations for countries – they are in practice quite difficult to enforce and still depend upon continual political will on the side of third countries (Holland and Doigde 2012). This becomes evident when assessing progress of EU-African cooperation on migration management (Collet and Ahad 2017). For example, while leverage to secure restrictions of mobility along the migratory routes seems to have been partly successful, at least in Niger, very limited progress has been made on securing readmission agreements. Nevertheless, judging from recent EU policy, migration conditionality are likely to continue being an important feature of European cooperation with third countries. For example, in 2017, the new European Consensus for Development emphasised the importance of “applying the necessary leverage by using all relevant EU policies, instruments and tools, including development and trade” to manage migration (Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission on the New European Consensus on Development, 2017). More recently, the 2018 EU directive outlining the Union’s vision for the new EU-ACP agreement, reiterated the EUs willingness to leverage development, trade as well as visa policy “to achieve measurable results in terms of stemming illegal migration and returning irregular migrants” (Council of the European Union 2018a:22).

3.5.1.c. Eroding the role of ODA in promoting sustainable development: the lack of coherence amongst other EU and Member States policies and their negative impact on third countries

In addition to development cooperation, a range of EU policies on trade, agriculture, tax regimes, military and security, environment and asylum can all contribute to harming the pursuit of sustainable development for countries outside Europe. Such policies can easily come into conflict with development policies and undermine the positive role played by ODA and development cooperation more generally. Moreover, in certain cases, these policies can contribute to exacerbating the conditions - such as wide social and economic inequalities, conflict, and climate change - that drive forced migration and displacement.

In terms of the trade and migration relationship, analysis tends to focus on whether migration benefits trade internationally or in receiving and origin countries. Answers point towards migration mostly benefiting trade and both complementing each other (Rapoport 2016). This dynamic has been underlined in most of the national Common Home studies, including Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, and Sweden. The Dutch study (van Reisen et al. 2019), for example, highlights the example of Ghanaian entrepreneurs boosting bilateral trade between Ghana and the Netherlands, while the Slovak study reports the case of migrants from Macedonia and Afghanistan to show how migrant entrepreneurs “set up national and multinational companies in a variety of sizes and help develop transnational or bilateral relations, including trade” (Letavajová and Divinský 2019:30). Despite this positive effect, there is an observed tendency for opening countries to trade while closing

35 Asylum and Migration Fund, Integrated Border Management Fund, Internal Security Fund and the funds for the European Border and Coast Guard, which combined amount to nearly €35 billion – a 300% increase compared to the last MFF.
36 As of September 2019, the EU has signed 17 readmission agreements, mostly with countries within the European and Asian regions. This list, with the exception of Cape Verde, includes no African country (European Commission, n.d.c.).
it requires higher investments, even though investment overall moving investment away from Least Developed Countries, as countries (Marchand 2017). There is also a tendency of programmes that address poverty and inequality in recipient reforms necessarily lead to an increase in investment in social not necessarily the poorest, there is a lack of evidence that trade (cf. Chapter 1); 2) it presumes that boosting trade will reduce poverty and inequality, which, as previously explained, is not always the case; and 3) just like for ODA, it accepts that good trade relationships foster a decrease in migration flows when in fact the opposite tends to happen (Campaniello 2014).

Ignoring a very complex system of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors underlying migration and its relationship with trade policies – coupled with lack of coherence in policies – has led to unintended consequences, such as in the case of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). There are instances where a developing country’s exporters of agricultural commodities protected by the CAP can still face tariff barriers to access EU markets leading to added migration pressure (Matthews 2015). Also, EU tariff protection, limiting EU farmers’ export potential under CAP, has also been said to increase migration pressure in developing countries (Matthews 2015). However, literature on how trade can affect migration is still somewhat underdeveloped when compared to research on how migration affects trade.

As part of the effort to increase coherence between development policies and trade, the so-called ‘Aid for Trade’ (AfT) agenda has been put in place to create conditions for countries to be able to benefit from trade opening, reflecting ‘the realisation that, for developing countries, the necessary investments are particularly large, and the capacity to meet them is particularly small’ (Stiglitz and Charlton 2006). Currently around 30% of total ODA is spent annually on trade at the global level and the EU is the world’s biggest supplier of AfT (WTO n.d.). There is, however, scant evidence that aid for trade is working. Besides mostly targeting the active population and not necessarily the poorest, there is a lack of evidence that trade reforms necessarily lead to an increase in investment in social programmes that address poverty and inequality in recipient countries (Marchand 2017). There is also a tendency of moving investment away from Least Developed Countries, as it requires higher investments, even though investment overall is increasing (UNCTAD 2016). While coordination between trade policies and sustainable development policies is desirable at certain levels, and AfT has been deemed highly effective in increasing trade (OECD/WTO 2013), trade is not geared towards crisis relief or to supporting countries facing market failure, and the results on addressing in-country inequality have been mixed (UNCTAD 2019). While trade and private sector investment are necessary to curb current SDG funding gaps (European Commission 2019f), the issues involving trade, development and migration policy as described, need to be addressed in a more coherent manner in international policy-making fora.

Another emblematic example of how other European policies and practices contribute to undermining sustainable development outside of Europe is related to the tax regime. A review of the tax treaties signed between EU Member States and developing countries demonstrates that power imbalances amongst the contractors lead to more residence-based treaties, that is, to tax treaties that place too much emphasis on the taxing rights of the countries of residence of multinational companies (EU Member States), while imposing too many restrictions on the countries that are the source of those companies’ income (often developing countries) (Hearson 2018:3). Acknowledging these imbalanced negotiations in the context of international taxation, the European Parliament has stated that the “global network of tax treaties… often impedes developing countries from taxing profits generated in their territory” (2016:AU). Accordingly, the Parliament has called on Member States to properly ensure the fair treatment of developing countries when negotiating tax treaties (European Parliament 2017). Similarly, the Commission has prepared a toolkit that incorporates recommendations in this regard, but the uptake by EU Member States has so far been minimal (European Commission 2017b).

Security and foreign policies are also areas that may have important ramifications for sustainable development in developing countries. Security-oriented actions funded under development instruments have already been flagged up as potentially problematic, especially when they exclusively reflect European foreign policy priorities and interests. While the bulk of European security, peacekeeping and military spending and operations are not financed under development cooperation, and are not therefore subject to the same limitations, it is nonetheless important to recognise the impact of this domain in potentially harming sustainable development. This has been for example the case in the Sahel region, as shown by the mixed track record of the EU’s Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP) capacity-building missions, of Member States military involvement in the region, and of the G5 Sahel, particularly with respect to their impact on local human security and resilience (Raineri and Baldaro, forthcoming; Juncos 2018). While it is legitimate for European actors to pursue policies and actions that foster their own security interests, the risk is, once again, that the latter come at the expense of the security needs of local communities in countries such as Niger or Mali (Brås 2018; Juncos 2018). Moreover, whether as part of or outside development policy, the potential human rights costs associated with strengthening military, policing and border control capacities of authoritarian states, remain a key area of concern (CONCORD 2018a; Koch Weber and Werenfels 2018). Geopolitical considerations, as well as access to strategic resources, play a large role in determining levels of military cooperation and/or involvement in particular regions, especially across the African continent - as shown by the case of Libya (Signé 2019; Jeannerot 2019).

In addition, EU arms and military equipment exports to developing countries can contribute to exacerbating or perpetuating situations and conditions that complicate the displacement of people. While in 2008 the EU Council adopted a Common Position on Arms Exports (Official Journal of the European Union 2008b) - which lays out a set of eight minimum standards “to be taken into account by Member States when assessing export licence applications for military technology and equipment, but also for brokering, transit transactions and intangible transfers of technology” (Immenkamp 2018) - arm exports ultimately remain a matter of national competence. The EU is the second largest arms supplier in the world (comprising 27% of global arms exports) (Wezeman et al. 2019). France, Germany, the UK, Spain and Italy combined are the main arm-producing countries in the Union, accounting for 23% global transfers (period 2014-18) (Wezeman et al. 2019). While Sub-Saharan countries appear to have historically received limited arm supplies from European producers (Wezeman, Wezeman and Béraud-Sudreau 2011) - with the notable exception of Italy in recent times - 2016 data show that an important portion of licences for arms exports (over 40%) was granted by EU Member States to countries in the Middle East and North Africa (European Parliament 2018c). Between 2014 and 2018, France, the third largest arm exporter, sent 28% of its exports to Egypt and contributed to 36% of Morocco’s imported arm supplies, while Germany, the fourth largest exporter, contributed to 10% of Algeria’s imported arsenal (Wezeman et al. 2019). Over the period 2014-18, the Middle East accounted for the highest growth in exports of all main European producers, with the exception of Spain (Wezeman et al. 2019:5). As highlighted in the SIPRI fact sheet, “French arms exports to the region rose by 261% between 2009–13 and 2014–18, while German, Italian and British exports grew by 125, 75 and 30%, respectively” (Wezeman et al. 2019:5). Several Common Home studies document that significant amounts of European arms, munitions and military exports are being deployed in refugee-producing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and particularly Yemen. While specific data is hard to come by, scattered evidence indicates that arms and military equipment - whether under legal arrangements or not - may end up in countries where they are used for international aggressions or domestic repression, and therefore contribute to human rights violations.

The EU’s role in contributing to climate change also plays an important role. The EU has one of the world’s worst ecological footprints and CO2 emissions per capita. The EU’s climate target to reduce emissions by at least 40% by 2030 was set in 2014 (European Environment Agency 2018). This was the basis for the EU’s position in Paris in December 2015, where the global agreement on climate was reached. Since then, a large number of legislative actions were approved at EU level. These included renewable energy sources, the emissions trading system, highly energy efficient buildings and products, standards for car emissions and emissions from fluorinated gases. The EC submitted its strategy for a climate neutral economy by 2050 in November 2018, which seeks to provide a cost-efficient trajectory towards attaining the target of net-zero emissions adopted in the Paris Agreement (Amanatidis 2019). Despite these efforts, the EU is contributing to a three-degree increase in global temperatures and the current climate policy framework is not compatible with the Paris Agreement. It is thus questionable whether the EU and other countries will meet the climate goals and targets set forth in Agenda 2030. Although a global phenomenon, climate change

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37 Those EU missions may be either civilian (EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali) or military in nature (EU training mission in Mali - EUTM). EUCAP Niger was launched in 2012 with the objective of fighting terrorism and organised crime, but capacity-building on border management and migration control was added to its mandate in 2015 (Venneti 2017; Hichoune 2016). The Malian missions were instead launched in 2015 to support Malian security forces in upholding the state’s political and social stability in light of the increasing threats coming from terrorist and insurgent groups, as well as organised crime. As with the Niger mission, migration management objectives were added to the Malian missions as well (Venneti 2017).

38 While France has substantial presence in Mali, forcing military contingents in Niger includes German, French and Italian troops (Brås 2018).

39 The G5 Sahel is an African regional body established in 2014 by the governments of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso, with the objectives of strengthening regional cooperation on security and development. Since 2017, EU institutions as well as several Member States (particularly, Germany, France and Italy) have supported - both financially and operationally - the establishment of a G5 Sahel Joint Force with the objective of stepping up military action against armed groups and transnational crime. https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/projects/eu-support-g5-sahel-joint-force (Brås 2018).

40 According to a study referring to the period 2006-2010 (Wezeman, Wezeman and Béraud-Sudreau 2011), Italy was at the time the 4th largest supplier of major conventional arms to sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa), after China, Ukraine and Russia. Countries supplied included Nigeria (which received 77% of the share of exports) as well as Namibia, Tanzania and Gambia.

41 See, for example: the video investigation by the New York Times on Italian bombs being shipped to Saudi Arabia and being used to kill civilians in Yemen (Browne, Marcolini and Tiefenthaler 2017); see also the EU-wide investigation led by Lighthouse reports, available at https://www.euarms.com
disproportionately affects people in less developed countries more severely, since developing countries have been replicating the (unsustainable) Western model of development and have fewer resources with which to adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change (CAFOD n.d.). Impacts on developing countries must be assessed and the negative externalities of EU action or inaction need to also be considered. Climate change-driven migration increases displacement, since the poorest of the poor flee natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes and slow-onset climate change manifestations such as drought, desertification or rising sea levels (ICMC 2019; World Bank 2018). According to the 2019 Global Report on Internal Displacement prepared by Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC 2019:9), in 2018 “heightened vulnerability and exposure to sudden-onset hazards, particularly storms, resulted in 17.2 million disaster displacements in 144 countries and territories,” accounting for more than 60% of all new internal displacements in the world. Such numbers are all the more worrisome because they fail to include the effects on displacement of “slow-onset disasters” such as drought, which are more difficult to measure (IDMC 2019:9). According to a recent World Bank (2018) report, it is estimated that as many as 143 million people, most of whom are in developing countries, may be compelled to leave their homes by 2050 due to such progressive environmental degradation. Generally, climate-displaced people move somewhere within their own country, often heading to urban areas, rather than crossing international borders (IDMC 2019). As a result, climate change negatively impact societal equality, damages resilience, and jeopardises peace as it exacerbates vulnerabilities among communities and between countries (ICMC 2019). Given the international community’s slow response in addressing climate change, it is expected that displacement numbers will only rise (UNHCR n.d.d; Podesta 2019).

Evidence suggests high levels of atrocities and flagrant disrespect for people’s wellbeing when it comes to land grabbing and the exploitation of natural resources (Akologo and Guri 2016; Zimmerle 2010). This happens when certain countries’ natural resources become the object of speculation and massive investments, where the land is typically owned by millions of peasant farmers, for instance, in Ghana, are then ‘grabbed’ by foreign investors and other multinationals. This very land that is grabbed is vital for the sovereignty of millions of peasants and organic producers. As governments push forward with the development of agro-industry and attempt to lure in foreign investments, the result for developing countries is the weakening of their rural economies. This typically not only impacts on the environment and natural resources in a country. But it also impacts on small-scale farmers’ ability to maintain their land, feed their families and contribute to a fair and balanced local food system (Akologo and Guri 2016). As stated in a report by FAO, IIED and IFAD on international land deals in Africa (Cotula et al.:100), “existing land uses and claims [may] go unrecongised because land users are marginalised from formal land rights and access to the law and institutions.” In addition, even in countries and regions where land is abundant, “large-scale land allocations may still result in displacement” (Cotula et al.:100). The response of decision makers and other stakeholders, including international organisations and development agencies, is the key to reversing this situation (Zimmerle 2010). Investors tend to be preoccupied with how to increase efficiency and develop their products at the expense of labour conditions or local economic development. One of the dynamics associated with this is the fact foreign investors often rely on their ability to exploit loopholes in national legal frameworks and the ignorance of communities to drive land grabbing efforts. The potential for corruption, manipulation, threats and intimidation far too often pave the way for land deals done in surreptitious circumstances.

The European Union has tried to tackle the lack of policy coherence through the establishment of Policy Coherence for Development (European Commission 2019d). However, numerous inconsistencies in interpretation and in practice have so far resulted in a rather ineffective translation of PCD at the operational level. Implementation and functioning of PCD tools is hampered by a lack of resources to strengthen inter-service coordination and insufficient technical expertise, as well as by the difficulty of measuring PCD impact due to the lack of baselines, targets and indicators (European Commission 2018). The same applies to the context of the SDGs, as the sole indicator for target 17.14 is the number of countries with mechanisms in place to enhance Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD). Similar concerns have also been raised by CONCORD which notes that only a small portion of impact assessments conducted by the European Commission to inform decision makers about the likely consequences of projects, plans, policies and regulations have adequately examined impacts on developing countries. Evaluation findings have concluded that there is no clarity or consensus among institutional stakeholders concerning the EU’s commitment towards developing countries. Some stakeholders understand that the EU has an obligation to ensure that their policies cause no harm to developing countries and bring about a positive contribution to their sustainable development. Other stakeholders consider that such an
obligation does not exist, and that PCD only implies that the EU should be aware of the possible impacts that their policies might have for developing countries without requiring them to be adapted accordingly. Furthermore, while some stakeholders interpret PCD as the incorporation of development objectives into other policy areas, others consider that PCD also means that development should contribute to support other policy areas (such as security and migration). While both the 2017 European Policy Consensus on Development (Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission on the New European Consensus on Development, 2017) and the recent Policy Coherence for Development staff working document (European Commission 2019d) highlight the need to orient development aid in line with the 2030 SDG Agenda, its partnerships and funding instruments such as the EUTF deviate from the SDG agenda and weaken PCD. In a context in which the EU’s obligations regarding PCD remain ambiguous and in which PCD is at times applied in reverse (development at the service of other policy areas) and where mobility is framed as security-related, it is clear that political will remains a decisive factor in determining the effectiveness of PCD, as defined in the Lisbon Treaty.

3.5.1.d. Eroding the role of ODA in promoting sustainable development: the problematic role of the private sector

The private sector has long been involved in development cooperation. The EU, in its new Consensus on Development (2017), has mainstreamed private sector engagement into the EU’s development cooperation policy. In this context, it also created a European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) as part of the External Investment Plan (EIP) aimed at using ODA to leverage additional private finance. The amount of EU ODA channelled through the European Commission’s blending facilities has risen over the last decade. The European Commission has given many reasons for promoting these facilities including the economic leverage being achieved, the visibility that these facilities give the EU and the dialogue and improved coordination they enable between the Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), governments, donors and the private sector. Nevertheless, whilst the private sector is a significant resource which has a very important role to play in Agenda 2030, there is so far little evidence of its much-anticipated contribution to reducing poverty and reaching the furthest behind through blended finances.\(^{44}\) The main issues of concern include: 1) a lack of emphasis on excluded and marginalised groups; 2) insufficient development additionality; 3) a lack of consideration for the development effectiveness principles (European Commission 2016f; Pereira 2017; COMECE 2017); 4) insufficient aid going to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (European Commission 2016f), and 5) an increase in tied aid (OECD 2017a).

In addition to these general concerns, it should be noted that the EU has incorporated the private sector as a key component of its ‘root-cause’ approach on migration (Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission on the New European Consensus on Development, 2017). Much of this ODA support for reducing migration to Europe is foreseen as blended finance. The EFSD (from 2021 the EFSD+) was designed in part to address the “specific socioeconomic root causes of migration...” (Official Journal of the European Union 2017:Art. 3). Both the Consensus on Development and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) make reference to the EIP as an instrument to address the root causes of irregular migration through increased employment opportunities (Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission on the New European Consensus on Development, 2017). Although not specifically mentioning blending nor the EIP, the EU Partnership Framework on Migration states that addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement will require giving a much greater role to private investors looking for new investment opportunities in emerging markets (European Commission 2014). These policies and instruments place great expectations on the ability of development aid to leverage private investment in order to boost economic growth, particularly in African countries. Some criticise a potential impetus for this may be to reduce migration. Whilst creating jobs in the African region is vital, linking such an approach to a migration-reduction strategy, especially in the short term, is likely to backfire. Moreover, without proper policies in place, economic growth benefits will accrue only or proportionately more to those already running businesses and other more privileged actors (CAFOD 2013).

\(^{43}\) Blending refers to the combination of EU grants with loans or equity from public and private financiers (European Commission n.d.a).

\(^{44}\) See, for a global overview, Chapter 1 of the ‘Reality of Aid’ report (IBON International 2018).
3.5.2. Barriers to the maximisation of the development potential of migration

The following section analyses the challenges and barriers that undermine the potential of migration to contribute to sustainable development outside Europe. Migration can be a driver of development, provided certain conditions are in place. More importantly, migration can play a very important complementing (and not opposing) role to development policy towards achieving sustainable development. The barriers identified in this section, similar to those of the previous section, mainly refer to European policies and practices; however, they also include a number of issues that are not necessarily related to a negative impact of European action. The elements described are the following: 1) Europe’s lack of commitment on opening regular migration channels from Africa to Europe; 2) insufficient progress on African regional mobility and collateral damage of EU external migration policies; 3) a lack of enabling environments in countries of origin and high cost of remittances; and 4) the limited involvement of diaspora/migrant groups in development.

3.5.2.a. Europe’s lack of commitment on opening regular migration channels from Africa to Europe

The previous sections have underlined the existence of an asymmetric partnership between the European Union and African countries. The diversion of aid, the emergence of migration control priorities, the inclusion of migration conditionalities are all trends that signal the predominant role that Europe still retains in shaping the orientation of EU-African cooperation. In particular, the inclusion of EU objectives on tackling irregular migration, both through a root-cause approach and migration management is in opposition to the perspective of African countries, for whom migration – as opposed to forced displacement – is seen as a potential opportunity for their social and economic development and should be facilitated (Tardis 2018; Knoll, and Weijer 2016). Return and readmission are a clear case in point of these diverging interests between EU and African partners. While increasing returns of irregular migrants is one of the main priorities for the EU and its Member States, it is generally not the case for origin countries in Africa, which benefit from financial and social remittances of their nationals abroad and the engagement of their diaspora. For this reason, in addition to regional integration, the long-standing priority of African countries has been the expansion of regular migration channels to Europe, especially for employment and study purposes (African Union Commission 2018; African Development Bank Group n.d.; World Bank n.d.; Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings 2019; Wike and Simmos 2015; SDGC/A 2018:6).

As discussed in Chapter 2 and in previous sections, while the EU has the legal competence for cooperating with third countries on migration and on certain aspects of visa policy, in practice this depends on the willingness of Member States to open new migration channels to Europe (van Ballegooij and Thirion 2019). The resistance of Member States, in the current political climate, to engage in this domain has, on the one hand, limited the concessions that the European Commission can offer to partner countries. On the other, it has also pushed the EC to think of alternative ways of convincing Member States to expand regular migration channels, especially by making the offer of legal channels of migration conditional upon cooperation on border management, readmission and return (Weinar 2017).

In theory, the aspiration to facilitate African-European mobility and open regular channels of migration has been a constant feature of joint declarations and plans (Weinar 2017). It has featured prominently in the framework of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), the regional dialogues, and more recently as a key component of the European Agenda on Migration, the Valletta Plan, the EUTF for Africa and the future Post-Cotonou EU-ACP partnership. Since September 2017, in an effort to push Member States to engage in the process, the European Commission has also committed itself to coordinating and financing a scheme of pilot projects on labour migration. As part of such a scheme, EU Member States (on a voluntary basis), would receive from third countries “a certain number of migrants coming through legal channels, in particular including for economic purposes” (European Commission 2017c:19). While the participation of EU Member States would be entirely voluntary, the participation of third countries would be conditional upon “the quality of the partnership on migration management and the level of concrete cooperation on combating irregular flows and readmission of irregular migrants.” (European Commission 2017c:19).
Despite Europe’s rhetorical commitment, in practice, very limited progress has so far been made on this front at the European level (Bartels 2019; CONCORD 2018a; Knoll and Cascone 2018; Koch et al. 2018; Carrera, Geddes, Guild, and Stefan 2017). Tunisia and Morocco, the only two African countries (together with Cape Verde) to sign Mobility Partnerships, have since 2013 and 2014 obtained only modest visa facilitation for students and business people (Limam and Del Sarto 2015; European Commission n.d.b.). More recently, a number of pilot projects have been launched between a few European countries (Belgium, France, Lithuania, Italy) and selected African countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Nigeria). The scope of projects remains fairly limited, as they generally target no more than 20-40 people at the time and in some cases do not go beyond professional traineeships;45 moreover, they are quite costly in terms of the infrastructure and resources required for implementation (Hooper 2019a).

Concerns also exist regarding the actual social protection and labour rights guarantees that participants in such a scheme would be entitled to, especially since projects differ in terms of contract obligations and conditions as well as length of stay (van de Pas 2018). Moreover, except for the Nigeria-Lithuania project, and in spite of the EU’s encouragement to consider establishing partnerships with countries such as Guinea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Niger, Senegal or Ghana (ICMPD n.d.a), no projects have yet targeted Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the use of regular migration channels as direct leverage to extract concessions on security-oriented measures reflects, once again, the deeply asymmetric partnerships between the EU and its African counterparts (Weinar 2017; Limam and Del Sarto 2015). Finally, another issue would be the high operational costs of such partnerships, particularly for training. Such costs would appear to be justified in a prospect of long-term employment of the third country nationals by European employers, but much less in schemes of temporary or circular migration (Hooper 2019a).

3.5.2.b. Insufficient progress on African regional mobility and collateral damage of EU external migration policies

Intra-African migration can be an important enabler of economic development in the continent. For example, in the Côte d’Ivoire, immigrants are estimated to contribute up to 19% of the GDP (OECD/ILO 2018a), and in Ghana, the contribution of immigrants to the government’s fiscal balance exceeds the contribution of the native-born population (on a per capita basis) (OECD/ILO 2018b). Recent publications further corroborate that intra-African migration is a catalyst for economic growth by, for example, boosting trade, fostering wider livelihood opportunities for migrants, and leading to both higher expenditures on education and better attainment outcomes (UNCTAD 2018).

As described above, the African continent has a relatively well-developed system of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) which aspire to guarantee, for citizens of their Member States, visa-free right of entry, right of residence and right of establishment. To date, ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA and IGAD have adopted free movement of people protocols – the EAC addresses the same issue in its common market protocol. The ECCAS, AMU and CEN-SAD similarly include provisions for free movement of people, capital and the right of establishment in their respective establishing treaties. Overall, however, much remains to be done, even amongst the RECs that have made the most progress (Chetail 2019). ECOWAS has so far completed only the first of two phases, and still needs to implement the right of establishment (Abebe 2017). The ECCAS protocols on the free movement regime have been weakly implemented. Other RECs such as AMU, CEN-SAD or IGAD lag further behind because protocols have not yet entered into force – in some cases lacking sufficient ratifications. Finally, the realisation of free movement in COMESA, ECGLC, and SADC is stalling due to a variety of reasons including a lack of political will on the side of African countries, limited actual economic integration, political instability and a lack of resources (Chetail 2019). While these shortcomings are the product of a variety of factors, it is important to recognise that the EU may also play an important role in facilitating progress on regional integration, especially as the Union contributes funding and technical assistance to African RECs via the European Development Fund (EDF).46

Besides technical assistance, however, the EU is impacting regional migration in other less positive ways. As already mentioned, the European Union and its Member States

45 See, for example, the case of the “Mediterranean Network for Training Orientation to Regular Migration (MENTOR), which saw the participation of 20 young moroccans and Tunisians in a professional traineeship scheme in Italy, under a multi-stakeholder partnership that involved employment agencies as well as government institutions at municipal and national levels in the different countries. For more information, see (Comune di Milano n.d.)

46 Under the current (11th) EDF cycle (2014-2020), approximately €3.3 billion (or roughly 11% of the total EDF budget) have been allocated to regional programmes to support, among other priorities, regional economic integration (Herrero and Gregersen 2016).
See, in particular, the statement delivered Felipe Gonzalez Morales (UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants) following his visit to Niger in October 2018 (OHCHR 2018). The rapporteur and limited access to education can also discourage migrants from investing in their countries of origin or engaging with local actors (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:48). Bureaucratic and structural difficulties in countries of origin further contribute to a difficult business environment in which to engage (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:41). When a country’s political and bureaucratic systems are characterised by endemic corruption, migrants can be discouraged from participating in investment or entrepreneurship in their countries of origin (Letavajová and Divíský 2019:39). Deficient social security systems may also affect the extent to which migrants are willing to consider returning to their countries of origin at a later stage in their lives (OECD 2017b). These examples highlight, once again, the importance of pursuing sustainable development as a key objective to maximise the development potential of migration, which cannot be used as a stand-alone solution.

High transaction costs are a key barrier that prevents the impact of remittances from being fully realised. Although some people physically board planes in order to bring money back to their families, factors such as restrictions on how much money may be brought into another country pose a problem for migrants who want to send substantial remittances to their country of origin (van Reisen et al. 2019:36; Góis 2019:49). In an effort to eliminate these barriers, the United Nations has stated in Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 10.c that transaction costs for remittances should be less than 3% and that costs exceeding 5% should be eradicated by 2030. Recent data, however, show that the rates are still high in sending remittances from many countries (see figure 24 below). Based on a review of the literature, De Bruyn (2017:22) found that causes include: “insufficient transparency of the remittance market; limited competition and insufficient inclusion of new [financial] actors... due to monopolies and regulation frameworks; low integration of receivers of remittances in the formal financial system; inadequate recognition of transnational character of migrant and diaspora [groups]; [the] socio-economic situation [and legal status] of migrant or diaspora [groups].” Costs usually include both the fee and exchange rate margin collected by the transmitting agency and “the combination of fees (including charges from both the sender and recipient intermediaries) and the exchange rate margin typically eats up fully 7% of the amount sent” (Cecchetti and Schoenholtz 2018). The Netherlands study also highlights the Eritrean government’s illegal tax on migrant remittances as an example of the difficulties in reaching this goal (van Reisen et al. 2019:36). Bureaucracy and corrupt governments in countries of origin can also act as significant barriers to the impact of remittances (Letavajová and Divíský 2019:39).

Evidence from the Common Home studies tends to support these claims. Social and political instability make it difficult for migrants and diaspora communities to maintain contacts with their countries of origin (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:40; van Reisen et al. 2019:35). Unemployment, unstable currencies and limited access to education can also discourage migrants from investing in their countries of origin or engaging with local actors (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:48). Bureaucratic and structural difficulties in countries of origin further contribute to a difficult business environment in which to engage (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:41). When a country’s political and bureaucratic systems are characterised by endemic corruption, migrants can be discouraged from participating in investment or entrepreneurship in their countries of origin (Letavajová and Divíský 2019:39). Deficient social security systems may also affect the extent to which migrants are willing to consider returning to their countries of origin at a later stage in their lives (OECD 2017b). These examples highlight, once again, the importance of pursuing sustainable development as a key objective to maximise the development potential of migration, which cannot be used as a stand-alone solution.

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Non-productive uses of remittances serve as an additional barrier that limits their impact (De Bruyn 2017). Family pressures and limited social expectations regarding how remittance money should be spent can limit their impact (Ceschi 2019:25). Additionally, migrants may make investments in their countries of origin that are underutilised. In the Slovenia study, the example of migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina building family houses in their countries of origin is cited but in many cases the houses remain empty as social connections in the old country grow weaker and migrants choose to focus on their lives in their new country (Zidar 2019:25). Together with challenges such as corruption and problems with bank transfers, the Slovakia study also identifies migrants’ “disagreement with the values and social order” of their countries of origin as a barrier to contributing to development impact through remittances, stating that people in the countries of origin may be distrustful of nationals who live abroad (Letavajová and Divinský 2019:39). On a larger scale, remittances have the potential to affect the social or political climate of the migrants’ country of origin. For example, the Sweden study mentions the possibility that remittances can “contribute to increased conflict” in countries in unstable situations (Lappalainen 2019:40). The Portugal study notes that a so-called “dependency effect” may be created through remittances which could inhibit their positive effect (Góis 2019:58). This dependence on remittances might reduce, in some cases, the incentive of a migrants’ family members to pursue education and work (van Reisen et al. 2019:27).
3.5.2.d. Limited involvement of diaspora/migrant groups in development: between exclusion and lack of professionalisation

Diaspora and migrant organisations can be important actors in contributing to sustainable development outside Europe by participating in development policy-making and work on the ground. Nevertheless, in spite of the diversity among Europe’s diaspora, until now they have often been absent or underrepresented in such processes. Member States are often cautious about with whom and with which countries of origin they wish to collaborate and the end result is simply less engagement and fewer co-development partnerships between state authorities and migrant and diaspora organisations. Many countries simply do not have a policy framework for working with diaspora and lack tools for engagement. While co-development has a lot of potential for benefiting countries of origin as well as destination countries, there are often obstacles associated with the process of engaging in co-development projects with diaspora/migrant organisations. For example, the Belgian Common Home study notes that local projects face the challenges of limited institutional and financial capacity at the municipal level (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:58). In the Italian context, emerging partnerships with NGOs, diaspora associations, and other development actors have been limited by the change in political focus and the shift of a migration narrative towards the migration-security nexus, which is tied to initiatives that do not emphasise co-development (Ceschi 2019:26).

The Belgian and Italian studies also draw attention to limited capacities and a lack of professionalisation as important factors undermining the presence of migrant organisations in development discussions. Small-scale organisations face several obstacles in the form of lack of time, skills and resources to explore fully their potential as co-development actors or to explore the situation in the country of origin. Although migrant and diaspora organisations are involved in various development activities, their projects are often limited in scope due to restricted capacity and funds. For example, the Austria study states that "low institutionalisation levels" and the informal and volunteer-based nature of such organisations lead them to be under acknowledged in the world of development actors (Kratzmann and Harl 2019:41). The German study raises the point that volunteer-based organisations face the challenge of continuity and may struggle to involve younger generations in their work (Fleischer 2019:33). Small-sized migrant organisations, especially, can be short-lived (van Reisen et al. 2019:28). Measuring the impact of organisations’ contributions and becoming trained for specific projects are additional challenges faced by these organisations (Göis 2019:48).

A lack of support in the destination country for diaspora organisations, as noted in the German study, exacerbates the capacity challenges such organisations face (Fleischer 2019:33). In some cases, this lack of support is tied to the political landscape. In the case of Austria, statements from political actors emphasising that migrants should be investing in Austria as opposed to their countries of origin have caused some diaspora members to be "reluctant to engage in development activities" (Kratzmann and Hartl 2019:42). In Italy, negative attitudes towards migrants and an increasingly nationalist political discourse contribute to a similar reluctance and a lack of opportunities for migrant and diaspora organisations (Ceschi 2019:23). Country policies do not always support collaboration or co-development initiatives with migrant and diaspora organisations. The Italian study observes the lack of "specific national and local policies supporting the professionalism of organisations or their political inclusion in consultative bodies and civil society structures" (Ceschi 2019:23). Even in cases where there may be resources available from the government, migrant and diaspora organisations do not always have adequate information regarding funding availability (Fleischer 2019:33). As noted in the Belgian study, another factor that prevents diaspora organisations from making large-scale development contributions may be unstable situations in their country of origin (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019:11).
3.6. Policy and practical opportunities in realising integral human development in countries of origin and outside Europe

The following section presents opportunities for achieving sustainable development outside Europe and maximising the benefits that migration brings to communities in countries of origin. As above, the section on opportunities is divided in two: 1) opportunities ensuring EU policy and practices contribute to sustaining sustainable development outside Europe; and 2) opportunities maximising migration’s development potential in countries of origin.

3.6.1. Opportunities ensuring EU policy and practices contribute to sustainable development outside of Europe

The previous section outlined a series of problematic issues hampering the role of ODA in promoting sustainable development. These included: insufficient, inflated and tied aid; the mainstreaming of migration objectives and policies in European development policy; the lack of coherence between European development policy and various other European internal and external policies and the problematic role of the private sector. The following sub-sections look at the potential of several policy frameworks and practices to address these issues: 1) Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); 2) Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD); 3) the EU-ACP negotiations for a new partnership and the new MFF; and 4) virtuous practices in private sector engagement.

3.6.1.a. Strengthening the role of ODA in promoting sustainable development: Implementation of Agenda 2030 and of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

The UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda encapsulates the contemporary global opportunity to advance development cooperation, assistance, and renewed partnership to achieve material development, enabling integral human development for all. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) individually, and in the full Agenda, offer the opportunity to follow a globally agreed, universally applicable common approach deriving from the principle of universal human rights and standards. The Sustainable Development Agenda principle of ‘leaving no one behind’ provides the opportunity of a fundamental guiding principle for partnership policies of the EU and its Member States with African and other partner countries to achieve the goals and targets of the Agenda. The SDGs offer the opportunity to align all national and European ODA with principles and practices demonstrated to support sustainable development. Realising this opportunity, however, depends on promoting – and supporting through development cooperation – the implementation of all goals and targets.

The Common Home studies make particular reference to the Sustainable Development Goals, especially relative to enhancing peoples’ livelihood security (SDG 1, 2, 6, 11, 13), access to basic services and income (SDG 3, 4, 8), decent work for all including migrant workers (SDG 8), gender equality (SDG 5), and peace (SDG 16) as well as industrial development and infrastructure (SDG 9) and reducing inequality within and among countries (SDG 10) in both domestic and international dimensions. As it should be clear from this non-exhaustive list, the Agenda refers to all major dimensions affecting sustainable development and, therefore, has the potential of influencing all major policy areas discussed in previous sections: development, trade, security, climate change, and migration. Since their adoption in 2015, national governments, international organisations and supra-national institutions (including the European Union - European Commission, n.d.t.), have been discussing SDG operationalisation, implementation and monitoring (European Parliament 2019b). 49 The new European Consensus on Development has explicitly incorporated the Agenda 2030 and the SDGs as a guiding framework for the EU’s development policy, therefore committing the bloc as well
as its Member States to observing its principles and reaching its objectives and targets. While this process has so far been slow, it is likely to increase more speed as key countries begin to mainstream the SDGs in their policies and action plans (European Parliament 2019c). New platforms and online tools are also being developed to support local implementation and public ownership of the Agenda 2030 and the SDGs.50

In collaboration with national governments, there is a strong opportunity for Caritas and other civil society organisations to contribute to the 2030 Agenda transformative principles as well. When it comes to the principle of ‘Leaving No One Behind’, reaching the people and communities hardest hit is at the core of Catholic Social Teaching and guides Caritas’ actions on the ground. Caritas focuses its efforts on the most excluded and vulnerable people and its potential is enormous based on the rootedness of its capillary actions on the ground. When it comes to the participation and dialogue, faith-based organisations are well positioned to allow meaningful engagement of local communities on the Sustainable Development Goals and development discussions since Caritas and other faith-based organisations are trusted and rooted in communities. Caritas has a vast network bringing in local capacity and knowledge that can support an effective response. Being a global network also implies that Caritas endeavours to apply a comprehensive and holistic approach based on input and experiences from its global partners to address the concerns of the most marginalised and impoverished people.

### 3.6.1.b. Achieving policy coherence via Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD)

The previous sections have shown the stark, and to some extent, inevitable lack of policy coherence across the various European policies that impact countries outside Europe. It also highlighted several challenges in implementing PCD. Nevertheless, Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and the more ambitious Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) have the potential of applying important correctives to this policy mix in order to ensure that the negative outcomes and consequences of contradictory objectives are at least mitigated.

Despite the challenges already outlined, PCD remains a key policy framework to pursue sustainable development both in Europe and outside. The EU has exercised a lead role on PCD in the international context and developed a series of mechanisms to create an institutional set up conducive to PCD. PCD issues are part of the regular agenda of several EU bodies such as the European Parliament Development Committee (DEVE), the Working Party on Development Cooperation (CODEV), the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the Foreign Affairs Council in Development Formation. Furthermore, since 2010, DEVE has a Standing Rapporteur for PCD. The EU has also taken other practical steps to mainstream a PCD approach in its activities such as awareness raising programmes and impact assessments. Nevertheless, for the EU’s PCD to contribute to development outside Europe and to maximise the positive synergies between migration and development, the EU’s leading role on PCD needs be not only rhetorical, but also operational. Adequate funding, sufficient mechanisms and resources for strong inter-service coordination and robust and systematic monitoring and evaluation tools to assess PCD impact are areas for practical investment that could lead to a more effective PCD approach according to Council Conclusions and observers of PCD (CONCORD 2017b; Council of the European Union 2019; European Commission 2018i.). Above all, PCD requires political will to mainstream human rights into all EU actions providing a better articulation of the nexus between migration, development and security framed in a human rights-based approach (CONCORD 2018a).

‘Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development’ (PCSD), a new policy tool developed in the context of Agenda 2030, and a sustainable development objective in itself (SDG 17.14), has the potential of complementing PCD and magnifying its positive impact. PCSD calls for pursuing coherence between the social, economic and environmental dimensions of policy with an impact in the Global North and in the Global South, with an eye on both current and future generations. PCSD is, therefore, multidimensional and strives to implement the 17 Sustainable Development Goals and their 169 sub-goals globally in a coherent manner. PCSD, however, does not make PCD redundant. PCD is an essential contribution to PCSD and has a stronger legal basis. PCD must ensure that policy coherence in the North focuses on the sustainable development of the South. In this way, PCD contributes best to the realisation of the PCSD or, in other words, to the realisation of the 2030 Agenda which, supplemented by the Paris Climate Agreement, is currently the most guiding international programme for global sustainable development. The new European Consensus on Development of 8 June 2017 also confirms this rationale, placing a strong emphasis on Agenda 2030 and the need for PCSD, but retaining PCD as an important pillar of PCSD.

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50 See for example https://www.local2030.org/ and https://sdg-tracker.org/
3.6.1.c. Strengthening the role of ODA and promoting a partnership with third countries on an equal basis: the EU-ACP negotiations for a new partnership agreement and the new Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF)

The ongoing negotiations for a new EU-ACP partnership agreement and 2021-2027 MFF are an opportunity to relaunch EU-African relations on a more equal basis. The EU-ACP negotiations are an essential opportunity to advance sustainable development and to ensure progress towards integral human development by engaging governments and other actors in development cooperation as equal partners in all aspects of dialogue, determination of aid and actions, decision-making and implementation. Hence, two central transformative principles of the 2030 Agenda should be essential components of the new Agreement, namely ‘Leaving No One Behind’ and the principle of participation (Medinilla and Bossuyt 2018). These principles should include respect for autonomous, self-determined structural, industrial, social and integral human development. Particular attention in the negotiations should be dedicated to the centrality of empowering youth, women, and families in order to build a truly sustainable future. In addition, the negotiations should increase their credibility by a stronger participation and dialogue between governments, social partner organisations (employer/public and private sectors and representative worker/employee unions), civil society organisations, youth, women, families, migrants and all those affected by the policies into the decision making process (Medinilla and Bossuyt 2018).

Long experience shows that full engagement and cooperation often presents unique opportunities to bring about success in development cooperation, particularly in realising integral human development. While policy-makers typically share these sentiments, they do not always develop the necessary procedures and practices to foster dialogue and participation, especially when it comes to defining strategies to involve those who are the most affected in the decision-making processes. Hence, ensuring an equal playing field between the EU and the ACP countries must be prioritised for the future. If PCD and the 2030 Agenda are indeed supposed to be guiding principles of the new Agreement, then rather than focusing on tackling the drivers of migration, the new partnership should fully adopt a people-centred approach and aim at tackling the root causes of poverty. Priority could be given to joint investments in education and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) programmes strengthening job opportunities and improving working conditions in the African region with a focus on rural areas and agro-business. In view of supporting the family as the basic cell of social development, tax-benefit systems and a better balance between work and family life could present important opportunities for moving forward. Furthermore, development aid should not be conditional on the cooperation of ACP countries in forced return and readmission. Rather, development aid resources should be directed to the countries and areas that need them the most, and cooperation on migration should focus on the protection of asylum seekers and on regular and safe pathways for migration (Caritas Europa 2019c; CONCORD 2019).

Another major opportunity to advance sustainable development by ensuring that poverty eradication, rather than migration control, is the main priority of the EU in the upcoming years, is the MFF 2021-2027 and, in particular, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) component of the new MFF. To ensure that effective PCD and human rights-based approaches are implemented, and that resources provided under the NDICI – inherently a development instrument – are maximised in a poverty eradication effort, it is indispensable that the EU includes a clear and visible commitment to SDGs in the NDICI’s objectives. Furthermore, to guarantee that the new MFF contributes to an environment that enables positive linkages between migration and development, it is equally important that the new framework does not perpetuate the framing of migration as a security issue and does not foresee the instrumentalisation of aid to curb migration. For example, negotiations around the new MFF should lead to the removal of negative language such as “migration crisis”, “migratory pressure” and “root causes of irregular migration” from the legislative text, and should not be based on the assumption that development aid is directly effective in reducing migration.
3.6.1.d. Private sector involvement as a support to long-term development

Without increased private sector investment to bridge the $2.5 trillion gap in development finance, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to provide the money needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals especially related to climate change. According to the European Commission, the implementation of the new European Consensus on Development is expected to gain further momentum with the future EU external financing instrument, expressly designed to support the implementation of the SDGs (European Commission 2019h:31). There is also an opportunity to use blended finance for the common good and more specifically for the benefit of the most vulnerable, marginalised groups and those furthest behind. Developed countries have promised to provide $100 billion per year for climate action in developing countries by 2020 (“Climate Finance” n.d.). There is currently a big debate over how much of the finance needed for climate action will be delivered by mobilising private finance. In its 2011 annual report, the private sector arm of the World Bank predicted that “within two decades the cost of addressing global warming in developing countries could reach $275 billion per year, an investment that will not be possible without the private sector, which is expected to pay for more than 80%” (IFC 2011:25).

Private sector financing is also essential for the creation of new jobs which are necessary to promote sustainable and inclusive economic development in the African region, one of the three strategic objectives in the Joint Communication for the Africa-EU Partnership (Arroyo 2019:5). It is also a crucial way to increase employment opportunities for Africa’s growing population as envisaged by Agenda 2063 (African Union Commission 2015). The European Investment Plan, expected to leverage over €44 billion of private investment by 2020, is set to be the main driver of this job creation. Furthermore, blended finance has enabled investment in development projects that would not have been possible through grants or loans alone. Over 75% of blending operations were in sectors such as energy, transport, and water and sanitation which, due to their project size, would have been unfeasible had they been funded by ODA alone (European Commission 2016f). Yet, such projects would neither have been possible merely through the use of private sector loans. The Commission’s evaluation of blending found that the ODA grants changed the perception of risk, encouraged contribution to global public goods, guaranteed projects with high environmental and social benefits, and most importantly, enabled market forces to reach marginalised groups (European Commission 2016f).

In addition to the political work in Brussels, the Vatican and Caritas partners have also been active in mobilising the private sector in social and development impact bonds. During the “Third Vatican Conference on Impact Investing – Scaling Investment in Service of Integral Human Development”, which took place from 8-11 July 2018 in Rome, investors, Caritas organisations and other key actors gathered to devise
strategies to invest in impact bonds to address some of society’s needs and to respond to the poor. The aim was to show that investing in people is not just morally right but can also be financially lucrative when impact bonds yield high returns on the investment (Third Vatican Conference on Impact Investing 2018). Reflections on how to engage with the private sector are ongoing within European and global society (The Spindle 2019) and reflect the desire of NGOs to establish strategic and valuable partnerships on common ground (Menden et al. 2019).

3.6.2. Opportunities maximising migration’s development potential in countries of origin.

Section 3.5.2 outlined a series of problematic issues hampering the development potential of migration. These included a lack of EU attention for African priorities on migration and development; collateral effects of EU security and migration policies on African regional mobility frameworks; a lack of enabling environments in countries of origin for investment; the high cost for remittance transfer and limited involvement of diaspora/migrant groups. In order to explore the potential of policy frameworks and practices to address those shortcomings, the next section will examine 1) the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration; 2) the Global Skills Partnership on Migration; 3) the strengthening of African regional mobility; 4) promising policies and practices on remittances; and 5) innovative projects on diaspora involvement in development processes.

3.6.2.a. Implementation of the Global Compact for Migration

The 2018 UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (UNGA 2019) – often referred to as the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) – represents another important policy opportunity for the years to come. The GCM is a comprehensive non-legally binding agreement, anchored in the current international human rights framework, which sets forwards 23 objectives to increase international governance and cooperation in the area of migration. The Global Compact aims at ensuring that migrants’ human rights are respected while tackling the challenges associated with migration in countries of origin, transit and destination. Importantly, the Compact tries to put in place the conditions that allow migrants’ positive contribution to sustainable development in line, for instance, with the target 10.7 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that seeks to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration.

The reluctance of several EU Member States’ to commit to the GCM reflects how migration has become a very political and controversial topic in national politics, and poses a challenge to GCM operationalisation, implementation and monitoring in the coming years. Nevertheless, the Compact offers a significant opportunity to improve a human rights-based governance approach to migration. Although the GCM is not legally binding and its content is not new (as it does not create new laws or standards), the human rights obligations that underpin the GCM are binding. In that sense, the GCM is a political document through which signatory states confirm that human rights are universal and that they must protect migrants’ rights. Another aspect of the GCM as a human rights protection tool is that it aims to limit the coercive dimension of migration management, especially detention (Objective 13). Beyond safeguarding migrants’ fundamental rights, the GCM is also an important opportunity to strengthen the contribution of migrants and migration to integral human development. The declaration calls for stronger recognition of the positive contributions made by migrants to the economic and social development in their destination countries (Objective 19), for the elimination of all forms of discrimination and promotion of evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration (Objective 17), and for the facilitation of mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences (Objective 18).

51 In late 2018, during the final phase of the negotiation of the draft of the Global compact, several states started raising objection against the Compact, spreading disinformation about its scope and impact. Quickly, fake news about the Compact snow-balled and interfered with several countries’ internal politics, bringing about the fall of several politicians and even governments. At the formal adoption of the GCM in December 2018, 152 countries voted in favour of the Global compact, even if several states rejected the Compact. Among them, nine EU Member states: Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland voted against, while Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia and Romania abstained, and Slovakia did not vote (Genes 2018).
Since the GCM came into force, there are still not many examples of how the GCM objectives can be implemented at a national level. One effort worthy of highlight is the National Plan for Implementation of the GCM in Portugal that builds on the objectives of the Compact and streamlines migration measures across different ministries and public policy areas, such as justice, social innovation or interfaith dialogue (Diário da República Portuguesa 2019). While this National Plan is quite recent and it is not yet clear what the concrete steps the incumbent ministries will take to achieve these objectives, it can be considered as a worthy attempt of incorporating the GCM across different sectors that impact migration and development at a country level.

Despite the GCM’s political importance, it could also lead to critical shortcomings depending on how Member States decide to implement it. The GCM attaches the same priority to all its proposed measures, which include not only reducing the vulnerabilities of migrants but also managing borders and minimising the factors that compel people to leave their country of origin. The EU priorities for the GCM’s implementation are also comprehensive in that manner (“EU input to the UN Secretary-General’s report on the Global Compact”). Although the aims of addressing the drivers of migration and irregular migration and of respecting migrants’ rights and promoting regular pathways may find reconciliation in the context of policy documents, they are hardly reconcilable in practice. With an extensive focus on border control and management, actions taken under the GCM could compromise the fundamental rights of migrants. For this reason, monitoring and the inclusion of civil society organisations will be key to ensure that the GCM implementation process is duly aligned with a human rights-based approach.52

In this context, an important venue to discuss the GCM has been, and is likely to continue to be the Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD). Established in 2007 with the objective of creating “a single, all-encompassing global forum to bring together policy makers on the two critical issues of migration and development” (GFMD n.d.a), the GFMD has since become an important forum gathering governments, as well as non-governmental stakeholders such as civil society to discuss policies and practices around the migration-development nexus. Starting with the organisation of the Civil Society Days (CSD), civil society has seen the GFMD has an important opportunity to “organise national and regional convenings, follow-up and advocacy actions to ensure that changes for migrants and migration are actually implemented on the ground” (Made Network n.d.a). Since 2011, the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) has established a GFMD Civil Society Coordinating Office and assumed coordination for the CSD, working closely with an International Civil Society Steering Committee comprising of 25 members from global civil society (GFMD n.d.b). In 2014, building on years of collaborative organising, the Migration and Development Civil Society Network (MADE) was launched. Including broad-based civil society organisations - such as members of the Caritas network - as well as migrant, refugee and diaspora organisations structured around regional and thematic hubs, MADE has since taken over GFMD-related activities under ICMC coordination. The existence of such a network has proved important in the context of the negotiations on the Global Compact for Migration (2017-18), since it supported the creation of the global Civil Society Action Committee - of which Caritas Internationalis is a member - that coordinated civil society advocacy actions and consultations on the draft. Such engagement is expected to continue in 2019 and beyond to focus on GCM implementation (made Network n.d.b).

52 In this context, the United Nations – under the leadership of the IOM - have established in May 2018 a UN Network on Migration comprising of 38 member organisations of the UN system and including all major organisations whose work relates to migration (UNDESA, ILO, IOM, OHCHR, OSRSG, UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, UNODC). In addition to supporting national governments in GCM implementation and monitoring, the UN Network also aims to involve civil society via consultations and programming (United Nations Network on Migration n.d.).
3.6.2.b. Regular channels of migration as an opportunity for mutual development of countries of origin and destination: the Global Skills Partnership

Chapter 2 highlights the role of migration, both from within the EU and from elsewhere, in sustaining the viability of European social and economic systems. The national Common Home studies, as well as European-wide research have highlighted the long-term demographic and social challenges faced by the European Union in terms of the aging population and changing modes of production. Significant labour shortages in certain European countries and regions as well as across particular economic sectors (from high- to low-skilled) already exist, and are likely to persist in the future (EIB 2016). At the same time, partly due to the reluctance of EU Member States to encourage and facilitate migration from third countries, these shortages are not being compensated by current levels of immigration to Europe (Mayer 2018; OECD/European Union 2016). The section on challenges and barriers highlights the lack of progress pertaining to expanding regular migration channels to Europe from third countries, and particularly from (Sub-Saharan) Africa. As discussed in this chapter, African countries have instead underscored the importance of facilitating migration to Europe - including “permanent, temporary and circular migration for diverse skill levels” (African Union Commission 2018:31), while at the same time expressing concern about potential ‘brain-drain’ effects (African Union Commission 2018; Kweitsu 2018). In this sense, establishing innovative schemes of international migration is likely to benefit both sides as well as migrants themselves.

The section on barriers outlined some problematic aspects of the current pilot projects on legal migration. Nevertheless, particularly in light of the current political climate across Europe and the resulting obstinacy of Member States in discussing this issue, EU-sponsored pilot projects are likely to remain the cornerstone of cooperation on regular migration with third countries. In this respect, the concept of the Global Skill Partnership (GSP) - a joint initiative of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the International Employers Organisation (IOE), and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) (ILO n.d.) - provides an innovative and perhaps useful framework to rethink these projects in order to ensure that benefits are equally shared amongst employers, migrant workers and communities in both countries of origin and destination.

A Global Skill Partnership (GSP) is a bilateral agreement designed to “channel migration pressures into tangible, mutual benefits for both a country of migrant origin and a country of migrant destination... [with the objective of] maximis[ing] the benefits of migration and shar[ing] them fairly” (Clemens and Gough 2018:1). Under the terms of these partnerships, countries of destination contribute to providing technologies, know-how and other resources to countries with the aim of building capacities and skills of people in countries of origin. These training opportunities, however, are provided both to potential migrants as well as to non-migrants, thus generating an increase in local human capital that can benefit the local economy as well. With this approach, countries of destination are given the opportunity of attracting workforce matching exactly the needed set of skills,35 with the additional advantage that training costs outside of Europe are lower. Accordingly, employment agencies and trade unions on both sides, as well as development cooperation agencies would be involved to ease skill recognition and validation of qualification after training (OECD 2018; European Parliament 2019c). For countries of origin, financial support by countries of destination contribute to easing their fiscal burden, while the broad scope of these training programmes mitigates the risks of brain drain and positively impact access to social and economic opportunities, particularly for youth.34 An important aspect of these partnerships is mutual benefit - implying that social and economic needs also need to be complementary.

The worldwide launch of the GSP in the context of the negotiations on the Global Compact for Migration has also contributed to increasing its visibility in policy circles (Clemens and Gough 2018:1; Hooper 2019b). It remains to be seen how the GSP will translate in the context of European policy and practice, especially with respect to partnerships with African countries. In that respect, select innovative European pilot projects on labour migration, while not exempt from shortcomings (see previous section), have already incorporated the main tenets of GSP.35 It also remains to be seen whether such a partnership, precisely because it is based on mutual need and compatibility of labour market, would also be possible between countries with very different economic structures and necessities (such as European Member States and several Sub-Saharan African countries). Though not a silver bullet solution to outstanding issues in global migration governance, this approach, nevertheless, provides a promising approach for the future.

53 Prior to establishing training programmes and relative economic sectors, the process requires a careful mapping of labour and skill shortages by both countries of destination and countries of origin.
54 Most of the above paragraph is based on information gathered in the context of the event “New Pathways for Labour Migration. What role for Skills Partnerships in EU migration policy?”, organised by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS 2019).
55 One of the most visible has been the Belgium-Morocco project, under which some tens of Moroccan youth are recruited for ICT professions in Belgium in the context of a larger vocational training in Morocco that also benefits people who remain in the country (Enabel n.d.).
3.6.1.c. Renewed and strengthened support to the implementation of RECs, Agenda 2063 and continental mobility

The key economic and importance of intra-continental migration, as well as South-South migration are processes rarely factored into European debates on migration and development (OECD/ILO 2018c). However, as discussed in previous sections, regional and continental mobility in Africa has the potential of making an important contribution to the sustainable development of African countries. Moreover, de facto, migration already contributes to providing livelihoods to peoples and communities engaged in cross-border trade, seasonal work and more long-term migration for employment (FAO IFAD IOM WFP, 2018). Therefore, supporting and building on existing and planned regional mobility systems, while ensuring that such systems include human rights safeguards and protections for migrant workers, presents a key opportunity for European institutions and governments to maximise the development potential of migration for the benefit of all.

The existing RECs protocols on free movement, the revised Migration Policy Framework and Action Plan for Africa (MPFA) (2018-2030) and the Free Movement Protocol adopted by the African Union Summit in January 2018 provide a clear way forward towards regional integration. However, at this stage, the main challenge in transitioning towards fully-fledged free movement regimes in Africa lies in the insufficient implementation of already existing frameworks (ECDPM 2016). Naturally, the main drive for implementing this vision will have to come from African national and supranational institutions – including the African Union, the governing structures of the different RECs as well as national governments – as well as from its civil society. Nevertheless, EU stakeholders can play an important role in supporting regional and continental integration and, more importantly, they can ensure that EU and Member States external policies do no harm to such a process (see section on barriers).

Besides freedom of movement, it will be important to ensure that regional and continental regimes include adequate safeguards for the protection of the rights of migrants and measures for their integration in receiving countries. The

56 For an innovative research project, involving researchers as well as institutions from both the Global North and Global South, see the “South-South Migration, Inequality and Development Hub” project at https://www.coventry.ac.uk/research/research-directories/current-projects/2019/ukri-gcrf-south/
57 For an in-depth discussion over African RECs, see ECDPM’s dedicated page at https://ecdpm.org/dossiers/political-institutional-dynamics-regional-organisations-africa/
3.6.2.d. Promising policies and practices on remittances

As already mentioned, SDG 10 of the Agenda 2030 includes a specific objective on reducing average costs to 3% globally. Such a target is difficult to achieve because it requires the combined involvement of a wide range of actors, including public authorities (national governments, supra-national institutions such as the EU, international organisations) as well as remittance service providers. Nevertheless, a number of policy frameworks, actions and practices on the ground show promise.

Since 2007, with the publication of the General Principles for International Remittance Services (World Bank 2007) - followed by the publication of a guidance report on the principles’ implementation (World Bank 2012), the World Bank has proposed a set of actions to make the international remittance market safer, more efficient and transparent. These principles refer to: transparency and consumer protection; payment system infrastructure; legal and regulatory environment; market structure and competition; governance and risk management; the role of remittance providers; and the role of public authorities. While public authorities are seen as responsible for designing policies supporting these principles, remittance providers can play an important role in making markets more efficient and fairer by cooperating on remittance infrastructure and competing on service provision (World Bank 2012).

De Bruyn (2017:24-30) identifies, amongst others, several policy opportunities likely to increase the impact of remittances on development: 1) the harmonisation and improvement of data collection on remittances; 2) encouraging transparency of transaction fees and dissemination of comparative information to consumers; 3) adaptation of national and regional regulatory frameworks to increase competition amongst financial service providers; 4) encouraging remittance partnerships, as well as the use of new technologies and services; 5) combining impact of remittances with state-led development funding; 6) involving diaspora groups (see section below); and 7) making remittances tax deductible.

Regarding national and regional regulatory frameworks, at the EU level, the Payment Series Directive (PSD) 2007/64/EC “provides a harmonised regulatory framework for payments and a common legal framework between the member states” (Bruyn 2017:25). While this framework leads to sufficient competition within the EU, the situation in the African context is rather different. Characterised by exclusivity arrangements and restrictions to type of institutions allowed to provide remittance services, this results in very low competition amongst providers. African regional and national regulatory frameworks therefore may strongly benefit from reform (IFAD 2017). Such a reform process has been part of the agenda of the African Union as well as of EU-ACP development cooperation for the last several years, as shown by the creation of the African Institute for Remittances (AIR) (GFMD n.d.c).

Remittance partnerships and their development are likely to make an important contribution to reducing costs of remittances. For example, since 2006, the Financing Facility for Remittances (FFR) of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) - supported by the European Union, Luxembourg and Spain - has funded more than 60 projects in more than 40 countries, “successfully increasing the impact of remittances on development by promoting innovative investments and transfer modalities; supporting financially inclusive mechanisms; enhancing competition; empowering migrants and their families through financial education and inclusion; and encouraging migrant investment and entrepreneurship.” (IFAD n.d.a). Among others, the FFR supported projects designed to involve micro-finance institutions as well as postal offices (often present in rural areas, unlike banks) in remittance provisions (IFAD 2017). Since early 2019, FFR has launched its latest initiative, the Platform for Remittances, Investments and Migrants’ Entrepreneurship in Africa (PRIME), which focuses specifically on maximising the impact of remittances in African countries (IFAD n.d.b). Finally, as already noted in several Common Home studies, the development of new technologies and services are also likely to have a positive impact. For example, the transfer of money through mobile phones has become increasingly popular, partially due to the comparative ease relative to more traditional modes of transfer (Góis 2019:49). Promising practices may include internet banking, but also collaborations of various kinds between mobile phone companies and financial institutions – although such solutions are still at an early stage when it comes to enabling transnational transactions (De Bruyn 2017).

African Union’s MPFA, which calls on its Member States to promote the “socio-economic well-being of migrants and society through compliance with international standards and laws,” (African Union Commission 2018:10) and refers to priorities such as the provision of social protection and social security benefits for labour migrants while working abroad, as well as the promotion of labour standards enforcement, provides a useful framework of reference in that respect.
3.6.2.e. Innovative projects on diaspora involvement in development processes

Over the last few years, the European Commission, and DG DEVCO in particular, have expanded their programmes and projects with diaspora/migrant organisations with the aim of understanding and improving the relationship between diaspora organisations and their countries of origin. With this objective in mind, the European Commission launched a new global programme late June 2019, known as the European Union Global Diaspora Facility. With a €5 million budget funded by the EU over a 42-month period, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) is implementing the facility with the intention of supporting governments of countries of origin and diaspora organisations to engage and collaborate more effectively with each other and with the EU (Chadwick 2018; ICMPD n.d.b). There are four components: first, a worldwide mapping of diaspora engagement in Europe; second, capacity building and technical assistance for governments and civil society to be more engaged in five regions; third, a global diaspora platform for structured dialogue with the EU (including annual fora in Brussels to gather information towards developing an online platform on capacity building endeavours, mapping results, diaspora engagement and funding opportunities); and, lastly, the creation of a roster of diaspora development experts to serve as a centralised resource (Hendrix 2019).

Caritas sees this facility as a great and long overdue opportunity for fostering co-development initiatives and recognising the contributions of migrant and diaspora organisations in the process. Numerous diaspora engagement actions already exist such as the ADEPT platform, support for the involvement of diaspora entrepreneurs in home countries (i.e. in Cameroon and Senegal), the EU Trust Fund supporting efforts in Senegal and Mali to leverage diaspora in development cooperation and in SDG implementation, as well as start-up seed funding project, for example, those supported by the French Development Cooperation (AFD). Belgium’s history of co-development policies, outlined in the Belgium Common Home study (Lafleur and Marfouk 2019), highlights that projects initiated and run by migrant organisations can be more successful if jointly supported by institutional frameworks and involving governmental and non-governmental organisations and companies in countries of origin and destination.

In addition, social remittances of diaspora members to their countries of origin often overlap with development and can contribute to the fulfillment of the SDGs. In many cases, groups focus on sending health and education knowledge and investments to their communities of origin or supporting equality initiatives between men and women and empowering women and girls (Fleischer 2019:28). Entrepreneurship and business development networks between countries of origin and destination countries is another important facet of social remittances which is exemplified by the case of the Cape Verdean migrant community in Portugal mentioned previously. Female migrants called ‘rebidantes’, venture back and forth between Cape Verde and Portugal bringing goods needed by people in the other country and have created a supportive informal business network. The project ‘Dias de Cabo Verde’ also serves to reinforce ties between entrepreneurial networks in both countries and develop joint business projects (Góis 2019:34). By creating a facility to learn about these examples and the thousands of other, a vital start can be made in creating structures that recognise migrants and diaspora communities as essential development actors.

In this regard, DG DEVCO’s involvement in monitoring and implementing actions with respect to migrant remittances and their development potential in countries of origin could further support this effort. For this, ongoing collaboration with different entities will continue, such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the African Institute for Remittances, and the Platform for Remittances, Investments and Migrants’ Entrepreneurship in Africa. Meanwhile discussions are ongoing with various regions, for example, with African partners via the EU-Africa dialogues but also with global financial institutions such as the World Bank, KNOMAD (Global Knowledge Platform on Migration and Development), CSOs and other actors interested in working on the issues are encouraged to focus on costs within specific financial corridors to have more impact (e.g. Europe-Africa corridor, or intra-Africa corridors, etc. (Hendrix 2019).
3.7. Conclusion

Chapter 3 presented an analysis on the interconnections between migration and development in the context of European external policy and EU-African relations. It began by providing a general overview of the migratory and asylum context in Africa, underlining the importance of regional migration dynamics and downplaying the importance of international migration from the perspective of the sustainable development of African countries.

The second section described the main legal and policy frameworks on migration and development, both in Europe and in Africa. Such description, in addition to reiterating the key importance of Europe as an aid provider, revealed the existence of a complex (and often contradictory) landscape of legal agreements, policy frameworks and funding instruments that have, increasingly mixed development and migration management objectives - especially since 2015 - under the ‘root-cause’ approach.

The third section examined the potential of migration to contribute to sustainable development in countries of origin, through an analysis of migrants’ financial and social contributions. Such section highlighted the important complementing role that remittances, but also softer processes such as knowledge transfer or circulation of ideas can play in fostering sustainable development in countries outside of Europe. The fourth section identified migration and development policy challenges and obstacles to advancing sustainable development externally to the EU. The first part of this section focused on the challenges that limit the added value of European ODA, including, among others, the inflation and securitisation of aid, mainstreaming of migration in development policy, the lack of policy coherence, and the problematic role of the private sector. The second part focused instead on barriers limiting the positive development impact of migration, and referred instead to Europe’s lack of commitment on opening regular migration channels to Europe, insufficient progress on African regional mobility, the lack of enabling environments (including high cost of remittances) in countries of origin, and the limited involvement of diaspora/migrant groups in development processes.

The fifth section instead underscored the potential policy and practical opportunities that may instead promote and foster sustainable development and enhance the development potential of migration. With respect to the opportunities, Agenda 2030 and the Policy Coherence frameworks, as well as the EU-ACP and MFF negotiations were identified, as well as virtuous practices in private sector engagement. With respect to enhancing the role of migration in development, the section also highlighted the potential of the Global Compact on Migration, the Global Skills Partnership of Migration, the strengthening of African regional mobility, promising practices on remittances as well as innovative projects on diaspora involvement in development processes.

Based on the above description and analysis, three main findings emerged from the data. One is in regard to the value of ODA and the concern that it is being compromised as a result of the instrumentalisation of aid and the EU’s security and migration control priorities. It is argued that ODA must be preserved as the EU and the Member States’ primary tool for addressing poverty. The second finding recognised that the integral human development of migrants and their human dignity is being compromised due to other contradictory foreign policy objectives of the EU and its Member States. Policy coherence is a necessity to address this. The third finding highlighted the potential of migration to complement sustainable development efforts. Amongst other contributions, the importance of financial and social remittances for the development of households and communities in countries of origin emerged from the data. As a result, mobility and migration need be preserved as a livelihood option for people, with the caveat that primary responsibility of the development of countries and regions should lie with states and governments. There is further detail in the next chapter on the overall conclusions and recommendations.
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS

Migration has become a deeply contentious issue in Europe. Irresponsible populist politicians, capitalising on the growing frustration of the impoverished working and middle-class, have turned migrants and their families into perfect scapegoats. As fear of migrants becomes the main driver of policies and actions in Europe, the continent risks losing sight of what migration really is: a challenge and an opportunity for all those involved (Avramopoulos 2017). It is in this context that the Caritas network has deemed it necessary to launch a renewed reflection on the complex interconnections between migration and development.

This European-wide publication has discussed the various ways in which migration and development are interconnected, both in Europe and globally. Drawing on Caritas’ perspective as a global, grassroots-based organisation primarily concerned with fighting poverty and social exclusion and promoting human dignity, Caritas has approached migration and development from two angles. On the one hand, it has analysed the extent to which migration itself does and may contribute to sustainable development in countries of origin and destination, provided the right conditions in each context are in place. On the other hand, it has examined the extent to which European and Member States’ policies and practices contribute both internally and externally to integral human development of people and to the sustainable development of countries in Europe and beyond.

4.1. Contributions associated with migration and development in Europe and overseas

The analysis of the European migratory context presented in the 11 Common Home studies and backed by additional secondary sources shows that migrants and refugees have long been important features of Europe, as European countries have experienced both immigration and emigration for centuries. In total, 60 million people, or 11.7% (of the total EU population of 512.6 million people) residing in EU Member States are considered as international migrants. According to the 11 Common Home studies, half or more of their respective migrant populations are from EU Member States. Not surprisingly, in many cases the largest numbers of migrants come from neighbouring countries. In 2015, the number of people seeking asylum in the EU-28 reached a peak and has since declined. However, it should be pointed out that the number of refugees in European countries remains very small in comparison to the frontline countries bordering Syria and Iraq as well as to worldwide totals.

Further analysis of the contributions of migration and of migrants to integral human development in countries of destination and in Europe confirms that migrants are already substantially contributing to the well-being of European societies. They make vital contributions in the labour market, sustaining the economy and creating jobs and businesses. They are often key actors in ensuring the sustainability of the welfare and social protection systems, and contribute to enriching European societies socially, culturally and politically. For many European countries of emigration, such as Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, emigrants are even making significant economic contributions elsewhere, often in other EU Member States or even in countries, such as the United States, Canada or Australia. In light of current social and demographic challenges faced by several European Member States - especially in relation to the aging population and changing modes of production, which have resulted in
significant labour shortages across labour sectors and regions - those contributions are likely to become even more vital for communities and countries in the future.1

Continued analysis shows evidence of the contributions of migration and of migrants in countries outside of Europe, i.e. in countries of origin, and stresses the importance of preserving human mobility as a relevant factor to foster sustainable integral human development. For many African countries, remittances constitute an important share of their GDP and substantially outweigh flows of development aid. The growing flow of remittances to countries of origin is being used by migrants’ households for productive activities as well as for sustaining household consumption patterns or fulfilling basic needs (education, healthcare, and food). Thus, remittances prove to be vital for the welfare of receiving households, also due to its potential to enhance their access to socio-economic opportunities and to contribute to poverty reduction. Other important contributions include knowledge transfer and the circulation of ideas and practices fostered by migrants individually and by migrant diaspora organisations; both of which play a key role in supporting development processes in countries of origin across a variety of domains. Regional mobility in African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), just like in Europe, contributes to sustaining the livelihood of communities and the viability of labour markets and economies. However, just as in Europe, it would be a mistake to assume that migration and migrants can take primary responsibility for the development of African countries and regions. Expanding now on the second angle Caritas uses to approach migration and development, the next section presents a critical assessment of what has been done and what should be done in these domains in order to create structures and policies that foster integral human development and to support the development potential of migration.

4.2. Barriers and challenges associated with migration and development in Europe and overseas

Further analysis of the 11 Common Home studies shows that a number of challenges and barriers threaten migration’s development potential and have a negative effect on the European commitment to promote sustainable development in the countries of destination. These are identified as both European and national barriers, reflective of the specificities of each Member State. Despite the efforts made, policies and practices governing the inclusion of migrants at the economic, social, cultural and political levels in European societies remain overall unsatisfactory. Whether at the workplace, at school, at the hospital or elsewhere, migrants still encounter discrimination, limited support, and restricted access to social provisions. This leads to the first main finding, consistently identified as a major concern in all of the 11 national Common Home studies:

Finding 1: A longer-term, global approach to migration is needed that includes inclusive integration models, while also taking seriously the concerns of native populations.

Promoting the inclusion of migrants and refugees through robust integration policies is essential, not only for unlocking the full potential of migration but also for pursuing a sustainable development agenda universally. While EU institutions actually have a mandate to provide incentives and to support Member State actions aimed at promoting the integration of third-country nationals (European Commission n.d.a), Member States nevertheless continue to face numerous setbacks. One major challenge is the perceived competition between marginalised local populations and the visible migrant population supposedly competing for scarce material resources. This situation is more broadly linked to structural changes taking place both in Europe and globally, from the casualisation of work and the restructuring of economic production (delocalisation, sub-contracting, etc.) to the retreat of the welfare state in many European countries. These structural changes have had devastating effects on the well-being of many Europeans, where the working and middle class of several European countries have seen their standards of living deteriorate. It is no wonder then in the current neoliberal era, where socio-economic inequalities are on the rise, welfare systems are being dismantled, and labour protection is

1 For an interesting discussion on future migration scenarios, which take stock of changing social, political and economic conditions in Europe and globally, see (Szczepanikova, Alice and Tina van Crickinge 2018).
becoming weaker, that many are tempted to see migration as the cause of these developments. Also unsurprising is the resulting consequence of the politicisation of migration in the European context and the obsession with fighting against irregular migration. Nevertheless, it is important to note that knee-jerk response is generally contributing to eroding the rights of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers as they become the easy scapegoats for all the societal ills.

For migration to truly benefit everyone, integration policies must be linked to general social and economic policies targeting the rest of the population, and particularly the most disadvantaged or newly impoverished segments of European communities. This understanding should inform a renewed discussion on the interconnections between migration and development and, more in general, on the kind of society we want for the years and decades to come. Fostering a long-term approach on the inclusion of migrants is, at its foundation, a matter of upholding basic human rights and of ensuring respect of everyone’s human dignity. Creating social and economic marginalisation, pushing people ‘outside the system’, and breeding resentment amongst newcomers contribute to eroding the opportunities associated with a cohesive society and weaken the potential of migration to contribute to the sustainable development of Europe. Moreover, strong integration is likely to yield greater returns in the long run for countries of destination and local communities, inasmuch as it may result in a virtuous circle (greater social cohesion, greater contribution to the tax system and social security, greater participation in the labour market, reduction of social marginalisation, and an enrichment of social and cultural life). Promoting an inclusive and balanced debate, which dispels harmful myths but also recognises the concerns and fears of the local population, is all the more important to counter the current toxic ‘broken narrative’ fuelled by irresponsible politicians. This alludes to a more recent and potentially very dangerous trend, which is identified as the second main finding.

Finding 2: Rising hostility towards migrants erodes social cohesion in Europe and inhibits the recognition of migrants’ contributions to countries of destination and countries of origin.

In the current polarised political climate, migrants and refugees are usually framed as a problem, either as a threat to European economy, identity or security or, at best, as passive victims in need of help, with the result that their contribution to European development is dramatically undervalued. Rising public hostility, xenophobia and open discrimination towards migrants and refugees is, unsurprisingly, eroding social cohesion in Europe, and limiting the public’s recognition of migration’s contributions. It is becoming more difficult for the public to discern misinformation from evidence-based news considering the wealth of data available and readily spread via social media. This has contributed to creating a climate of ‘fake news’ which tends to scapegoat migrants for things not necessarily even relating to them such as blaming them for society’s macroeconomic challenges. Such a climate, fuelled by disingenuous media and/or irresponsible governments and populist politicians, who are trying to gain popular support to win national and local elections, has led to an impasse both at national and European levels. Divisive rhetoric has legitimised continuous attacks on migrants’ rights, the criminalisation of solidarity, as well as discriminatory and racist policies in a variety of domains. Pro-migrant legislative actions have been effectively blocked many times – the reform of the common European asylum system and the opening of more regular channels of migration are two good examples – while also eroding existing good policies and practices on migrant integration.

The toxic mix of populist nationalist politics, negative and biased media messaging and frustrated public opinion – much of which has been hurt by years of economic crisis, neoliberal labour and social policies, and the downsizing of the welfare state – has produced a vicious circle in public debates that is difficult to break and requires a strong counter-narrative.

Consequently, it is important that the media, journalists, politicians and public figures take seriously their responsibility to contextualise migration accurately and responsibly. Promoting a more balanced debate will also depend on whether media and social media providers can also be involved in these discussions to ensure better public access to (good quality) information. It should be stressed that migrants are people and members of our communities. They should never be described in terms of numbers, figures, as ‘problems’ or as subjects in newscasts. They should be given the opportunity to speak for themselves, to voice their own stories and to present their own testimonies, while, if they wish, also engaging in policy development and in proposing solutions. It is expected that such an approach would further work to disarm populist narratives pitting poor communities against each other. In addition, highlighting publicly some opportunities associated with migration could further help.
4.2.1. External dimension with focus on Africa

In analysing the interconnections between migration and development in the context of European external policy, a specific focus was directed on the African continent and on EU-African relations. The analysis of the migratory context in Africa revealed the importance of placing the volume and scope of African migration to Europe within a wider historical context. Migration of all types has long been a feature of the continent, and most African countries are, at once, countries of origin, transit and destination. In contexts such as the Sahel, century-old patterns of pastoral nomadism and circular/seasonal migration intertwine with regional refugee and IDP escape routes as well as with Europe-bound migration corridors. While there is an important share of African migrants - mainly from North Africa - attempting to reach Europe, the majority of African migration takes place within the continent and, particularly, within sub-regions. This is also the reality of asylum, whereas Sub-Saharan African countries alone host more than 30% of the global refugee population. When it comes to pursuing sustainable development in Africa and elsewhere, numerous challenges and barriers emerged from the data that threaten migration’s development potential and have a negative effect on European commitment to facilitating integral human development in countries of origin. These included insufficient progress on African regional mobility, Europe’s lack of commitment on opening regular migration channels, the lack of enabling environments (including high cost of remittances) in countries of origin, and the still limited involvement of diaspora/migrant groups in development processes in countries of origin. The third and the fourth main findings both draw further attention to challenges related to the external dimension, first, related to the value of European Official Development Assistance (ODA) and, secondly, related to policy incoherence.

Finding 3: The value of ODA is being compromised as a result of the instrumentalisation of aid and the EU’s security and migration control priorities. Instead, ODA must be preserved as the EU and its Member States’ primary tool for addressing poverty.

Despite the multiple ways previously described about the contributions of migration to development, it would be a mistake to presume that migrants should take primary responsibility for the development of the countries and regions from which they come. It is important to approach the developmental potential of migration in a nuanced way, being mindful that the impact of migration on countries of origin can have important drawbacks such as the disruption of family unity and cohesion, the perpetuation or reinforcement of social and economic inequalities and negative interference in political affairs. Being the result of dynamics that are essentially individual or family-based, migration cannot be expected to respond to the public interest, which needs to be represented by national and supra-national institutions, starting locally. For these reasons, migration should only complement sustainable development policies and actions, which need to be designed by stakeholders in Africa or the developing regions, such as governments and local civil society actors. In this context, European ODA can provide a key source of support.

In the current political context, voices from different sides of the political spectrum have questioned the added value and relevance of ODA as a tool of European foreign policy. Yet, ODA remains the primary tool through which both the European Union and its Member States can address poverty, social and economic inequalities and climate change, which are all major issues of our time. When responding to the needs and priorities of partner countries, if channelled to relevant domains (i.e. economic sustainable development, good governance, conflict prevention, access to food security, human rights, democratisation, and so forth), and when involving local stakeholders (including civil society), ODA can in fact play a major role towards achieving sustainable development worldwide.

The challenges to achieving sustainable development focus on the barriers limiting the added value of European ODA, including, among others, the inflation and securitisation of aid, the mainstreaming of migration in development policy, the lack of policy coherence, and the problematic role of the private sector. All of this contributes to further eroding the potential of ODA in pursuing a sustainable development agenda. Additionally, development policy is increasingly being directly linked to short-term migration-reduction objectives. The anti-immigrant climate described above has likely been a key driver in this recent policy agenda of the European Union and its Member States. In particular, the Union’s preoccupation with securing its external borders, and eliminating or at least ‘containing’ irregular migration from outside Europe, seem to have overridden almost all other concerns related to the protection of migrants’ and refugees’ rights, and the preservation of development cooperation as an instrument exclusively devoted to eradicating poverty. It would be short-sighted, however, to use European development cooperation as part of a broader migration-reduction strategy. Not only is this approach likely to backfire against its stated aims but also risks undermining the potential long-term benefits of development aid. If Europe wishes to retain its global role as a value- and principle-based international actor, and ensure that official development assistance leads to meaningful poverty reduction, ODA should therefore remain a cornerstone of European external action, and it should not be influenced by other foreign policy objectives, which leads to the fourth finding.
Finding 4: The integral human development of migrants and their human dignity is being compromised due to other contradictory foreign policy objectives of the EU and its Member States.

The EU and its Member States (to varying degrees) are known to pursue different foreign policy objectives that may compromise their development objectives and contribute to harming the pursuit of sustainable development for countries and people outside of Europe. These conflicting policies (e.g. policies on trade, agriculture, climate change, tax regimes, military and security, environment and asylum) can easily compromise and undermine the positive role played by ODA and development cooperation more generally. Moreover, in certain cases, these policies and additional practices (i.e. arms sales, land grabbing, exploitation of natural resources, etc.), can contribute to further exacerbating the conditions - such as wide social and economic inequalities, conflict, and climate change - that drive forced migration and displacement, and can thus contribute to creating the conditions for increasing irregular migration movements to Europe. This is all the more worrisome in light of Europe’s lack of commitment on expanding regular migration channels, which has so far embittered relations with African partners on migration cooperation.

In terms of the trade and migration relationship, for instance, analysis tends to focus on whether migration benefits trade internationally or in receiving and origin countries. Answers point towards migration mostly benefiting trade and both complementing each other. Typically, however, countries are more open to trade than they are to migrants. Ignoring a very complex system of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors underlying migration and its relationship with trade policies – coupled with lack of coherence in policies – has led to a number of unintended consequences. Another example of how other European policies and practices contribute to undermining sustainable development outside of Europe is related to the tax regime. There is a global imbalance in international taxation negotiations, to the detriment of developing countries which are often unable to generate as much profit from taxes generated in their own territory. In an effort to address this, the European Parliament has called on Member States to ensure the fair treatment of developing countries when negotiating tax treaties.

Security and foreign policies are also areas that may have important ramifications for sustainable development in developing countries. Security-oriented actions funded under development instruments have already been flagged up as potentially problematic, especially when they exclusively reflect European foreign policy priorities and interests. Another contradiction relates to EU arms and military equipment exports to developing countries, which can exacerbate or perpetuate situations and conditions that compel the displacement of people. The EU’s role in contributing to climate change exemplifies another issue with contradictions. The EU’s climate target to reduce emissions by at least 40% by 2030 was set in 2014. Since then, a large number of legislative actions were approved at EU level. Despite this, the EU has one of the world’s worst ecological footprints and CO2 emissions per capita. Although this a global phenomenon, climate change disproportionately affects people in less developed countries, and can contribute to increasing displacement. Estimates suggest that as many as 143 million people, most of whom are in developing countries, may be compelled to leave their homes by 2050 due to such progressive environmental degradation. Ultimately, these actions are in contradiction with development objectives and they affect the livelihoods and well-being of whole communities of people living in developing countries - often for the worst. Similar repercussions are noted in relation to land grabbing and to the exploitation of natural resources. These trends and the resulting contradictory policies and actions are worrisome, because they show an utter disrespect of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and fail to put the person at the centre of the policy or to foster an atmosphere that enables and fosters integral human development.

While the EU has tried to tackle the lack of policy coherence through the establishment of PCD, numerous inconsistencies remain both in interpretation and in practice, resulting in its rather ineffective translation at the operational level. The simple result is that there is no clarity or consensus among institutional stakeholders concerning the EU’s commitment towards developing countries. A greater effort is clearly needed from the EU and its Member States to ensure that their policies cause no harm to developing countries and bring about a positive contribution to their sustainable development. In a context in which the EU’s obligations regarding PCD remain ambiguous and in which PCD is at times applied in reverse (development at the service of other policy areas) and where mobility is framed as security-related, it is clear that political will remains a decisive factor in determining the effectiveness of PCD, as defined in the Lisbon Treaty.
4.3. Opportunities associated with migration and development in Europe and overseas

Continuing the expansion of the second angle Caritas used to approach migration and development, the next section presents the opportunities that emerged from the data as a result of existing structures, policies and practices that foster integral human development and support the development potential of migration both in Europe and overseas.

There are a number of existing conventions, policies, and promising practices in countries of destination, as well as opportunities arising from multi-stakeholder collaborations and civil society engagement that signify important opportunities for migration. For instance, *Agenda 2030*, the *Global Compact on Migration* as well as the *Urban Agenda* provide useful frameworks through which civil society organisations can advocate for inclusive policies by linking migrant integration to sustainable development objectives, including the respect of human rights and human dignity. Highlighting the positive results and opportunities that come from resettlement as well as innovative private and/or community sponsorship schemes would be another important issue worthy of greater public attention. More than that, when such schemes benefit from the participation of civil society organisations (including Caritas) as well as institutional partners, they contribute to enhancing safe and legal channels for protection purposes. Another example of a general opportunity is building on existing legal frameworks and conventions for the protection of the rights of migrants and refugees. Additional opportunities associated with migration that emerged from the analysis include also the successful integration policies and practices at work, policies and practices fostering the social inclusion of migrants, projects and activities that seek to promote intercultural dialogue and understanding, and practices that foster the participation of migrants and/or of migrant and diaspora organisations in social and political affairs. All of these opportunities could benefit from greater public visibility, showing evidence of positive collaborations and successful stories as well as personal testimonies.

When it comes to the external dimension, the publication also identified **policy and practical opportunities** attributed to promoting and fostering sustainable development and enhancing the development potential of migration in countries of origin. Again, the importance of *Agenda 2030* framework emerged, as did the Policy Coherence framework and the EU-ACP and MFF negotiations. These were all identified as key frameworks for civil society and other stakeholders to advocate better quantity and quality of ODA. The *Global Compact on Migration*, the *Global Skills Partnership of Migration*, and the strengthening of African regional mobility were recognised as promising tools to enhance the role of migration in development. Some innovative policies and projects on remittances, as well as on diaspora involvement in development cooperation were also discussed. Finally, this leads to the fifth main finding and reminder for national and EU policy makers to bear in mind when devising a comprehensive approach to any future long-term migration and development policies.
Finding 5: Migration is a natural part of life. Opportunities must be assured so that people are not forced to migrate out of desperation, but rather via safe and legal channels in pursuit of their personal life projects.

Migration and mobility compose a universal feature of humanity. Since the beginning of time, people have been on the move - migrating. This is not expected to stop soon; on the contrary, greater mobility is expected in the future. Migrants are often resilient; they can make choices depending on their situations and financial means – about how to respond to life’s circumstances and decide whether, with whom and when to flee or leave their country. Having expectations of substantially affecting this process through development cooperation is only naive and likely to fail. Regardless of the efforts put in place to deter, stop, or prevent migration movements, desperate and resourceful people will find a way through the fences, and will continue to risk their lives along dangerous routes. This is one more reason why international cooperation should rather focus on facilitating regular mobility for the sustainable development of all countries. If any meaningful connection between ODA and migration is to be made, then this should ensure that development policy contributes to making migration a choice rather than a necessity – keeping in mind that, as discussed in Chapter 1, development is likely to reduce (but will never completely stop) economically-motivated migration over the long term. Thus, in order to truly maximise the benefits of international migration, regular migration should be strengthened by giving people from all skill levels, education, and economic backgrounds the chance to move in a safe and legal manner between their countries of origin and of destination.

From a legal point of view, because the EU is bound by international refugee and human rights obligations, it cannot dismiss the negative side effects of its external policies, and should ensure the respect of human rights and protection needs, while also promoting the sustainable integral human development of people in countries of destination, transit and origin.

Ultimately, the combination of these various dimensions (i.e. the internal vs. external, country of destination vs. country of origin, barrier vs. opportunity) exemplify the interconnection between migration and development - both in policy and in practice on the ground. All of the data in this publication and these findings together allude to the complexity of the so-called nexus between migration and development. Overall, the key is to create a virtuous circle on migration and development based upon the following: 1) migration is a potential opportunity for sustainable development of all countries and communities, and it needs to be facilitated with measures ensuring the dignity and rights of people on the move; 2) the development agenda should be primarily concerned with fostering sustainable development in Europe and beyond for the benefit of everyone, ensuring that migration largely remains a choice and not a desperate necessity. The findings of this publication confirm that, given the right structures and legal opportunities, states should build on the potential of migration to contribute not only to the integral human development of migrants and their families, but also to communities, as well as to the sustainable development of their countries of origin, transit and destination.

In addition to these main findings, the following section puts forward essential recommendations targeting EU level policymakers in the European Commission, Parliament and Council and where applicable, also the Council of Europe.
CHAPTER 5
RECOMMENDATIONS TO EU LEVEL STAKEHOLDERS

This section identifies essential recommendations targeting policymakers in the European Commission, European Parliament and EU Council and, where applicable, in the Council of Europe as well. These recommendations complement the numerous existing recommendations put forward by Caritas and other NGOs over the past years in relation to ensuring the dignity and rights of migrants, asylum protection standards, aid effectiveness and sustainable development principles. Caritas Europa calls on European Union leaders:

- To prioritise migration and development policies creating environments which enable people to achieve their full potential, to develop their life project, and - all in all - to fulfil their integral human development. To change the negative discourse on migration and to counter rising hostility and harmful attitudes toward migrants and migration.

- To effectively address the barriers identified in this publication that inhibit the contribution and recognition of migrants both to countries of destination as well as to countries of origin.

- To promote the factors that facilitate migrants’ ability to participate fully in society and to recognise their contributions.

To achieve this, more attention needs to be devoted to opportunities to maximise the development potential of migration and to enhance migrants’ integral human development in countries of destination as well as of origin.

1 For recommendations targeting the national level, please refer to the 11 national Common Home studies on the Caritas Europa website: https://www.caritas.eu/common-home-series/

2 Please refer to our publications and positions on the topic, such as Caritas Europa 2016b; Caritas Europa 2018c; Caritas Europa 2019c.
Caritas recommends EU policymakers:

To change the negative discourse on migration, counter rising hostility and harmful attitudes toward migrants and migration:

1. Stop linking migration to security concerns. Instead, emphasise the important role of migrants and migration’s contribution to development both in countries of origin and destination.

2. Fight against misinformation and disinformation by supporting evidence-based research and promoting an objective debate on migration and development targeting the media and wider public.

3. Humanise migration and migrants through stories and testimonies, applying a person-centred approach and making visible migrants’ many contributions to their countries of destination and origin.

4. Raise awareness about the drivers of forced migration, including causal effects of EU and Member States’ practices and policies on countries of origin, such as the consequences of arms sales, land grabbing, the exploitation of natural resources, among others.

5. Conduct evidence-based research and raise awareness via EU-wide campaigns, about the opportunities associated with migration, emphasising and recognising the many ways migrants contribute to integral human development both in their countries of origin and of destination.

6. Foster a culture of encounter and promote a positive narrative on migration.
To maximise the development potential of migration and enhance migrants’ integral human development in countries of destination:

1. Prioritise and promote rights to equal opportunities and non-discrimination, notably by adhering to existing equality frameworks\(^3\) and by finalising the EU negotiation to adopt the anti-discrimination directive to ban discrimination on the grounds of age, disability, religion or belief, among other characteristics, in all areas of EU competence.\(^4\)

2. Create structures and practices that allow and foster the full and active participation of communities in society, particularly by facilitating labour market inclusion and access to basic social and economic rights for all.

3. Guarantee an environment that fosters integral human development and that delivers and supports access to economic, social, cultural and physical materials and resources to all, including migrants.

4. Overcome the structural barriers inhibiting welcoming societies, as there can be no integration without participation:
   - Guarantee high-quality, accessible and affordable social services for all. Take into account the particular needs of many migrant women (and children), who may experience multiple risks and vulnerabilities.
   - Invest in early childhood education and care as well as family support.
   - Guarantee access to employment for all, with a particular focus on the most marginalised.
   - Promote a boost in job quality, fight labour market inequalities, and create policies to foster a social economy and to support social enterprise and entrepreneurship.
   - Ensure migrants play an active role in their own self-determination (i.e. recognising their agency to make decisions and act while also involving them in policy processes that affect them).

5. Foster structures to ensure the involvement of migrant/diaspora groups in social and political affairs.

6. Facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible mobility and enforce human rights in line with Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees.

7. Implement Agenda 2030 and the SDGs in a participatory, inclusive, transparent and universal manner, supporting the engagement of all stakeholders and, particularly, of civil society and migrant/diaspora groups.

8. Expand safe and legal pathways to Europe and link policy to practice, enabling channels for protection, employment and family reunification purposes. Foster resettlement, humanitarian admission programmes, humanitarian visas, community sponsorship, family reunification, visa facilitation for labour purposes and other mobility schemes.

9. Ensure access to asylum, meaning that asylum policies and the granting of refugee status are in line with the Geneva Convention, that the right to asylum is respected, and that the right to seek asylum in the EU is maintained.

10. Ensure solidarity and responsibility sharing among EU Member States to welcome asylum seekers in the negotiation of the Common European Asylum System, especially concerning the reform of the Dublin Regulation.

11. Promote a conducive environment to humanitarian assistance and solidarity towards migrants and stop blurring the roles of NGOs and human smugglers. Remove restrictions on civil society’s space and prevent violations of the rights of human rights defenders, including smear campaigns, threats and attacks against them, or other attempts to hinder their work.

12. Implement the ‘firewall’ principle to ensure that migrants can gain access to basic services and to the humanitarian support provided by public institutions or CSOs, regardless of their administrative status and without fear of being deported. Ensure that victims of smuggling and trafficking can access justice without fear or prosecution.

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\(^3\) This refers to directives against discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic origin, against discrimination at work, equal treatment for men and women in matters of employment and occupation, and equal treatment for men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services.

\(^4\) The European Parliament adopted the directive proposal (COM(2008)462) against discrimination based on age, disability, sexual orientation and religion or belief beyond the workplace (European Commission n.d.u) in 2009, but since then the proposal has been stuck at the first reading stage in the European Council. Currently, EU non-discrimination legislation only exists to protect against the discrimination of women, and on grounds of race and ethnicity in the labour market.
To maximise the development potential of migration, enhance opportunities for migrants to be able to contribute to integral human development and to sustainable development in countries of origin and ensure a virtuous circle between migration and development:

19. Ensure the respect for human rights is at the core of all partnerships with third countries including monitoring and accountability mechanisms. Overhaul cooperation with countries not respecting human rights and never return people to a country where they risk facing abuse or loss of life.

20. Promote external policies coherent with sustainable development and that have sufficient resources allocated to empower the most excluded. Ensure European Official Development Assistance (ODA) is used solely to tackle the root causes of poverty and the drivers of forced displacement (conflict, environmental disasters, persecution, structural inequalities, lack of good governance, etc.) and not used for purposes of curbing migration flows.

21. Ensure ODA is allocated to countries based on actual recipients’ needs and development strategies and not on the EU’s foreign policy objectives (particularly in relation to trade, taxation, security, arms exports, migration management and control, etc.).

22. Tackle the lack of policy coherence through the establishment of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and address the inconsistencies in interpretation and in practice so that it can be effectively translated at the operational level.

23. Ensure that the EU and its Member States’ external policies cause no harm to developing countries or existing frameworks of regional mobility in the Global South, and bring about a positive contribution to their sustainable development.

24. Ensure no conditionality on migration management, readmission, and (forced) return is included in new cooperation agreements and provisions being discussed by the EU, its Member States and third countries and regions (e.g. EU-ACP, NDICI).

25. Ensure equal partnerships between the EU and partner countries when setting priorities in ongoing negotiations and future agreements.

26. Ensure involvement of migrant/diaspora groups in development cooperation and transnational partnerships.

27. By 2030, reduce to less than 3% of the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%, according to SDG target 10.c.


European Investment Bank (EIB), 2016. Migration and the EU - Challenges, opportunities, the role of EIB. Retrieved September 10, 2019 from https://www.eib.org/attachments/migration_and_the_eu_en.pdf


Programmes%20in%20Europe%20-%20Expanding%20complementary%20pathway%20for%20persons%20in%20need%20of%20protection.pdf


### LIST OF ACRONYMS

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries</td>
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<td>ADEPT</td>
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<td>CELAC</td>
<td>Community of Latin American and Caribbean States</td>
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<td>CEPS</td>
<td>Centre for European Policy Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCME</td>
<td>Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe</td>
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<td>CEN-SAD</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>EU Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Common Home</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDESE</td>
<td>Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité International Alliance of Catholic Development Agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODEV</td>
<td>Working Party on Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMECE</td>
<td>Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
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<td>CONCORD</td>
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<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Comité des Représentants Permanents / Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the MS</td>
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<tr>
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<td>CSDP</td>
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<td>DG DEVCO</td>
<td>EU Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>ECRE</td>
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<td>FRONTEX</td>
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<td>GAMM</td>
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<td>GCM</td>
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<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>IBMF</td>
<td>Integrated Border Management Fund</td>
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<td>ICMPD</td>
<td>International Centre for Migration Policy Development</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRMW:</td>
<td>International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families</td>
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<td>ICSP:</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<td>ICT:</td>
<td>Information and Communications Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDMC:</td>
<td>Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre</td>
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<td>IDP:</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<td>IIEA:</td>
<td>International Institute for Environment and Development</td>
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<td>IFAD:</td>
<td>UN International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
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<td>IGAD:</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>ILO:</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOE:</td>
<td>International Employers Organisation</td>
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<td>IOM:</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>ITUC:</td>
<td>International Trade Union Confederation</td>
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<td>JAES:</td>
<td>Joint Africa-EU Strategy</td>
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<td>JLMPI</td>
<td>Joint Labour Migration Programme</td>
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<td>JVAP :</td>
<td>Joint Valletta Action Plan</td>
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<td>LAC:</td>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>LDCs:</td>
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<td>MEP:</td>
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<td>MFF:</td>
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<td>MP:</td>
<td>Mobility Partnership</td>
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<td>Migration Policy Framework for Africa</td>
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<td>MS:</td>
<td>Member States of the European Union</td>
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<td>NDICI:</td>
<td>Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<td>NGO:</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>OAU:</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA:</td>
<td>(EU) Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD:</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OECD-DAC:</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>OHCHR:</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>OSRSG:</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>PCD:</td>
<td>Policy Coherence for Development</td>
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<td>PCSD:</td>
<td>Political Coherence for Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>PICUM:</td>
<td>Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migration</td>
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<td>REC:</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<td>SAD:</td>
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<td>SOM:</td>
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<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
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<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNDESA:</td>
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<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organisation</td>
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<td>UNODC:</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>VFA:</td>
<td>Visa Facilitation Agreements</td>
</tr>
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<td>VNR:</td>
<td>Voluntary National Review</td>
</tr>
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<td>WACC:</td>
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